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71. Introduction 
1.1 Background and research objective 
Since the first exploration well was drilled on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
in 1966, both the authorities and the oil and gas industry have been repeatedly reminded 
of the high risks and the multitude of different hazards involved in petroleum 
production. The Petroleum Safety Authorities’ (PSA) safety statistics are a clear 
reminder of this: after nearly five decades of production, occupational and major 
accidents in the offshore activity have caused the death of 268 workers (PSA, 2012b). 
The majority of these happened in the period up to 1980 and culminated with the 
capsizing of the drilling rig Alexander Kielland which killed 123 workers. Since then it 
is generally acknowledged that safety has been given far more attention within the 
industry and that the risk level has gradually reduced (Kongsvik et al., 2012; Ryggvik, 
2003; Wiig, 2004). For example, the number of fatalities per 100 million working hours 
dropped from 3.3 in the period from 1990 to 1999 and to 0.5 in the last five-year period 
(PSA, 2012b).
Despite the fact that the development within the Norwegian petroleum industry has 
been considered a success (Ryggvik, 2003), accidents and near misses with catastrophic 
potential still happen, and when they do the costs could be considerable for the workers 
involved, for the companies, for the environment and for society. High potential 
incidents such as the blowout on the Snorre Alpha platform in 2004, the collision of the 
Big Orange XVIII vessel in 2009 and the well kick on the Gullfaks C platform in 2010 
are all reminders of this. Hence, there is a continuous need for improvements. Such 
improvements require knowledge, in particular knowledge about why things go wrong.
One essential source for such knowledge is investigations led by the regulatory 
authorities (e.g. PSA, 2009b, 2010a, 2011b) and in-depth analyses conducted by safety 
researchers into accidents and near misses on the NCS and other oil and gas incidents 
internationally (e.g. Austnes-Underhaug et al., 2011; Hayes, 2012; Schiefloe et al., 
2005; Sutton, 2012; Wright, 1994). What these investigations and analyses demonstrate, 
more than anything, is that accidents, even those with a relatively limited extent of loss, 
8are seldom caused by one single causal factor. Rather, it is a multitude of different 
technical, behavioural and organizational factors and the unique combination of these 
that contribute to the accident causation scenarios. The blowout on the Snorre Alpha 
platform on the NCS in 2004, which under slightly different circumstances could have 
resulted in a catastrophe similar to the Piper Alpha and Deepwater Horizon disasters, is 
illustrative of this. The causal analysis of the blowout (Schiefloe et al., 2005) concluded 
that an unfortunate combination of several different factors made the incident possible. 
Some of these were insufficient planning of work operations, extensive corporate 
reorganization, inadequate technical maintenance and a constant production pressure. 
Despite the fact that most accident investigations and analyses point to a well of 
different causal factors, some are more frequently occurring than others and are thus 
identified across different types of accidents. According to Walker et al.’s (2012) 
analysis of 108 fatal accidents and 174 high potential incidents in 75 companies within 
the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), one of the most common 
direct causes is violations of safety rules and procedures.
Walker et al.’s findings are not unique. Several other studies and accident analyses 
across a range of different industries report that procedural violations, especially those 
committed by front-line workers and others with safety-critical responsibilities, are a 
common causal factor (e.g. Austnes-Underhaug et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2011; Hudson et 
al., 1998; Lee and Harrison, 2000; Mason, 1997; Reason, 1987). Within the mining 
industry, for example, Lenné et al. (2012) have found that non-compliant actions can be 
identified as a contributing factor in 57% of workplace accidents, and within the 
aviation industry Helmreich (2000) has found that more than half of the observed errors 
that result in undesired aircraft states are caused by violations of written procedures. 
Accidents and near misses within the Norwegian oil and gas industry do not represent 
any exception to this. Violations of safety regulations have, for example, been ranked as 
the most important cause of collisions between offshore service vessels and offshore 
installations on the NCS (Kvitrud, 2011; Kvitrud et al., 2012). Also, investigations of 
accidents and near misses conducted by the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) 
9repeatedly identify a lack of compliance with rules and procedures as a central 
contributing factor (e.g. PSA, 2009a, b, 2010a, 2011a, b). In fact, it is hard to find PSA 
investigation reports that do not point to safety violations as a significant causal factor. 
The investigation of the Snorre Alpha blowout, for example, revealed that 28 different 
violations contributed to the blowout and that three of these ‘were direct triggering 
factors that caused the incident to occur’ (PSA, 2005b: 26).
Another example of an incident with a catastrophic potential is the collision between the 
well stimulation vessel Big Orange XVIII and an unmanned water injection facility on 
the Ekofisk field in 2009, where the ensuing PSA investigation report concluded that a 
lack of compliance with resting time regulations, the requirement to monitor all activity 
in the safety zone and requirements related to the safe entry of vessels, contributed 
significantly to the collision (PSA, 2009a). 
The well-recognized importance of violations as a central contributing factor to 
accidents and near misses across different industries, and the fact that this also applies 
to the Norwegian oil and gas industry, forms the point of departure for this thesis. 
However, rather than focusing on violations as a cause of mishaps and thus embracing 
aberrant behaviour as a meaningful and satisfactory explanation of bad outcomes, 
violations are primarily dealt with as a symptom and a consequence of deeper 
organizational deficiencies. Thus, this thesis aims to go behind safety violations, as 
indicated in the title. This implies that a system perspective is applied. In addition, 
violations are addressed from a different and hopefully more constructive viewpoint 
than that which is common within accident investigations and traditional safety 
research, which tends to pay more attention to conditions that hinder safety rather than 
to conditions which foster safety (Hollnagel, 2012). In this thesis this is done by putting 
more explicit focus on safety compliance rather than on safety violations. This implies 
that the main emphasis will be on acts that are in accordance with prevailing 
procedures, instead of acts that are contrary to procedures. In line with Antonsen et al. 
(2008) it is believed that addressing safety violations from such a point of view has a 
greater potential when it comes to shedding light on the conditions that can facilitate a 
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safe balance between formal prescriptive regulations and the way work is actually 
carried out. 
With a system perspective as the guiding principle for empirical enquiry, and the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry as the primary research context, the main objective of 
the thesis then is to go behind safety violations and to examine and identify the 
conditions that affect the propensity to act in accordance with prevailing rules, 
procedures and regulations. With this objective as a specified course of action, the 
empirical and theoretical work in the thesis aims to add new knowledge about the 
antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour within the oil and gas industry. Such know-
ledge is believed to be important, especially for future development of effective 
proactive measures which aim at improving safety compliance within this particular 
industry. Hopefully, it will also be of importance for other industries where safety is a 
significant concern and where rules and procedures constitute a central part of the safety 
management system. 
Such knowledge should also be a contribution to safety research and to the broader, 
more theoretically oriented sociological (and social psychological) traditions – where 
different explanations of the causal relationship between context and behaviour have 
been a fundamental topic for disciplinary debates for decades (Mouzelis, 1995). Having 
said that, it should also be noted that the research objective and the empirical research of 
the thesis are highly related to a particular sort of sociological explanation, namely 
contextual explanations. Typically, contextual explanations seek to describe the 
behaviour attached to some element (an individual, an enterprise, a group) by the 
characteristics of its environment, and not the other way around – how individuals and 
groups create the environment they are a part of (Stinchcombe, 1987). This implies that 
the empirical work primarily is focused on how environmental conditions affect 
compliance with safety regulations, and that, to a lesser extent, it is focused on how 
individuals or groups create their own norms for safe work performance (even though 
this is also recognized as an important research topic). 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. In the remainder of chapter one, the research 
questions that have been developed to shed light on the main objective will be 
presented. Also, a brief description of the research context which constitutes the 
empirical basis of the thesis will be presented. The object of the study (safety 
compliance) will be described and discussed in detail in chapter two, followed by a 
presentation of the theoretical perspective (the system perspective) and a discussion of 
previous research in chapter three. Chapter four presents a description of the research 
designs and the different research methods that have been employed in the empirical 
work of the thesis. A short summary of the research findings is presented in chapter 
five, and is followed by a discussion and conclusion in chapter six. An extended 
presentation of the empirical work and the research findings is to be found in the 
appendix, where the four research articles that constitute the fundament of the thesis are 
attached. 
1.3 Research questions 
The main objective of the thesis is relatively broad. Thus, it invites a multitude of 
different research questions with a basis in various theoretical and practical problems. In 
addition, the Norwegian oil and gas industry is not limited to one type of work context. 
Several different types of contexts exist, such as fixed offshore installations, floating 
drilling rigs, supply bases, onshore gas-receiving terminals and offshore supply vessels, 
to mention but a few. Thus, the main objective of the thesis also invites empirical 
studies of different work contexts. Further, the term ‘safety compliance’ is, in principle, 
not only restricted to individuals and individual behaviour at the front line of work 
organizations. It is also a term that is applicable to the enterprise level, since the 
behaviour of an enterprise as well as the behaviour of an individual or a work group is 
regulated by a set of national safety regulations and internal procedures. Thus, the main 
objective of the thesis also invites empirical studies of safety compliance at different 
organizational levels. 
Despite these many possible directions for empirical investigations, some boundaries 
have been set. After (1) a broad literature review which was aimed at identifying gaps 
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and promising avenues for further research in the existing research works and (2) an 
examination of relevant investigation reports and accident analyses, four distinct, but 
still complementary research questions were formulated. These four questions were 
investigated in four separate studies and the results of the empirical investigations were 
presented in separate research articles (attached in the appendix). The three first 
research questions are related to front-line workers’ compliance with company internal 
safety rules and procedures, whereas the last is related to enterprises’ compliance with 
national safety regulations. 
The first research question has its starting point in one of the few extensive review 
studies on the subject of violations and compliance, conducted by Alper and Karsh 
(2009). Based on previous research, their study identified six categories within the 
organizational context that affect the level of safety compliance among front-line 
workers: (1) individual characteristics, (2) information/education/training, (3) design to 
support worker needs, (4) safety climate, (5) competing goals and (6) problems with 
rules. Alper and Karsh’s review study is highly relevant to the topic of this thesis 
because it represents a condensed account of the conditions which previous studies have 
identified as important for workers’ propensity to act in accordance with prevailing 
safety rules and procedures. Their review is, however, based on studies within sectors 
other than the oil and gas industry, with a predominance of studies from the aviation 
sector and the health care sector. Thus, it would be valuable for the objective of this 
thesis to examine the extent to which the main findings within other sectors also apply 
to the oil and gas industry. This is done by asking: To what extent can the variation in 
safety-compliant behaviour among front-line oil and gas workers be explained by 
explanatory variables that are found to be relevant within other sectors? This research 
question is addressed in article #1. 
The second research question is related to a common topic within safety compliance 
research, namely leadership and the impact that leadership practices have on front-line 
workers’ propensity to act in accordance with safety rules and procedures. Previous 
research on this topic has primarily focused on the safety-specific dimensions of leader-
ship (e.g. monitoring, correction, and reward for safe behaviour), whereas few studies 
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have examined the more general dimensions of leadership (e.g. trust, cooperation, and 
involvement), and how such dimensions are related to workers’ compliance with rules 
and procedures (Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004). One such general dimension which is 
of particular interest is leadership involvement (i.e. the degree to which leaders are 
involved in subordinates’ work operations), and the impact that such involvement has 
on subordinates’ safety compliance. In accident investigations and analyses, a lack of 
leadership involvement in work operations is often identified as an important cause of 
non-compliance among front-line workers because it is assumed that it hinders leaders 
to reveal unsafe work practices (e.g. Hayes, 2012; PSA, 2005a). Further, safety 
management literature frequently claims that active and hands-on supervision is of vital 
importance to ensure that work is carried out in accordance to rules and procedures (e.g. 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). However, few studies have attempted to explore and test 
such claims empirically. Thus, the second research question that is asked is: How does 
leadership involvement in work operations influence safety compliance among front-
line oil and gas workers? This research question is addressed in article #2. 
The purpose of the third research question is to shed light on a notable research gap in 
safety compliance research. Whereas the vast majority of previous research has focused 
on safety compliance as a product of appropriate safety motivation and safety attitudes, 
and thus has been concerned with identifying the organizational conditions that affect 
such motivation and attitudes, this research question deals with knowledge of rules and 
procedures as an important prerequisite for compliance. Knowledge of rules and 
procedures certainly reduces the probability of unintentional non-compliance (Reason, 
1997), but few studies have attempted to investigate how organizational conditions 
influence such knowledge (Barber, 2002). Thus, the third research question that is asked 
is: How do the contextual aspects of work affect front-line oil and gas workers’ 
knowledge of rules and procedures? This research question is addressed in article #3. 
As already described, the fourth research question differs from the first three as regards 
the level of analysis. Instead of focusing on how company internal conditions affect 
individual safety compliance, this question deals with how company external conditions 
affect compliance with national safety regulations at the enterprise level. Empirically 
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speaking, however, these two levels do not function independently of each other as 
previous research has found that enterprises which have established a well-functioning 
safety management system that meets legal obligations promote safety-compliant 
behaviour among front-line workers (Torp and Grøgaard, 2009). However, whereas the 
majority of previous research has focused on safety compliance (or non-compliance) at 
the individual level and effective measures which can be taken to improve individual 
safety compliance, few studies have paid similar attention to the enterprise level. This 
implies that few studies have examined why some organizations follow safety 
regulations while others do not, and that few studies have aimed at identifying effective 
compliance-enhancing measures at the enterprise level (Baldock et al., 2006). This 
research gap is the origin of the fourth research question which turns its focus to labour 
inspections and their impact on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations. Labour 
inspections are among the most fundamental instruments applied by the regulatory 
authorities to ensure compliance with existing safety legislations. Despite that, 
relatively few studies have examined whether such inspections actually have any impact 
on enterprises’ legislative compliance. Thus, the fourth research question that is asked 
is: What effect do labour inspections conducted by regulatory authorities have on 
enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations? This research question is addressed in 
article #4. 
1.4 The research context 
The first three research questions in this thesis are all addressed on the basis of three 
separate empirical studies conducted among front-line workers employed (or hired as 
contractor workers) by one large Norwegian oil and gas company, Statoil. The last 
research question, however, is addressed on the basis of an empirical study conducted 
within the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA). Within these two 
organizations, four different research contexts have been selected for empirical studies:  
o Offshore service vessels, Statoil (research question 1) 
o Offshore platforms, Statoil (research question 2) 
o Maintenance and modification work, Statoil (research question 3) 
o Labour inspections, NLIA (research question 4) 
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Together, these research contexts provide a wide and thorough access to information on 
the subject of safety compliance. Before continuing on to the description of each of 
these contexts, it might, however, be beneficial to introduce Statoil, the main source of 
the empirical data, in brief and give a short description of the central position that 
compliance with safety rules, procedures and regulations has within this organization. 
Statoil was established as a state-owned petroleum company in 1972 after the 
discoveries of commercially profitable oil and gas fields on the NCS in the late 1960s. 
In parallel with the Norwegian oil and gas industry in general, the following four 
decades represent a history of continuous growth for Statoil. One year after its establish-
ment, the company had 54 employees, in 1977 it had 504 employees and ten years later 
it exceeded 10,000 employees (Kongsvik, 2006). In 2013, Statoil is a fully integrated 
public limited petroleum company which, after the merger with the oil and gas division 
of Norsk Hydro in 2007, employs approximately 23,000 employees. The Norwegian 
Government holds 67% of the shares. It is the leading operator on the NCS, among the 
world’s largest net sellers of crude oil and condensate, the world’s largest offshore 
operator and the second largest gas exporter to the European market (Statoil, 2013).  
The high activity level and the many potential hazards included in the activities that 
Statoil performs imply that this is a company that is exposed to a wide range of risks 
that could result in significant losses. Hydrocarbon leakages, falling objects, fires, 
explosions, loss of well control, blowouts and hydrogen sulphide emissions are all 
examples of such risks. Thus, the focus on risk management in order to ensure safe 
operations is a high priority area (Statoil, 2013).  
One important element within this priority area is the company’s compliance and 
leadership model (CLM). This model is not a short-term campaign, but a general 
description of and a written requirement for how work shall be performed within the 
company (Statoil, 2011). Like any other petroleum company, Statoil’s work operations 
are highly regulated by internal rules and procedures and CLM is a strategy 
implemented for the purpose of ensuring compliance with these. The model places a 
particular emphasis on leadership and the role that leaders have in enabling subordinates 
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to perform their work safely and in accordance with the prevailing procedures. All 
employees in Statoil, all contractors and all subcontractors are obliged to plan, execute 
and evaluate their work according to CLM (also known as the A-standard action 
pattern). CLM as such is not examined specifically in this thesis, but it is mentioned 
here just to underline that compliance with rules and procedures represents an important 
part of the system of safety barriers and controls in Statoil. The model is also illustrative 
of the fact that the company’s safety philosophy relies heavily on achieving safe 
operations through governing workers’ behaviour, as previously described in 
Antonsen’s (2009) safety culture study of Statoil. 
1.4.1 Offshore service vessels 
The first research question, concerning the relevance of previous safety compliance 
research conducted within other sectors, is addressed on the basis of a survey designed 
to monitor safety and working environment issues among employees working on 
offshore service vessels chartered by Statoil.2 The vessel fleet consists of 85 vessels 
which all operate on the NCS. Each vessel has two work shifts (four weeks on duty and 
four weeks off), so the total number of shifts within the fleet, and within the study 
population, is 170. A work shift consists of approximately 10-15 seamen. Typically, this 
includes a captain, a first officer, a second officer, engineers, sailors, an electrician and 
a steward.
Virtually all work operations conducted by the crew are regulated by an extensive body 
of regulations which includes Statoil’s company-specific procedures, the ship owners’ 
internal procedures, national and international rules, guidelines, manuals and best 
practices. This, and the fact that the risk level is considered to be high on board offshore 
service vessels (Kongsvik et al., 2012) implies that they are highly relevant for safety 
compliance research. The relevance of such research is also strengthened by the fact that 
few, if any, studies have aimed at identifying the conditions that affect safety 
compliance among front-line personnel on board these vessels.
2 The survey was conducted as a part of a larger research and development project at NTNU Social 
Research Ltd, Studio Apertura. The project was financed by Statoil Marine. 
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Three different types of vessels are 
included in the study: anchor 
handling vessels, platform supply 
vessels and standby vessels. These 
vessel types serve different functions 
on the shelf, and to some extent the 
types of risks included differ with 
respect to the vessel type. The anchor 
handling vessels’ primary function is 
to move drilling rigs from one location to another. In brief, these operations include rig 
towing, positioning, anchor lifting and seabed anchoring. Chains and wires under high 
tension represent a significant risk during anchor handling operations, and could cause 
serious harm to crew members as well as affecting the stability of the vessel. The 
capsize of the Norwegian anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin while anchoring the 
drilling rig Transocean Rather off the coast of Shetland in 2007 is a reminder of this. 
Eight seamen were lost in the accident. 
The platform supply vessels serve another important function within Statoil’s logistic 
chain. These vessels transport equipment, bulk products, hazardous chemicals and 
supplies to and from offshore supply bases and offshore installations. Lifting operations 
with cargo containers and bulk-loading hoses close to offshore installations, often under 
challenging weather conditions, represent a substantial risk of personal injuries on these 
vessels. Owing to the fact that they operate close to the installations, these vessels are 
also relatively frequently involved in platform collisions and contacts (Kvitrud, 2011). 
Such incidents have a catastrophic potential and can actually affect the stability of the 
offshore installations. 
The last type of vessels included in the study, the standby vessels, is responsible for the 
installations’ emergency preparedness in case of the need for quick evacuation. In 
addition these vessels have guard duties which involve protecting the installations from 
drifting vessels or other hazards. These vessels do also operate close to the installations. 
Standbyvesselandsupplyvesseloperatingoutsidethe
TrollAplatform.(Photo:AnetteWestgard/Statoil)
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Thus the risk of collisions is present, as is the risk of personal injuries during emergency 
exercises and real-life situations. 
1.4.2 Offshore platforms 
The second research question, which 
regards the influence that leadership 
involvement has on safety compli-
ance among front-line oil and gas 
workers, is addressed on the basis of 
a multi-sample survey designed to 
monitor effectiveness and safety in 
Statoil during the merger process of 
Statoil and Hydro in the period 
between January 2009 and October 
2010. The survey was conducted six times among all employees in Statoil, but the 
second research question is only addressed on the basis of responses from offshore 
workers employed on Statoil’s offshore platforms (i.e. onshore workers and workers 
employed outside Norway were excluded from the analysis). 
Offshore oil and gas production is a high-risk industry and the dangers of fires, 
explosions, gas leakages, oil spills, blowouts and other hazards are always present. The 
capsize of the Alexander Kielland platform on the NCS in 1980, the Piper Alpha 
disaster in the British sector of the North Sea in 1988, the Montara oil spill off the 
northern coast of western Australia in 2009, and the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010 all serve as reminders of the degree of risk related to offshore 
operations. No major accidents with loss of human lives have occurred in recent years 
on the NCS, but incidents with a major accident potential have occurred. One example 
of this is the already described blowout on the Snorre Alpha platform in 2004. Another 
example is the well control incident on the Gullfaks C platform in 2010, which, just like 
the Snorre Alpha blowout, was found to be triggered by work practices that were not in 
line with written procedures (Austnes-Underhaug et al., 2011). 
Statoil’sGullfaksCplatforminthenorthernpartofthe
NorwegianNorthSea.(Photo:ØyvindHagen/Statoil)
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Because of the high risks involved in offshore oil and gas production, particular 
attention has been paid to the prevention of major disasters and occupational accidents 
since the very beginning of this industry (Sutton, 2012). An extensive development of 
national and international safety regulations and guidelines and company internal rules 
and procedures are examples of such preventative measures (Ryggvik, 2003). Thus, 
work operations on offshore platforms today are highly regulated by procedures, and it 
is recognized that the safety level within these complex work systems to a large degree 
depends on human behaviour and adherence to safety procedures (Mearns et al., 2001). 
Therefore, this is also an industry where human risk management systems pay 
considerable attention to safety compliance. Statoil’s offshore platforms are no 
exception to this, exemplified with the already described compliance and leadership 
model. Hence, they should be highly relevant for a study which explores the relationship 
between leadership and safety compliance.  
1.4.3 Maintenance and modification work 
The third research question, 
concerning how the contextual 
aspects of work affect front-line 
workers’ knowledge of rules and 
procedures, is addressed on the basis 
of a qualitative on-site interview 
study of contractor workers from a 
maintenance and modification 
company. The specific company 
studied here is kept anonymous. It 
should, however, be mentioned that this company is a relatively large actor within the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry which carries out maintenance and modification work 
both onshore and offshore. The tasks and operations that this company performs vary 
considerably with respect to the complexity and risks involved – from advanced sub-sea 
operations, restoration of pressurized systems and large-scale modification projects, to 
simple routine tasks, such as minor repair and revamp projects. Half of the workers 
Kollsnes,oneofStatoil’sgasreceivingterminals,treats
gasfromtheTroll,KvitebjørnandVisundfieldsinthe
NorthSea(Photo:HelgeHansen/Statoil)
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interviewed perform their work on one of Statoil’s offshore platforms and the other half 
on one of Statoil’s onshore gas receiving terminals. 
At present, maintenance and modification of onshore and offshore production facilities 
within the Norwegian petroleum industry is a growing industry. This is due to the fact 
that the production facilities are ageing and because there has been a significant 
decrease in investments in new offshore installations and onshore plants. However, the 
economic margins are relatively low within this part of the petroleum industry because 
of a rapidly growing number of actors, and thus an increased competition (Sasson and 
Blomgren, 2011). 
Contract based maintenance and modification work within the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry is highly relevant with respect to safety compliance research for several 
reasons: firstly, contractor workers represent a particularly large group of workers 
within this industry. On the NCS alone, almost 70% of all offshore personnel are 
employed by contractors (PSA, 2006); secondly, contractor work in general, and 
maintenance and modification work in particular, is a high-risk part of this industry. In 
fact, contractor workers represent the group of workers that perform the most hazardous 
work operations and are most frequently involved in accidents within the petroleum 
industry (PSA, 2012a; Walker et al., 2012); thirdly, maintenance and modification 
work, both onshore and offshore, is highly regulated by a relatively extensive set of 
rules and procedures. The extent and complexity of these regulations, makes questions 
related to procedural knowledge, and the origins of such knowledge, particularly 
important. 
1.4.4 Labour inspections 
The fourth research question, which deals with the impact that labour inspections have 
on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations, is examined on the basis of two field 
experiments conducted within the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA). The 
two field experiments measure this impact by a comparison of inspected and previously 
uninspected enterprises with respect to their level of compliance with national safety 
regulations.
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The NLIA is a government agency under the authority of the Ministry of Labour with 
approximately 600 employees. The overall mission of the inspectorate is to ensure safe 
and healthy work environments and secure employment conditions by assuring that the 
enterprises comply with the existing workplace regulations. The main instrument 
applied by the NLIA is on-site inspections of enterprises which aim to control and 
enforce compliance with the national working environment regulations. Typically, some 
guidance and information is offered by the inspectors during an inspection, but four 
different coercive measures are available when dealing with enterprises that do not 
comply with the relevant regulations. These are formal orders, coercive fines, shutdown 
of operations and reports to the police. Formal orders are written orders to correct 
eventual violations within a limited time period and coercive fines could be imposed if 
the orders are not complied with. Shutdown of operations and reports to the police are 
typically imposed if the life and health of the employees are in imminent danger or in 
cases where the breaches of the regulations are serious. Formal orders represent the 
most widely applied coercive measure. Of the 15,000 inspections conducted in 2011, 
roughly 60% resulted in one or more formal orders (NLIA, 2012). 
The NLIA’s jurisdiction area is the land-based sectors of work. This implies that legal 
TwofatalaccidentsoccurredonthesemiͲsubmersibledrillingrigScarabeo8atWestconYardin
Ølensvågin2009and2011.BothwereinvestigatedbytheNLIA(Photo:HåvardSæbø)
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issues related to workplace safety and health within offshore oil and gas activity are 
inspected and controlled by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). However, the 
NLIA’s jurisdiction area, and thus the inspectorate’s labour inspection activities, 
includes several areas of work that are involved in the petroleum industry, such as the 
offshore supply bases, the petroleum plants’ mechanical workshops, the ports where 
loading/unloading of supply vessels is conducted, and the yards where maintenance and 
modification of offshore drilling rigs is carried out. Hence, a study of the NLIA’s labour 
inspections and the impact that the inspectorate’s inspections have on enterprises’ 
compliance with national safety regulations is highly relevant to a significant part of the 
oil and gas industry. 
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2. From safety violations to safety compliance 
As already described, safety violations are in the current thesis addressed from a 
different viewpoint than that which is common within accident investigations and 
conventional safety research. This is done by putting a more explicit focus on the 
counterpart of safety violations, namely on safety compliance. That is, the thesis is more 
concerned with identifying and explaining the conditions that are favourable to rule-
following than with conditions which provoke rule-breaking. This implies ‘looking at 
what goes right’ rather than ‘looking at what goes wrong’, to use Hollnagel’s (2012: 3) 
words.
Traditionally, however, safety violations have been addressed from the opposite 
position. That is, from the ‘looking at what goes wrong’ position (for some early contri-
butions, see for example Ames, 1935; Heinrich, 1931; Hersey, 1936; Karn, 1961; 
Slocombe, 1941). The fact that the current thesis takes the reverse point of view does, 
however, not by any means imply that safety violations fall completely out of scope. 
Actually, safety violations constitute the vital background and starting point of the 
thesis. It is therefore essential to make it clear what a safety violation actually is (and 
how violations are understood in this thesis), before returning to an explanation and 
discussion of the concept of safety compliance. 
2.1 Safety violations 
So what is a safety violation? Despite the importance of this question there is no 
straightforward answer to it – as several different definitions exist throughout the 
research literature. Some of these are presented in Table 1. The definitions share some 
similarities, but there are also some noteworthy differences between them. As regards 
similarities, each definition stresses that there must be some rules, procedures, 
instructions, regulations, guidelines, or best practices present to be violated. In addition, 
each definition specifies that a violation involves actions that are contrary to these. As 
regards differences, some of the definitions stress that the rules, procedures, instructions 
etc. must be written, whereas others make no such restriction.  
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Lawton (1998: 77), for example, defines violations as ‘deliberate deviations from the 
written rules’, whereas Barber (2002: 83) defines them as ‘deliberate deviations from 
Table1
Differentdefinitionsofsafetyviolations
Reference Definition
Alper and Karsh (2009:
740)
‘Anactionthatiscontrarytoarule.’
Amalberti et al. (2006:
66)
‘Violationsaredeliberatedeviationsfromstandardprocedure.’
Barber(2002:83) ‘Deliberatedeviationsfromsafepractice.’
BeattyandBeatty(2004:
528)
‘Intentionalactscontrarytoadviceorbestpracticeguidelines.’
Bener and Crundall
(2008:334)
‘Violationsaredefinedasdeliberatedeviationsfromthose
practicesbelievednecessarytomaintainthesafeoperationofa
potentiallyhazardoussystem.’
Hobbs and Williamson
(2002a:158)
‘Anintentionaldeviationfromproceduresorgoodpractice.’
Hudsonetal.(1998:1) ‘Violationsaredeviationsfromtherules,procedures,
instructionsandregulationsdevelopedforthesafeandefficient
operation(ormaintenance)ofequipment,plantsetc.Deviations
fromgoodpractice,evenwhennotlaiddownformally,mayalso
beregardedasviolations.Breachesintheserulescanbeeither
unintentionalordeliberate.’
Lawton(1998:77) ‘Violationsaredefinedasbehavioursthatinvolvedeliberate
deviationsfromthewrittenrules.’
Mason(1997:288) ‘Violationscanbedefinedasanydeliberatedeviationsfromthe
rules,procedures,instructionsorregulationsintroducedforthe
safeorefficientoperationandmaintenanceofequipment.This
appliestoalllevels,fromanoperatorthroughhighͲlevel
management.’
Masonetal.(1995:3) ‘Violationsareanydeliberatedeviationsfromtherules,
procedures,instructionsandregulationsdrawnupforthesafe
orefficientoperationandmaintenanceofplantorequipment.
Breachesintheserulescouldbeaccidental,unintentionalor
deliberate.’
Parkeretal.(1995:1036) ‘Thedeliberateinfringementofsomeregulatedorsocially
acceptedcodeofbehaviour.’
Reason(1997:72) ‘Violationsaredeviationsfromsafeoperatingprocedures,
standardsorrules.Suchdeviationscanbeeitherdeliberateor
erroneous.’
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safe practice’. ‘Safe practice’ is, however, a vague and roomy term and there is usually 
no definite answer of what a safe work practice actually is (Battmann and Klumb, 
1993). Typically, it is only possible to decide whether an act or a decision is safe with 
the benefit of hindsight; that is, after something has gone wrong (or right, for that 
matter). To be more clear-cut, safety violations in the current thesis are therefore more 
narrowly defined, as actions that are contrary to written safety instructions (e.g. formal 
rules, procedures, regulations etc.). This also implies that acts that are only contrary to 
social norms or informal codes of safe behaviour are not treated as safety violations 
here.
Another significant difference between the definitions in Table 1 has to do with the 
intentionality of the actor. For example, in Beatty and Beatty’s (2004) and in Lawton’s 
(1998) definitions it is stated explicitly that a violation is an intentional act. This implies 
that only deliberate acts of rule-breaking are seen as violations. In Reason’s (1997) 
definition, however, violations are seen as acts that could be both deliberate and 
erroneous. Hence, Reason’s definition is similar to that of Alper and Karsh (2009: 740) 
who define a violation as ‘an action that is contrary to a rule’, regardless of the degree 
of intentionality. This is also how violations are understood in this thesis. That is, an 
action is defined as a safety violation if it is contrary to a written safety instruction, 
irrespective of the intentionality of the actor.  
This definition is rather general and it could serve as a framework for all kinds of safety 
violations. However, as Reason (1990, 1997, 1998, 2008) has argued, there is a need to 
differentiate between different subtypes of violations and to distinguish between 
violations and other types of aberrant behaviour. Basically, Reason (1997) describes 
two different types of violations; intentional and unintentional violations (see Figure 1). 
The intentional ones are deliberate violations of procedures which are known and 
understood by the actor, such as knowingly breaking procedures to get a job done with 
less effort, or, for example, because the procedures are considered impractical in a given 
situation. In Reason’s (1987) study of the Chernobyl disaster (which is also the study 
that represents the starting point of systematic research on safety violations), it was 
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found that all of the five major violations committed in the initial phase of the disaster 
fell into this category.  
The unintentional ones are violations of procedures of which the actor has no awareness 
or knowledge and therefore operates without any reference to, such as operating 
hazardous machinery in breach of written instructions because the operating instructions 
for some reason are not known or understood by the operator. In such instances, a 
violation has been committed without the actor being sufficiently aware of the relevant 
rules or procedures, and not, for example, because non-compliance has been perceived 
as an easy pathway towards a goal.
A relevant example of this is an accident on the drilling rig West Epsilon in the North 
Sea in 2007, where a 30-inch casing (weighing more than eight tons) fell down from the 
lifting collar and crushed the roof of the drilling hut and ended up in the driller’s chair. 
The following investigation report stated that the direct cause of the accident was that 
the lifting collar was not properly closed and locked when the casing was lifted. That is, 
the lifting operation was not conducted in accordance with the prevailing procedures. 
The same investigation report, however, also stated that the operators involved in the 
accident had no information about how to operate the locking mechanism correctly 
because the relevant procedures were not available on the rig (PSA, 2007b). Hence, the 
breach of the procedures was committed unintentionally. 
Figure1
Ataxonomyofsafetyviolations,adaptedfromReason(1997)
Violations
Intentional
Routine
violations
Optimizing
violations
Necessary
violationsUnintentional
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Despite the distinction between intentional and unintentional violations, both should, 
according to Reason (1997) be distinguished from malevolent acts, such as sabotage, in 
which both the act and the damaging consequences are intended. Also, they should be 
distinguished from acts of human error, such as slips, lapses and mistakes, which arise 
from cognitive and perceptual failures (though the distinction between errors and 
violations can often be blurred, see Reason and Hobbs, 2003). 
Reason’s taxonomy of safety violations does not offer a further classification of 
unintentional violations, but as regards intentional violations the taxonomy 
distinguishes between three major categories, based on their origins. These are routine, 
optimizing and necessary violations. According to Reason (1997), routine violations are 
typically triggered by organisations that rarely sanction violations or reward compliance 
(similar to what Gouldner (1954) four decades earlier described as mock
bureaucracies). In practice, routine violations involve corner-cutting at the skill-based 
level of performance. That is, choosing the path of least effort between the start and 
endpoint of a given task. To use Hollnagel’s (2009: 13) words again, this implies 
deliberately choosing ‘efficiency’ at the expense of ‘thoroughness’, because it involves 
a minimum of time, expense, effort or waste.  
Optimizing violations on the other hand are triggered by personal rather than task-
related reasons. That is, they are typically motivated by personal desires to optimize 
non-functional goals (e.g. violating for the thrill of it) and are, as such, unrelated to the 
functional aspects of the task. According to Reason (1997), this type of violation is 
characteristic of particular demographic groups, mainly young males.  
Necessary violations, in contrast, are not related to any particular demographic group or 
personal desires such as least effort or thrill, but to deficiencies within the organization 
or particular work situations. These deficiencies, such as lack of adequate tools or 
equipment, make violations inevitable in order to get the job done. Hence, these types of 
violations are, at least from the actor’s point of view, committed with necessity. 
Reason’s taxonomy of safety violations is primarily a categorization of violations 
committed by individual workers or groups of workers, not by organizations. Such 
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individual violations are typically identified among sharp-end workers in the proximal 
phase of a workplace accident (Wagenaar, 1998). In the present thesis, however, it is 
important to underline that the term ‘safety violation’ is not limited to individual 
behaviour. Rather, it is a term that is considered to be applicable and relevant to the 
organizational level as well. The main focus in the empirical work, though, is on 
individuals (or sharp-end workers, to be more precise), as only one of the four research 
questions deals explicitly with the organizational level. 
2.2 Safety compliance 
As mentioned briefly above, the systematic study of safety violations within 
organizational safety research was brought to the fore after the worst accident in the 
history of commercial nuclear power plants: the Chernobyl accident in 1986 (Hudson et 
al., 1998). The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) investigation of the 
accident found that several specific violations of safety-critical procedures made the 
disaster possible (IAEA, 1986; see also IAEA, 1992). Some of these, it was concluded, 
were located at the level of the individual operator, and others were located at the 
organizational level.  
These conclusions were picked up and discussed by Reason (1987) in his review of the 
human and organizational elements involved in the accident, a review which rapidly 
motivated other researchers not only to investigate violations in isolation, but also to 
examine how they are provoked by social and cultural influences within the 
organizations (e.g. Battmann and Klumb, 1991, 1993; Hudson et al., 1998; Lawton and 
Parker, 1998; Mason, 1997).
In recent years, however, and similarly to this thesis, researchers within this area have 
shown an increased interest in identifying conditions that promote safety compliance 
rather than in simply identifying violation-provoking conditions (e.g. Griffin and Hu, 
2013; Kapp, 2012; Larsson et al., 2008; Lu and Yang, 2011; Neal and Griffin, 2006; 
Pousette et al., 2008; Torp and Grøgaard, 2009). This shift in focus represents a 
transition from a negative and reactive approach, towards a more positive and proactive 
approach. A shift which, on a broader thematic level and with inspiration from the 
positive psychology movement (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), has been 
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frequently requested within organizational research as a whole (Luthans, 2002) and 
within some of organizational research’s specific sub-disciplines such as leadership 
research (Avolio et al., 2009) and safety research (Hollnagel, 2012). But what exactly 
does the term ‘safety compliance’ mean and is there really a positive linear relationship 
between safety compliance and safety? This will be discussed below.
2.2.1 Safety compliance defined 
In safety research, the term ‘safety compliance’ is often referred to as one of two 
components of the more general term ‘safety behaviour’. The other component is safety 
participation. Whereas safety participation refers to behaviour that supports safety in the 
wider organizational context, such as attending safety meetings, contributing to 
voluntary safety work, helping co-workers and making suggestions to improve safety, 
safety compliance is usually regarded as being the basic safety activities that have to be 
carried out by individuals in order to maintain safety at work (see Griffin and Neal, 
2000; Neal and Griffin, 2002).
Thus, safety compliance (see Table 2) is frequently defined in line with Neal et al. 
(2000: 101) as behaviour which ‘involves adhering to safety procedures and carrying 
out work in a safe manner’. This implies that safety compliance is related to what 
Borman and Motowildo (1993), within the work performance literature, refer to as ‘task 
performance’, whereas safety participation is related to what they refer to as ‘contextual 
performance’. 
Again, however, and similarly to some of the definitions of ‘safety violations’, Neal et 
al.’s (2000) frequently cited definition of safety compliance is relatively broad and not 
well specified. In principle, it can be interpreted as a kind of all-embracing definition 
which covers all types of behaviour that is carried out safely – whatever that might be. 
To be more precise, safety compliance in the current thesis is therefore understood as 
behaviour that is in accordance with the prevailing formal safety instructions. This 
definition is narrower than that of Neal et al. (2000), and more in line with, for example, 
Masia and Pienaar (2011: 3) who define safety compliance as ‘the extent to which 
employees adhere to safety standards, procedures, legal obligations and requirements.’ 
However, in this thesis the term is not restricted to employees’ compliance with 
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company internal safety rules and procedures – it also includes enterprises’ adherence 
to national safety regulations developed by regulatory bodies (as is also specified in 
Zohar’s (2008) definition of safety compliance in Table 2).  
Table2
Differentdefinitionsofsafetycompliance
Reference Definition
Heidenstrøm(2011:23) ‘Safetycomplianceistheemployee’swillingnesstofollowrules,
procedures,andregulationsestablishedbytheorganizationin
ordertocreateasaferworkenvironment…’
Innessetal.(2010:279) ‘…behavioursfocusedonmeetingminimumsafetystandardsat
work,suchasfollowingsafetyproceduresandwearingrequired
protectiveequipment’
Mahmoodetal.(2010:
3)
‘Safetycomplianceexplainsthecoreactivitiesthatneedtobe
carriedbyemployeestoensuretheareaareprotectedfrom
injuries,suchascomplyingwithsafetyrulesandsafety
procedures’
MasiaandPienaar
(2011:3)
‘Safetycomplianceistheextenttowhichemployeesadhereto
safetystandards,procedures,legalobligationsand
requirements.’
MullenandKelloway
(2009:257)
‘Safetycomplianceinvolvesfollowingrequiredsafetypolicies…’
NealandGriffin(2002:
70)
‘Thetermsafetycomplianceisusedtodescribethecoreactivities
thatneedtobecarriedoutbyindividualstomaintainworkplace
safety.Thesebehavioursincludeadheringtostandardwork
proceduresandwearingpersonalprotectiveequipment.’
Nealetal.(2000:101) ‘Safetycomplianceinvolvesadheringtosafetyproceduresand
carryingoutworkinasafemanner.’
Niskanenetal.(2012:
1929)
‘SafetycomplianceisdefinedasruleͲfollowingincoresafety
activities…’
Størseth(2007:190) ‘…adherencetosafetypolicies.’
Winteretal.(2010:12) ‘…coreactivitiesrequiredtomaintainasafeworkplace.’
Zohar(2008:381) ‘Safetycomplianceinvolvesadherencetorulesandprocedures,
developedbythecompanyand/orregulatorybodies.’
2.2.2 Safety compliance and safety 
As seen in the introductory chapter, accident analyses and investigations regularly 
conclude that accidents and near misses are caused by violations of safety regulations. 
Thus, through the wisdom of hindsight (but without regard to the bias that ex post facto 
insight might give) there is established a clear negative relationship between safety 
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violations and workplace safety. Does this also imply that there is a positive linear 
relationship between safety compliance and safety, and that hazardous work systems 
would be safe if only people and organizations complied sufficiently with the relevant 
procedures and regulations? In the current thesis this is an important question, which 
has also been recently discussed by safety researchers elsewhere (e.g. Besnard and 
Hollnagel, 2012; Bieder and Bourrier, 2013; Dekker, 2006; Grøtan, 2014; Hale and 
Borys, 2013a, b; Hopkins, 2011; Kletz, 2001; Reason, 2008; Townsend, 2013; Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007). As will be described below, there is, however, no definitive and 
clear-cut answer to it.  
One part of the answer lies in the myriad of quantitative studies that document a 
negative relationship between rule-following (both at the enterprise level and the 
individual level) and different types of adverse safety outcomes, such as accidents, 
injuries and near misses. Cheng et al. (2010), for example, have found that enterprises’ 
level of compliance with national safety regulations is negatively related to the 
frequency of occupational accidents. That is, the more compliance with labour safety 
laws, the less occupational accidents. As regards the individual level, Goldenhar et al.’s 
(2003) study of construction workers has documented that workers who report high 
levels of safety compliance also experience a fewer number of near misses. The same 
study also found an indirect negative relationship between safety compliance and 
occupational injuries through self-reported physical symptoms. Comparable findings 
have been made in Jiang et al.’s (2010) study of petroleum workers, which found that 
employee’s safety compliance was related to lower levels of workplace injuries and near 
misses. Similarly, Zacharatos et al. (2005) and Nahrgang et al. (2011) have found a 
significant negative relationship between safety compliance and injuries/near misses 
(the more compliance, the less injuries/near misses). These findings are also supported 
in two review studies on the topic by Clarke (2006) and Christian et al. (2009). In sum, 
the quantitative studies therefore support the notion of a positive linear relationship 
between safety compliance and safety. That is, the more compliance the better for the 
state of safety. 
32
Another part of the answer to the question about the relationship between safety 
compliance and safety, and an important supplement to the findings in the quantitatively
oriented studies, lies in the fact that safety rules and procedures have certain apparent 
limitations. Although rules and procedures in general are important as instructions for 
guiding behaviour in relation to dangers and hazards, their most fundamental limitation 
is that ‘there will always be bad rule situations and no rule situations’, as stressed by 
Reason (1997: 74). More precisely, this means (1) that there will always be situations in 
which the prescribed line of action of a rule or procedure for some reason is not 
favourable to safety, and (2) that there will always be situations which are not covered 
by rules or procedures. In the first situation (bad rule), compliance will make things 
worse and hence reduce safety. In the second situation (no rule), compliance is 
irrelevant – i.e. it must be replaced with some sort of improvisation (or no action at all). 
These two limitations make the notion of a positive linear relationship problematic, as 
they imply that compliance with procedures is not always beneficial for safety – often 
not even being an available option. 
One example of the fact that compliance is not always beneficial for safety and that 
mere compliance can have fatal consequences, is the disaster on the production platform 
Piper Alpha in the British part of the North Sea in 1988, where 167 rig workers died and 
only 61 survived (Wright, 1994). Contrary to what one might believe, the investigation 
of the disaster demonstrated that most of the workers who died complied strictly with 
the emergency procedures and assembled in the accommodation area when fires broke 
out. Catastrophically, the accommodation area was directly in line with a subsequent 
devastating explosion, meaning that most of those who had complied with the 
emergency procedures and the training they had previously gone through did not 
survive. Those who jumped into the sea on the other hand, and in doing so also 
disobeyed the emergency procedures, survived (Punchard and Higgins, 1989; see also 
Reason, 2000b). 
Another example from the oil and gas industry is the already described blowout and 
near loss of the Snorre Alpha platform in the Norwegian part of the North Sea in 2004 
(Schiefloe et al., 2005). Even though a long list of non-compliances contributed to the 
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blowout, it was, paradoxically enough, a deliberate and well-considered deviation from 
written procedures that contributed to stopping the leak and put the platform back into 
service (Besnard and Hollnagel, 2012). This deviation meant that the platform manager 
decided to remain aboard the platform together with a team of well workers in order to 
plug the leaking well with concrete, despite the fact that the safety procedures clearly 
stated that the platform must be fully evacuated when the stability of the whole 
installation is threatened. Applying these procedures, however, would have left the leak 
unplugged and as a consequence the platform could have suffered the same fate as the 
Piper Alpha and Deepwater Horizon. However, the crew who despite the procedures 
were left on Snorre Alpha managed to stop the leak and put the platform back into 
normal operation. 
The two examples above clearly illustrate that, under certain circumstances, non-
compliance can be better than compliance and thus that the notion of a positive linear 
relationship between compliance and safety is challenging. As Besnard and Hollnagel 
(2012) have previously highlighted it is therefore important to underline that… 
The SnorreAlpha Platform is still in service today, almost ten years after theblowout (Photo:Rune
Johansen/Statoil)
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…safe operations cannot be ensured by rigid and blind compliance. Instead, 
they require that operators assess the adequacy of, and adapt, procedures to 
operational conditions. (Besnard and Hollnagel, 2012: 4)
In the current thesis, this point is recognized as important, but with respect to the 
research objective it falls out of the scope of the thesis to examine and determine under 
which conditions non-compliance is safe or not. A fundamental assumption in the thesis 
– and in line with, for example, Hopkins’ (2011) thorough discussion of the topic – is, 
therefore, that compliance with safety rules and procedures under most, but not all, 
conditions represents safe practice. At the same time it is recognized that safety is a 
product of numerous interrelated known and unknown elements and that compliance 
with safety rules and procedures is only one of these. Alone, however, rule-making and 
compliance is not enough to ensure safe operations – and in many instances merely 
being in compliance simply implies achieving a minimum level of hazards management 
(Manuele, 2003). This opinion is also reflected in a frequently cited safety culture guide 
elaborated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, where it is emphasized that… 
Organizations with a mature safety culture focus more on the overall goals 
and key points than only on compliance with procedures. (IAEA, 1998: 4) 
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3. The system perspective 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, a system perspective is applied as the guiding 
principle for the empirical work of the thesis. In this chapter it will be explained what 
this means. In addition, an account and a discussion of previous research that has been 
carried out within the frames of a system perspective will be offered. 
3.1 Second stories of failure and success 
According to Reason (2000a), human behaviour in organizations (be it safe or not) can 
be viewed in two different ways – either through the person perspective or through the 
system perspective. Each of these has their own basic model of behaviour causation, 
and these models give rise to different philosophies of how human behaviour should be 
managed within an organization. With regard to unsafe acts, the person perspective 
typically focuses on the workers at the front line of the organization and sees such acts 
as being caused primarily by mental processes, such as carelessness, forgetfulness, 
inattention and recklessness. Thus, the associated preventive measures are directed 
towards the individual level – as for example disciplinary actions or campaigns that 
appeal to people’s morals, conscience or fear. The system perspective, on the other 
hand, sees the same acts as consequences rather than causes, with their origins in 
contextual rather than individual factors. Thus, within the system perspective the 
fundamental assumption behind eventual preventive measures is that ‘though we cannot 
change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work’ 
(Reason, 2000a: 768). Hence, preventive measures guided by the system perspective 
typically focus on working conditions, such as time pressure, inadequate equipment, 
impractical procedures etc., rather than on individuals and their attributes. 
The person perspective and the system perspective, Reason (1993) argues, coincide with 
two overlapping ages of safety research, namely the human error age and the socio-
technical age, respectively. The human error age followed after the technical age (in 
which the focus was on technical measures and causes), and had its origins in the 1930s 
‘when it became apparent that human beings are capable of circumventing even the 
most advanced engineered safety devices’ (Reason, 1993: 7). The sociotechnical age 
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made its entry in the 1980s in the aftermath of some major accidents within complex but 
assumedly well-defended systems, such as Chernobyl, Bhopal, Zeebrugge and Piper 
Alpha.3 Applied in the safety research field, the sociotechnical perspective highlights 
that the sources of safety challenges do not belong solely to either the technical or the 
human spheres. Instead the causal relationship, it is argued, is to be found in the 
interactions between the technological, organizational and human spheres. Thus, human 
behaviour is not seen as solely determined by individual differences, but as highly 
influenced by the technological and organizational system within which it occurs. This 
idea constitutes the essence of the system perspective and it is important to note that this 
influence is seen as relevant not only in order to understand failures and substandard 
behaviour, such as violations, but also in order to understand success and normal 
behaviour, such as compliance (Reason, 1993). 
The person perspective and the system perspective constitute two fundamentally 
different types of explanations in safety research and have been referred to with 
different metaphors by safety scholars. Dekker (2006: 1), for example, refers to the 
person perspective as the ‘Old View’ and the system perspective as the ‘New View’. 
The essence of the old view, he claims, is that human actions are seen as acts that are 
conducted in a vacuum. Hence, errors and violations, for example, are interpreted as 
acts caused by unreliable people, whereas safe and compliant acts are seen as acts 
conducted by well-intentioned people. According to the old view, complex systems 
would therefore be fine were it not for the unpredictable behaviour of unreliable people. 
Thus, Dekker also refers to the old view as ‘The Bad Apple Theory’, which reflects the 
opinion that it is usually bad individuals in otherwise perfect systems that cause bad 
things to happen. Consistent with this, Woods et al. (2010: 5) use another metaphor as 
they refer to the person perspective as ‘first stories’ and the system perspective as 
‘second stories’, indicating that the person perspective (The Bad Apple Theory) only 
scratches the surface of a multifaceted and deeper story. Within this deeper second story 
human errors and violations only represent the starting point of scientific inquiry. 
3 The concept of sociotechnical systems was coined already in the 1950s by Trist and Bamforth (1951), 
but according to Reason (1993) decades passed before safety researchers realized the full value of the 
concept for accident prevention and safety research. 
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An essential notion of Woods 
et al.’s second story is the 
idea that complex 
organizations have a sharp 
end and a blunt end, and that 
both must be taken into 
account in order to fully 
understand how safety is 
shaped and created (Figure 
2). The sharp end of an 
organization constitutes the 
part of the organization that operates close to or in direct contact with some hazardous 
process. Within the oil and gas industry, this group of front-line personnel typically 
consist of occupations such as crane operators, drillers, derrick men and maintenance 
personnel. The blunt end, on the other hand, typically consists of ‘regulators, 
administrators, economic policy makers, and technology suppliers’ who ‘control the 
resources, constraints, and multiple incentives and demands that sharp-end practitioners 
must integrate and balance’ (Woods et al., 2010: 8). Thus, within the second stories 
perspective it is, according to Woods et al., essential to study and understand how 
activities (as, for example, those related to rules and procedures) conducted at the sharp 
end are influenced and constrained by activities at the blunt end (as, for example, 
leadership practices, established production goals etc.).  
Again, the already described investigation of the nearly fatal accident on the drilling rig 
West Epsilon in 2007, where a 30-inch casing fell and crushed the roof of the drilling 
hut, is a relevant example (PSA, 2007b). The investigation revealed that the very reason 
why the sharp-end personnel at the rig operated the drilling equipment in breach of the 
relevant procedures was not because of recklessness, forgetfulness or any other 
psychological failings among the personnel (first story). Rather (second story), the non-
compliant acts were explained by the fact that the responsible managers and the part of 
the organization (blunt end) that should have provided correct information and relevant 
Figure2
The sharp and blunt end of complex organizations (adapted
fromWoodsetal.,2010)
Bluntend:managers,
regulatorsetc.
Resourcesand
constraints
Practitionersatthe
sharpend
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procedures to the drilling personnel (sharp end) failed, and that the sharp-end workers 
for that reason had to carry out the drilling operation without all the relevant procedures 
at hand. It can thus be argued, in Woods et al.’s (2010) terms, that it was the interplay, 
or the lack of interplay, between the sharp and the blunt end that caused the front-line 
operators to act as they did, i.e. in breach of the relevant procedures. 
Another essential notion of the second story as a metaphor of system explanations is the 
idea that it is a story not only of failure, but also one of success. That is, the interplay 
between the blunt end and the sharp end can explain failures as well as successes, 
accidents as well as normal operations, aberrant human behaviour as well as normal 
human behaviour, violations as well as compliance. None of these extremes, Woods et 
al. (2010) argue, can be understood by examining the sharp end in a vacuum. Hence, 
they claim that the study of aberrant behaviour cannot be separated from the study of 
normal behaviour: 
When error is seen as the starting point for study, when the heterogeneity of 
errors (their external mode of appearance) is appreciated, and the 
difference between outcome and process is kept in mind, then it becomes 
clear that one cannot separate the study of error from the study of normal 
human behavior and system function. (Woods et al., 2010: 25) 
3.2 Getting the balance right 
Different metaphors aside, the essence of the system perspective is that both safe and 
unsafe acts must be examined and understood in light of the context within which the 
acts occur. Hence, the system perspective is typically concerned with factors that often 
are distant (both in time and place) from the actual behaviour of front-line personnel, as, 
for example, decisions made by management, leadership practices, socialization, 
employee involvement, organizational complexity, the quality and clarity of safety 
procedures and so on.
According to Wagenaar and van der Schrier (1997) the positive aspect of the system 
perspective is that it highlights the relationship between the behaviour of sharp-end 
workers and factors that management can control. Thus, they argue that it holds a 
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potential for generating adequate knowledge on how to, for example, prevent violations 
and then consequently, how to improve safety compliance. Conversely, they argue that 
the person perspective lacks this potential because it fails to identify the causal 
connection between employee behaviour and operational conditions, in their own 
words:
Portrayal of substandard behaviour as freak events does not lead to 
prevention, because it denies the relationship between the behaviour of 
employees and anything management can control. Relating unwanted 
behaviour to situational factors opens up the possibility of prevention, 
because the working situation is largely under the control of management.
(Wagenaar and van der Schrier, 1997: 27) 
Similar arguments have also been adopted by other safety scholars (some of whom have 
already been mentioned, e.g. Dekker, 2006; Woods et al., 2010), but does the fact that 
the current thesis applies a system perspective mean that I am of the opinion that (1) the 
person perspective has no real value or (2) that it is in some deep conflict with the 
perspective applied in this thesis? 
The short answer to both of these two questions is ‘no’. Actually, it is believed that 
personal qualities do matter, and in line with Reason (2008: 103) it is believed that; ‘to 
think otherwise is to fall prey to “learned helplessness” – saying to oneself “What can I 
do? It’s the system”’. Empirical studies do also support this argument. That is, there is a 
correlation between certain personal qualities (demographics and psychological 
characteristics) and safety behaviour, including safety compliance. Chan et al.’s (2002) 
study of the effect that workers’ age has on compliance with safety procedures is an 
example of this. Ashton’s (1998) correlational study of personality traits and different 
workplace delinquencies, such as non-compliance, is another. Salgado’s (2002) study of 
the big five personality dimensions and deviant behaviour at work is a third example, 
and Mount et al.’s (2008) study of the relationship between individual conscient-
iousness and safety violations a fourth. (For a review study on the relationship between 
personality factors and safety behaviour, see Clarke and Robertson, 2005). 
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Chan et al. (2002), Ashton (1998), Salgado (2002) and Mount et al.’s (2008) studies, or 
any other study that focuses on intrapersonal explanations, are not by any means in 
conflict with the theoretical perspective applied in this thesis. It would be more 
reasonable to say that the clear-cut demographical/psychological perspectives that these 
writers apply are complementary to the perspective applied in this thesis. That is, they 
shed light on the same empirical phenomenon, but from a different angle. Moreover it is 
believed that this difference in angles opens up different practical insights and different 
theoretical contributions which together contribute, hopefully, to a more profound 
understanding of the study object.
Also, it is believed that the two perspectives (at least in principle) can be combined, in 
the sense that both can be integrated into one and the same empirical analysis. Zhou et 
al.’s (2008) quantitative study of safety compliance within the construction industry is 
an example of this. Their study explores both the effect of individual variables such as 
work experience and education on the one side, and the effect of contextual variables 
such as management commitment and workmates’ influence on the other. Another 
example is Wallace and Chen’s (2006) quantitative study of safety compliance among 
254 repair generalists where the effect of both personality and group safety climate was 
explored. There is also one example of such a combination in the current thesis, as the 
effect of the offshore service vessel workers’ age and job experience is explored in 
combination with contextual variables, such as safety climate and procedure quality, in 
the empirical work related to the first research question (article #1). However, the 
overriding perspective of the thesis is purely systemic and thus focused on how 
environmental conditions affect compliance. 
3.3 Safety compliance and the system perspective: previous research 
Within the Norwegian oil and gas industry, the system perspective is often denoted as 
the MTO perspective (Man, Technology and Organization) and within this industry it is 
today widely acknowledged that both technological, organizational, and human factors 
(and in particular the interplay between these factors) are important elements in the 
establishment of safe operations (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007). In the current thesis, 
however, it would be fair to say that first and foremost it is the relationship between 
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man and organization that is in focus, and that the importance of technological aspects, 
such as the physical work environment or the standard of technical equipment, is not 
explored with the same depth. Furthermore, the thesis is to a certain degree also about 
the relationship between the organization and its external environment, as the fourth 
research question deals with the effect that external actors (labour inspections) have on 
enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations. Hence, it could be argued that an open
system perspective (which holds a long tradition within organizational research, e.g. 
Emery, 1969, Katz and Kahn, 1966, Trist, 1969) is applied, since a part of the system’s 
environment is also taken into account. 
Since the essence of the system perspective is that behaviour, be it substandard or not, 
must be examined and understood by the characteristics of its environment, the study of 
safety compliance within this perspective is to a large degree about identifying the 
contextual antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour and in so doing pointing out 
factors that are of importance in preventive work. As follows from the main objective 
presented in the introductory chapter, this has also been the essence of the empirical 
work within the oil and gas industry in this thesis. But before continuing to the 
empirical part of the thesis, a short and condensed review of previous research within 
this field will be presented. 
The review is structured around some the most important previously identified ante-
cedents of safety-compliant behaviour. This means that the review is not meant to be 
completely exhaustive; it is the basic parts of previous research that will be presented 
and discussed. Research related to individual safety compliance will be reviewed first, 
and then a shorter review of research related to safety compliance at the enterprise level 
will be presented. 
3.3.1 Safety culture and safety climate 
As already described, the systematic study of safety violations within organizational 
safety research was brought to the fore in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in 
1986 (Hudson et al., 1998), as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation 
report stated that a combination of several procedural violations made the disaster 
possible (IAEA, 1986). The very same report also had a great influence on safety 
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researchers in another way as it launched the now frequently applied term ‘safety 
culture’ – not only to describe the root cause of the disaster, but also to describe the 
organizational background and environment within which the procedural violations 
were committed (Sorensen, 2002).  
In the academic safety literature, the term ‘safety culture’ has numerous different 
definitions (e.g. Cooper, 2001; Cox and Cox, 1991; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; 
Pidgeon, 1991), and there is no universal agreement about what to include in the 
concept (Antonsen, 2009). However, safety researchers seem to agree that safety culture 
is about the employees’ shared attitudes towards safety and managements’ priority of 
safety in the organization (Choudhry et al., 2007). In addition, it is (in line with the 
conclusions of the Chernobyl investigation) regularly claimed among safety culture 
scholars that there is a causal relationship between safety culture and the safety-related 
behaviour of employees (Törner, 2008). Thus, safety culture is also frequently seen as 
an important organizational antecedent of workers’ risk-taking behaviour and 
propensity to act in accordance with prevailing rules and procedures (e.g. Cui et al., 
2013; Fleming, 2012; Geller, 2001; Mearns and Flin, 1995; Mearns et al., 2001; 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010). Reason (1998) for example, claims that organizations 
with…
…a poor safety culture will encourage an atmosphere of non-compliance to 
safe operating practices. Violations are likely to be most common in 
organizations where the unspoken attitudes and beliefs mean that 
production and commercial goals are seen to outweigh those relating to 
safety. (Reason, 1998: 297) 
During the last two decades a significant number of studies have been carried out in 
order to test such claims. These studies are typically quantitatively oriented 
(psychometric questionnaire studies) and the term ‘safety climate’ is usually applied in 
favour of ‘safety culture’. Safety climate can be defined as the set of perceptions that 
employees share regarding safety in their work environment (Zohar, 1980), and 
measures of safety climate typically reflect the extent to which employees perceive 
safety as valued within their organization (Griffin and Neal, 2000). Hence, safety 
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climate measures are often regarded as a snapshot of the underlying safety culture (Flin 
et al., 2000), and the measures typically consist of several factors such as workers’ 
perception of safety training, safety management, safety policies, safety equipment, and 
safety communication. 
The assumed causal connection between safety culture and safety compliance is highly 
supported in studies of safety climate, as several safety climate studies across a well of 
different industries and national cultures have demonstrated that a positive safety 
climate promotes safety-compliant behaviour. Agnew et al.’s (2013) study of safety 
climate and worker safety behaviours in Scottish hospitals, Lu and Yang’s (2011) study 
of safety compliance within the Taiwanese passenger ferry industry, Sinclair et al.’s 
(2010) study of individual safety performance among US retail workers, and Cavazza 
and Serpe’s (2009) study of the use of personal protective equipment within the Italian 
mechanic, textile and food industry are all examples of this. In Alper and Karsh’s 
(2009) review of previous research on safety violations and compliance, the positive 
link between safety climate and safety compliance is also one of the more consistent 
findings. Identical findings are also made in two other review studies by Clarke (2006) 
and Christian et al. (2009). On the basis of empirical findings, it is therefore no exagg-
eration to say that the positive relationship between safety climate and safety 
compliance is relatively firmly established. Thus, in the empirical work related to the 
current thesis’ first research question, the impact that safety climate has on safety 
compliance among offshore service vessel workers has been in focus (article #1). 
As regards causal explanations as to why safety climate positively influences workers’ 
safety compliance Neal and Griffin’s (2004) so-called ‘framework for conceptualizing 
safety climate and safety behaviour’ is frequently applied. According to their theoretical 
framework the positive relationship between safety climate and workers’ safety 
compliance is a result of the role that the safety climate plays as a frame of reference 
that provides clues to sharp-end workers about the overall importance of safety in their 
organization or work group. Zohar (2010) explicates this by adding that it is within this 
frame of reference that employees receive, interpret and make sense of signals from a 
complex net of different sources (e.g. colleagues, policies, rules, practices) about what 
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sort of role behaviour is expected, supported and rewarded. Employee behaviour, Zohar 
argues, will then tend to align with these perceived expectations. Hence, safety climate 
is often considered to be of importance for employees’ motivation to act in accordance 
with safety rules and procedures. As Neal and Griffin (2004: 19) put it: ‘safety climate 
reflects a psychological environment that provides a motivational antecedent for safety 
behaviours’. In addition, safety climate is also considered to be of importance for 
workers’ knowledge about risk and safety, and in combination safety motivation and 
safety knowledge is believed to constitute the causal mechanism between safety climate 
and safety compliance (Neal and Griffin, 2004) as illustrated in Figure 3. This is also 
widely supported in empirical studies (e.g. Griffin and Neal, 2000; Kwon and Kim, 
2013; Sinclair et al., 2010; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010). 
Despite the fact that safety climate/culture is considered an important contextual 
antecedent of safety-compliant behaviour, this perspective is not without its critics. 
According to Reiman and Oedewald (2004), for example, one of the major drawbacks 
of the safety culture perspective, such as that applied within safety climate studies, is 
that the safety culture concept is often presented as an organizational characteristic 
separately from other characteristics of the organization, such as the organizing of work, 
technology and the organizational structure. Moreover they claim that this separation 
reduces the safety culture concept to refer only to aspects of the organization that are 
known in advance and are clearly connected to safety, such as safety training, safety 
communication and safety values. This, they argue, results in a loss of the holistic 
Figure3
Theassumedrelationshipbetweensafetyclimateandsafetycompliance(adaptedfromNealand
Griffin,2004)
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viewpoint which originally was sought within the organizational culture approach. 
Hence, they claim, that safety culture or safety climate models occasionally imply that 
safety can be studied and promoted as something that is detached from the composition 
of the work system as a whole (see also Choudhry et al., 2007 and; Kongsvik et al., 
2010 for a discussion on this topic).
In line with Reiman and Oedewald’s (2004) arguments, Antonsen (2009) argues for a 
broadening of the scope of safety culture and climate research. Instead of looking solely 
at the safety-specific aspects of the culture, Antonsen recommends that one should also 
examine the way organizational culture as a whole may influence safety. Within 
climate/compliance research this has been done to a certain, yet limited, degree by 
researchers who have investigated the relationship between more general (non-safety-
specific) climate variables on the one side and safety compliance on the other (e.g. 
DeJoy et al., 2004; Parker et al., 2001). Larsson et al.’s (2008) study of safety 
compliance among Swedish construction workers is one of these. The results of their 
study showed that the overall organizational climate exerted a significant impact on 
safety compliance. Hence, they concluded that climate factors which were not safety-
specific (such as clearly stated job descriptions, feedback on work performance, 
influence over one’s own work etc.) constitute important conditions for safety 
compliance.  
Findings, such as those made by Larsson et al. (2008), are important since they indicate 
that workers’ safety behaviour is a highly integrated part of the overall organizational 
functioning and that it can be managed much as other aspects of worker performance. 
Hence, the findings point to the necessity of expanding the safety culture and climate 
tradition with a more general organizational approach. However, few safety compliance 
studies have been concerned with such an expansion, and even fewer within the oil and 
gas industry. Thus, in the current thesis’ article #2 such an expansion is included, by 
examining how some general work climate dimensions mediate the relationship 
between leadership and offshore workers’ safety compliance. 
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3.3.2 Leadership 
Another common research topic in studies of safety compliance is that of leadership. In 
some of these studies leadership is considered a sub-dimension of safety climate (e.g. 
Biggs and Banks, 2012), in others a predecessor of safety climate with indirect links to 
safety compliance (e.g. Schutte, 2010), and in still others as a separate explanatory 
variable with direct links to safety compliance (e.g. Lu and Yang, 2010).  
Regardless of this difference, the vast majority of the leadership studies have one thing 
in common – they put focus on the safety-specific dimensions of leadership, such as 
leaders’ safety objectives, their role-modelling behaviour with regard to safety and their 
reward of subordinates for safe behaviour (e.g. Griffin and Hu, 2013; Inness et al., 
2010; Kapp, 2012; Zohar, 2002). Typically, these studies fall into two different groups. 
The first group of studies applies a behaviouristic model, built on the principles of 
operant conditioning (Skinner, 1969), and investigates the relationship between leaders’ 
safety rewards and monitoring behaviour on the one side and subordinates’ safety 
compliance on the other (e.g. Krause et al., 1999; Zohar, 2002; Zohar and Luria, 2003). 
Since these studies are preoccupied with the reinforcement of safe behaviour through 
rewards and monitoring, they are usually referred to as applying a safety-specific 
transactional leadership perspective (i.e. a direct focus on the transactions or exchanges 
that take place between leaders and subordinates). The second group of studies applies a 
more indirect behaviouristic model and puts the focus on safety-specific 
transformational leadership practices. Both transactional and transformational 
leadership practices are characterized by an exchange of values between leaders and 
subordinates, but within the latter the exchange is in the form of intangible values such 
as closer relationships with subordinates, shared values, and visions (Sarros et al., 
2002). In addition, safety-specific transformational leadership is, among other 
characteristics, characterized by leaders who display concern for the safety and well-
being of employees, and who stand out as clear and positive role models for their staff 
by working in a safe way themselves (Kapp, 2012). 
In general, studies that stress the safety-specific dimensions of leadership give support 
to the assumption of a positive causal relationship between the safety-related behaviour 
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of leaders and their subordinates’ compliance with safety rules and procedures 
(Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004). Hence, in the empirical work related to this thesis’ 
first research question, which deals directly with the relevance of previous research, the 
impact of safety leadership among offshore service vessel workers is examined (article 
#1). In that study, however, leadership is not treated as a distinct explanatory variable, 
but as a sub-dimension of safety climate. 
The impact of leadership is also emphasized in the empirical work related to the thesis’ 
third research question, which deals with the relationship between organizational 
context and oil and gas workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures (article #3). The 
most explicit and extensive focus on leadership, however, is to be found in the 
examination of the second research question (article #2). As described in chapter 1.3, 
this research question addresses the fact that previous leadership studies have primarily 
focused on the safety-specific dimensions of leadership, and that the more general 
dimensions of leadership (such as trust, cooperation and involvement) and these 
dimensions’ impact on workers’ safety compliance are often overlooked. Some studies 
focus on these more general dimensions of leadership (e.g. Yagil and Luria, 2010), but 
at large the research effort on this topic is limited – and even more limited within the oil 
and gas industry (some exceptions exist, see for example O’Dea and Flin, 2001). 
Consistent with Hofmann and Morgeson’s (2004) review of previous safety leadership 
literature it is therefore believed that the impact of leadership should be examined from 
a broader point of view than that which is common: 
…it is important, when either reviewing or investigating the relationship 
between leadership and safety, to move beyond the safety-specific literature 
to consider the broader leadership literature. This is important because it 
may yield additional insight into how leadership can impact safety.
(Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004: 170) 
3.3.3 Procedure quality 
As already described, Reason (1997) stresses that there will always be situations which 
are not covered by rules, and that there will always be situations in which the prescribed 
line of action of a rule or procedure for some reason is not favourable to safety, and that 
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compliant actions under such circumstances can be unsafe.4 Compliance with rules and 
procedures can, however, also be associated with limitations related to the quality of the 
rules and procedures themselves. For example, in Antonsen et al.’s (2008) study of 
safety compliance on an offshore supply base, the importance of comprehensibility, 
accessibility and accuracy is emphasized. This implies, Antonsen et al. argue, that if 
compliance with rules and procedures is to be expected, the employees must, as a 
minimum requirement, understand the language used (comprehensibility), have access 
to the information (accessibility), and be provided with a relatively clear-cut description 
of the relevant tasks (accuracy).  
This might seem self-evident, but several practical safety guides and empirical studies 
claim that procedure quality is a real challenge – even in industries which rely heavily 
on written safety instructions. In Simpson et al.’s (2009) guide to understanding human 
error in mine safety, for example, it is emphasized that safety rules frequently are far 
from being appropriate, practical, well written and well communicated, and that this is 
often at the expense of compliance. Laurence’s (2005) questionnaire study of Australian 
mineworkers supports this view. When asked to indicate their reasons for not complying 
with the safety rules, close to 35% of the mineworkers in Laurence’s study reported that 
it was due to some sort of problems with the rules (regarding for example complexity, 
extent and lack of plain language). The negative relationship between rule 
complications and safety compliance is also a significant finding in Alper and Karsh’s 
(2009) review of previous research on safety violations and compliance within 
industries other than the one which is in focus in this thesis. The relationship between 
procedure quality and safety compliance is therefore explicitly dealt with in the 
empirical work related to the first research question in this thesis (article #1). 
As Antonsen et al. (2008: 7) argue, procedure quality, understood as comprehensibility, 
accessibility and accuracy is important because it contributes to enhancing workers’ 
knowledge of the safety procedures and thus ‘reduces the probability of unintentional 
violations’. The importance of appropriate knowledge and the relationship between 
knowledge and unintentional non-compliance is also highlighted by other writers, such 
4 Compliance with bad rules is, by Reason (1997: 75), referred to as ‘mispliance’. 
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as Reason (1997) and Lawton (1998). Except for the obvious relevance of procedure 
quality, however, few studies have been concerned with identifying the conditions that 
influence workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures (Barber, 2002). Considering the 
fact that a larger proportion of actual accidents in the oil and gas industry are linked to 
unintentional violations rather than to intentional violations (Walker et al., 2012), there 
is little doubt about the need for more research on this topic within this particular 
industry. As described in chapter 1.3, article #3 therefore deals with the relationship 
between organizational context and front-line oil and gas workers’ knowledge of rules 
and procedures. 
3.3.4 Employee involvement 
According to Bourrier’s (2005) comparative studies of compliance with safety proce-
dures in French and American nuclear power plants, there are three critical ingredients 
related to the design and adjustment of procedures that appear to be important for 
strengthening the match between the written procedures and actual work practices. First, 
she argues, there should be feedback from the lower levels to the upper levels of the 
organization. Second, adjustment and design of procedures should be based on the 
views and experiences of those who are directly involved in applying the procedures, 
i.e. sharp-end workers. Third, the time interval between worker feedback about 
necessary procedural adjustments and actual adjustments should be as short as possible.  
These three ingredients all point to one common denominator, namely that active 
involvement of employees in safety-related activities is a crucial element when the goal 
is to make sure that work operations are carried out without inappropriate discrepancy 
from written procedures. Bourrier (2005) is, however, by no means on her own in 
stressing the importance of such involvement. Mohamed (2002) for example, claims 
that employee involvement is a most essential ingredient in a climate that favours safety 
compliance: 
…management must be willing to devolve some decision-making power to 
the workforce by allowing them to become actively involved in developing 
safety interventions and safety policies, rather than simply playing the more 
passive role of the recipient. (Mohamed, 2002: 376)
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In the research literature this is also a highly supported view. One example of this is 
Ludwig and Geller’s (1997) experimental study of professional drivers’ compliance 
with traffic regulations. In their study it was found that drivers who were allowed to 
participate in formulating safety goals complied more than did drivers who had had the 
same goals assigned to them with no opportunity to discuss or influence the goals. 
Another example is Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s (2010) study of safety behaviours within 
the process industry. Their analysis demonstrated that employee involvement in safety 
activities (such as participating in safety goal setting and identifying safety problems) 
correlated highly (r=0.40) with safety compliance. A third example, which is 
particularly relevant for the type of industry studied in this thesis, is Antonsen et al.’s 
(2008) already described study of safety compliance on a Norwegian offshore supply 
base. In their study, which was designed to evaluate a change project that aimed at the 
increased use of procedures, it was found that workers’ influence on the design of new 
procedures (in addition to procedural simplicity) was the most critical success factor for 
improved compliance. 
Given the research evidence, the importance of employee involvement in safety-related 
activities is hard to question. Other scholars, however, have stressed that employee 
involvement should not only be limited to safety-specific topics, such as participation in 
the design of safety procedures or safety goals. Barling et al. (2003), for example, have 
claimed that job autonomy and involvement in a broader sense is also important. 
Autonomy and involvement, they claim, improves job satisfaction which in turn has a 
positive effect on workers’ safety compliance. This positive relationship between 
employee involvement on the one hand, understood as control over their own work 
activities, and safety compliance on the other, is also emphasized by Cooper (2001) 
when he claims that: 
Increasing people’s opportunity for control over their work activities leads 
to greater acceptance of the necessity and the desirability of safety rules, 
which results in safety belonging to everyone. This also provides the 
motivation for people to conform to safety rules in spirit as well as in the 
letter of the law. (Cooper, 2001: 208)
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Nevertheless, there is not much empirical research on the relationship between 
employee involvement in this broader sense and safety compliance, at least not within 
the oil and gas industry. In the empirical work related to the second research question of 
this thesis, however, the impact that employee involvement has on safety compliance is 
explored to some extent (article #2). There, employee involvement (and competence) is 
treated as a part of the offshore workers’ work climate. 
3.3.5 Job demands and resources 
In the decades that have passed since Karasek (1979) introduced his now frequently 
applied and cited demand-control model, there has been a growth of empirical evidence 
showing that the combination of high job demands and low job resources is an 
important precursor of psychological strain and work-related illness (Bakker, 2007). 
One example of this is Schaufeli et al.’s (2009) longitudinal study of managers in the 
telecom industry which showed that the combination of increased job demands (such as 
work overload and time pressure) and decreased job resources (such as social support 
and feedback) is a significant predictor of both emotional burnout and sickness 
absenteeism (for earlier, but similar findings see e.g. Melamed et al., 1991; Taris et al., 
1999). Another example is Pekkarinen et al.’s (2013) recent study of nurses in Finland 
which demonstrated that high job demands were associated with higher levels of musc-
uloskeletal symptoms, and that job resources (in particular social support) helped to 
buffer against the negative effects of high job demands. 
Though research on occupational health has long been influenced by Karasek’s (1979) 
model and its modified successors (e.g. Karasek and Theorell, 1990), it is only recently 
that the model has had a direct impact in research on safety behaviour and safety 
outcomes (Hansez and Chmiel, 2010). The results, however, are noteworthy and 
important for the topic of the current thesis. For example, Nahrgang et al. (2011) have 
found full support for the demand-control model in their meta-analytic investigation of 
the relationship between job demands/resources and safety compliance. This implies 
that high job demands combined with low job resources were negatively related to 
safety compliance in their study. Turner et al.’s (2012) cross-sectional study of health 
care staff, however, only found empirical support for a significant positive relationship 
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between high job resources and safety compliance, but no significant negative 
relationship between high job demands and safety compliance. On the other hand, 
Hansez and Chmiel’s (2010) study of employees within the energy sector found that job 
demands had a negative effect on safety compliance and job resources a positive effect. 
This study also revealed some of the possible causal mechanisms between job 
demands/resources and safety compliance, since the effect was found to be indirect – 
through strain and motivation. Hence, they concluded that the findings imply that it is 
important in future studies of safety compliance to include variables that extend beyond 
the safety-specific ones. As described earlier, this is done in article #2 of this thesis, but 
job demands and resources are not explicitly dealt with there.  
A more explicit treatment of this thematic is to be found in the empirical work related to 
the first research question (article #1). There, however, job resources are excluded, 
whereas job demands are included as a part of the safety climate construct. To include 
job demands in safety climate constructs is not an uncommon choice. According to Flin 
et al. (2000) the job demand dimension (or work pressure) is, in fact, among the five 
most common sub-dimensions of the safety climate construct, and according to Zohar 
(2010) job demands (or the balance between different demands, such as safety vs. 
efficiency) is a key feature of an organization’s safety climate. It could therefore be 
argued that safety compliance research that applies Karasek’s (1979) demand-control 
model to a certain degree is related to safety compliance research that applies some sort 
of a safety climate model. 
3.3.6 Systematic HSE activities: safety compliance at the enterprise level 
According to Cooper’s (2000) theoretical model for understanding and analysing safety 
cultures, both individual and contextual factors affect workers’ safety behaviour – 
including compliance. One element within the set of contextual factors that Cooper 
specifically emphasizes is the organization’s safety management system. Thus, he 
stresses the importance of ‘examining the degree to which safety management systems 
actually influence people’s behaviour’ (Cooper, 2000: 126). Despite its importance 
though, he underlines that too little is known about the causal relationship between the 
quality of safety management systems and workers’ safety behaviour. More recently, 
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however, and as mentioned briefly in the introduction, a study conducted by Torp and 
Grøgaard (2009) supports Cooper’s emphasis. Torp and Grøgaard’s study, conducted 
among Norwegian motor mechanics, demonstrates that companies which have 
established a well-developed health and safety management system that meets legal 
obligations promote safety-compliant behaviour among the sharp-end workers. Thus, 
there is, as expected out of Cooper’s (2000) model, empirical support for a causal 
relationship between company compliance and individual compliance, where the former 
constitutes an important framework condition for the latter.
The findings of Torp and Grøgaard (2009) imply that variation in individual safety 
compliance, at least partly, can be explained by variation in company safety compliance 
– i.e. the degree to which the enterprise meets the legal requirements relating to safety at 
work. Hence, understanding the antecedents of individual safety compliance will benefit 
from an improved understanding of the factors that affect company safety compliance. 
Independent of this, investigating the factors that affect company safety compliance is a 
topic worthy of study in its own right, as it is correlated to more objective safety 
performance measures – such as, for example, occupational accidents (Cheng et al., 
2010). Accident investigations do also repeatedly point to enterprises’ lack of 
compliance with legal requirements relating to safety at work as a significant 
contributory factor (Hansen, 2010). This is also the case within the Norwegian oil and 
gas industry (e.g. PSA, 2009a, b, 2010a, b, 2011a, b). This illustrates the fact that 
research on safety compliance should not be limited to the individual level. Despite this, 
few studies have focused on the enterprise level. This implies that few studies have 
examined why some organizations follow the legal requirements relating to safety at 
work while others do not (Baldock et al., 2006). 
There are some exceptions though. For example, Saksvik et al.’s (2003) study of 
Norwegian companies’ compliance with regulations related to systematic health and 
safety activity found that large enterprises fulfilled more of the requirements of the 
regulations than did small enterprises, and that enterprises within the public sector were 
more compliant to the regulations than those within the private sector. This is consistent 
with Wright et al.’s (2005) review of previous research on the topic. Another study, 
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conducted by Baldock et al. (2006), of small British enterprises, found that management 
training and experience, use of external assistance with respect to health and safety 
topics, enterprise size, and membership of trade or business associations were 
significant factors which were positively related to rule compliance at the organizational 
level. Thus, the studies of both Saksvik et al. (2003), Wright et al. (2005), and Baldock 
et al. (2006) indicate that poor compliance with safety regulations at the organizational 
level arises from a limited access to health and safety resources. 
With direct relevance to the fourth research question of the thesis, Baldock et al. (2006) 
did also find that enterprises which had been inspected by regulatory authorities were 
far more likely to comply with safety regulations, compared to enterprises which had 
not been inspected. In fact, among a number of other variables tested, labour inspections 
were found to be the variable with the most positive influence on organizational safety 
compliance. 
The positive impact of labour inspections is supported in some other studies (Andersen 
et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2000), but the findings of these studies are limited by the fact 
that self-reported data forms the basis of the analyses. Hence, the studies are vulnerable 
to positive bias. In addition, the cross-sectional study design of these studies makes 
inferences regarding cause and effect relationships difficult. For these reasons, Hillage 
et al. (2001) have recommended experimental research designs when evaluating the 
impact of labour inspections. The study of labour inspection effects, presented in article 
#4, is based on such a research design. 
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4. Research design and methods 
4.1 The main lines 
According to Guthrie (2010), four different types of social science research can be 
identified – pure, applied, policy and action. Pure research is concerned with scientific 
outcomes in isolation, and the purpose of this type of research is to make discoveries 
that are of interest to scientists and science, and to make theoretical progress. Applied
research, on the other hand, is concerned with topics that have some type of potential 
for practical application, but the research design does not offer a particular way of 
implementing the results. Policy research, Guthrie describes, is based on practical 
issues that are of interest to those who make decisions about them – as for example 
studies that investigate the effect of governmental policies. The last type, action
research, is usually initiated to solve a concrete problem or to improve practical action 
within a limited area (for example an organization), by applying scientific theories and 
methods to analyse the situation and by implementing real measures to improve the 
situation. In line with action research’s pragmatic philosophical groundings it has thus 
been argued that the credibility and validity of action research should be measured 
according to whether actions that arise from it actually solve the practical problem at 
hand (Greenwood and Levin, 2007). 
Guthrie’s (2010) categorization is, of course, a simplification of reality as few real 
studies can be unambiguously localized within one of the four categories. Nevertheless, 
considered on a continuum (Figure 4) it makes sense to classify research with respect to 
its emphasis on practical action – or at least with respect to its intended importance for 
practical action. This is also the case for the research and the different research designs 
of the studies included in this thesis. 
As described in the introductory chapter, the empirical work of the thesis aims to 
generate knowledge that is of practical importance – especially for actors within the oil 
and gas industry. This is also reflected in the design of each study and in the choice of 
research methods. In the main, all of the studies are designed with the purpose of 
examining the conditions that are of importance for a particular type of practical action 
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– safety compliance. Then, the research methods applied are chosen to support this 
purpose. Furthermore, the particular conditions that the studies are designed to examine 
are first and foremost of the manageable type – the ones that (at least in principle) can 
be managed and controlled – not the ones that are fixed and immovable. Unlike action 
research, however, none of the studies included in the thesis are designed to manipulate 
these conditions with the intention of improving a concrete situation. Thus, it could be 
argued that the studies fall (or at least that they aim to fall) close to Guthrie’s applied
research category. That is, they are designed to shed light on ‘topics that have potential 
for practical application, but without a particular way of implementing the results’ 
(Guthrie, 2010: 5).
This classification of the studies included in the thesis is, however, only partly true. 
Each of the four studies is also designed with the purpose of making a theoretical 
contribution, either by testing hypotheses on the basis of previous theory and research 
(deduction) or by moving from specific observations to theory expansion (induction). 
Hence, it would be fair to say that the studies included in the thesis fall somewhere 
between pure and applied research. However, one of studies – the one which deals with 
the impact of labour inspections (article #4) – is a typical example of policy research; it 
deals with the effect of a particular governmental policy instrument and it aims (as will 
be described later) to provide data for decision-makers. Additionally though, that 
particular study also aims to offer a theoretical and scientific contribution by referring 
more to gaps in previous safety compliance research than to the information needs of 
Figure4
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the governmental decision-makers. Hence, in Guthrie’s terms it would be fair to say that 
the labour inspection study is a combination of policy research and pure research. 
Although the aims and the principal lines of each of the studies are highly related, they 
draw upon both qualitative and quantitative methods and a variety of different research 
designs – from field experiments, via questionnaire surveys, to semi-structured 
interviews. Such a combination of different research methods is often referred to as 
‘mixed method research’ (e.g. Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) or ‘triangulation’ (e.g. 
Denzin, 1970). According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the pluralistic approach 
of mixed methods research has its philosophical partner in pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, 
1920) since the research methods are chosen on the basis of what works best for 
answering a given research question and not on the basis of some extreme ontological 
or epistemological position (e.g. constructivism or positivism). In the following, a brief 
description of the design and methods of each of the four studies will be offered. A 
more comprehensive description is included in each of the four research articles. 
4.2 Research question 1: the offshore service vessel study 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter the first research question, concerning the 
relevance of previous safety compliance research within other industries, is addressed 
on the basis of a self-report questionnaire survey designed to monitor safety and 
working environment issues on offshore service vessels chartered by Statoil. This is a 
questionnaire that was developed by Studio Apertura, the research institute where I 
work, in 2000 and it has (with some revisions and adjustments) been employed for data 
collection within the same population every second year since then.
The study included in this thesis is based on data collected in the period from August to 
November 2010. The questionnaire consisted of 73 items related to topics such as safety 
management, accident reporting practices, risk exposure, work practices and compliance 
with safety procedures, and nine items related to demographic characteristics. A total of 
2,022 questionnaires were distributed to all 170 work shifts and 1,108 questionnaires 
were returned from 113 different shifts. On the work shift level this gives a response 
rate of 66%, and on the individual level a response rate of 55%. The individual response 
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rate is, however, a conservative estimate, since the number of questionnaires distributed 
exceeded the size of the population.  
Among the respondents, sailors (30%) constituted the largest occupational group, 
followed by officers (24%), engineers (18%), apprentices (8%), captains (8%), stewards 
(6%) and electricians (5%). As regards type of vessel, the largest group of respondents 
worked on supply vessels (46%), followed by respondents who worked on anchor 
handling vessels (32%) and standby vessels (21%). 
Before analysing the data, and consistent with the research question, an examination of 
earlier research was conducted to identify variables that previously had been recognized 
as important in explaining variation in safety-compliant behaviour. At this stage, it was 
not deemed important to focus solely on contextual (system) variables. Alper and 
Karsh’s (2009) review of the topic was considered particularly relevant as it offered a 
condensed collection of previous research. Also, their review study revealed that few 
studies of the topic have been conducted within the oil and gas industry (and to my 
knowledge – there have been none on offshore service vessels). 
On the basis of previous research, and in particular Alper and Karsh’s review study, 
four hypotheses were formulated. One of these was derived from the extensive body of 
safety climate research (e.g. Cavazza and Serpe, 2009; Lu and Tsai, 2010) which shows 
that a positive safety climate promotes safety-compliant behaviour. Another one was 
derived from research that emphasizes the negative effect that unclear procedures 
(procedure vagueness) has on safety-compliant behaviour (e.g. Elling, 1987; Laurence, 
2005). These two hypotheses, which explicitly deal with systemic conditions, were 
combined with two hypotheses that deal with individual attributes. These were related 
to the vessel workers’ demographic attributes and were derived from research which 
demonstrates that age (e.g. Gyekye and Salminen, 2009; Lu and Yang, 2011) and job 
experience (e.g. Hobbs and Williamson, 2002b) are positively related to safety 
compliance. 
Two items from the survey were used to measure age and job experience and 18 items 
were used to measure safety climate and procedure vagueness. The 18 items were 
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selected on face value and previous research (in particular Flin et al., 2000) and 
included statements such as ‘safety has first priority in the shipping company where I 
work’, ‘sometimes I feel forced to continue working, although safety can be threatened’ 
and ‘the procedures are difficult to understand/vaguely formulated’. In order to uncover 
the underlying factor structure of the 18 items and to reduce the number of items to a 
manageable size, a first order and a second order exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 
conducted (Meyers et al., 2006). These analyses revealed that the second order factor 
safety climate and the first order factor procedure vagueness were two distinct 
constructs.5
The dependent variable, safety compliance, was measured by one single item. This item 
was formulated as a statement regarding compliance with safety procedures (‘I always 
follow the procedures’) with which the respondents were asked to indicate agreement or 
disagreement by either ticking the statement or by not ticking the statement. This was 
coded as yes = 1 and no = 0, respectively.
Regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesized relationship between the set 
of independent variables and safety compliance. Since ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is not appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous (as is the case 
here), binary logistic regression (BLR) was chosen to test the hypotheses. BLR is a 
statistical method which has expanded from its origins in biomedical research to 
research within the social and behavioural sciences. It has become so widespread that 
Huck (2004: 438) predicts that ‘it may soon overtake multiple regression and become 
the most frequently used regression tool of all’. Unlike OLS, the BLR allows one to test 
whether or not a set of independent variables can predict the probability of a case falling 
into the higher value (i.e. the value 1) on the dependent variable (Meyers et al., 2006) – 
in our case, the probability of a given individual reporting that he/she always follows 
the procedures on board the vessel.6
5 The results from the second order EFA was checked by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), as 
recommended by Milfont and Duckitt, J. (2004). 
6 All analyses were conducted with SPSS 18.0 software. 
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4.3 Research question 2: the offshore platforms study 
Similar to the first research question, the second research question, regarding the 
influence that leadership involvement has on safety compliance among front-line 
offshore platform workers, is also addressed on the basis of a self-report questionnaire 
survey. As described briefly in the introductory chapter this is a questionnaire survey 
which originally was designed to monitor effectiveness and safety during the merger 
process of Statoil and Hydro in the period between January 2009 and October 2010. The 
survey was conducted six times among all Statoil’s employees. Hence, six separate data 
analyses were conducted for each sub-sample and in addition one analysis for the total 
sample. The questionnaire consisted of 39 items related to a varied set of local 
workplace factors such as leadership, risk, roles, safety practices, job satisfaction, and 
safety compliance. 
The total sample consisted of 10,003 respondents working on one of Statoil’s (at that 
time) 28 different offshore installations. The size of the six different sub-samples varied 
from 1,316 in May 2010 to 2,068 in October 2010. The mean response rate for all six 
samples was 65%, but this varied from a low of 52% in January 2010 to a high of 86% 
in October 2010. Among the respondents in the total sample 88% were men. This is 
representative of the gender distribution on the NCS as a whole, where approximately 
90% are men (PSA, 2012c). As regards age, 57% of the respondents in the total sample 
were above 45 years, 32% were between 36 and 45 years, and 12% were below 36 
years. 
Prior to analysing the data, a review of previous research concerning the relationship 
between leadership and safety compliance was conducted. As has been described 
earlier, this review revealed that previous research on the topic has primarily focused on 
the safety-specific dimensions of leadership (e.g. Biggs and Banks, 2012; Kapp, 2012; 
Krause et al., 1999; Lu and Yang, 2010; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009; Zohar, 2002; 
Zohar and Luria, 2003) and that the more general dimensions of leadership have not 
been examined with similar depth. There is, however, reason to believe that a broader 
set of leadership actions, such as the degree to which leaders are involved in the sub-
ordinates’ work operations, must be taken into account in order to more fully 
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understand the relationship between leadership and safety compliance. The studies of 
for example Mattila et al. (1994), Fleming et al. (1996), and O’Dea and Flin (2001) 
demonstrate that supervisors who are close to the sharp end of the work operations and 
have a cooperative and participative relationship with their subordinates generate more 
safety compliance within their work group. Investigations of accidents within the 
Norwegian offshore oil and gas industry point in the same direction, (e.g. PSA, 2005a, 
2007a, 2011a). Thus, it was hypothesized that leadership involvement will positively 
influence safety compliance. In addition to this direct effect it was also hypothesized 
that the effect of leadership involvement would be indirect, by affecting the work 
climate constructively and that a positive work climate in turn would have a positive 
influence on safety compliance. Three separate work climate dimensions (and thus three 
separate hypotheses) were emphasized: (1) workers’ competence and involvement, (2) 
role clarity, and (3) follow-up of contractors (Figure 5 summarizes the full hypothetical 
model).
Sixteen items from the survey were used to measure the constructs included in the 
hypothetical model. In order to uncover the underlying latent factor structure of these 
items and in order to reduce the number of variables to a manageable size, EFA was 
conducted on the first sample (the sample from January 2009). Then five separate 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on the remaining five samples to 
evaluate the replicability of the factor structure generated by the EFA. All the CFAs 
Figure5
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confirmed that the same factor structure that the EFA had uncovered could also be 
replicated in the five succeeding samples. The leadership involvement factor included 
items such as ‘my leader participates actively in planning and preparing the work’, and 
the safety compliance factor included items such as ‘if we are uncertain about the 
execution of risk-exposed tasks, we always execute a safe job analysis (SJA)’. Items 
such as ‘I am able to utilize my expertise and abilities in my present position’, ‘the 
responsibilities of my position are unambiguously documented’, and ‘in my unit we 
closely follow up suppliers/contractors we work with’, were related to the three work 
climate dimensions – workers’ competence and involvement, role clarity, and follow-up 
of contractors, respectively. 
In order to assess the four hypotheses (which corresponds to the paths between the 
constructs in Figure 5), multiple regression analysis was found not to be appropriate as 
it is incapable of assessing models with latent variables7 and indirect relationships 
(Meyers et al., 2006). Since the latent variables consisted of several manifest variables7,
neither path analysis was found to be appropriate. Path analysis is usually used to assess 
paths between constructs, but its use is limited to variables that are operationalized by 
only a single measure (Maruyama, 1997). The four hypotheses were therefore tested by 
structural equation modelling (SEM) – one test for each measurement period and one 
for the total sample.8
SEM is a statistical technique which combines path, factor, and regression analyses and 
is suitable for testing direct and indirect relationships between a set of latent variables. 
The SEM consists of a measurement model, which describes the connections between 
the latent variables and the manifest indicators that comprises them, and a structural 
model, which describes the (causal) relationship between the latent variables (Tomarken 
and Waller, 2005). Typically, the two models are estimated in one go, the so-called one-
step strategy. However, this strategy could cause problems because if the complete 
7 Latent variables are variables which are not directly measurable by a measuring instrument (e.g. social 
class, intelligence, satisfaction, safety compliance etc.). Instead they are measured by a set of indicators, 
i.e. manifest variables (e.g. questions in a questionnaire). See for example Blunch (2008). 
8 The EFA and its accompanying analyses were conducted using SPSS 18.0 software. The CFAs and the 
structural model assessments were conducted using AMOS 18.0 software. 
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model does not fit the data it is complicated to find out whether the lack of fit arises 
from the measurement model or from the structural model. Thus, Blunch (2008: 162) 
recommends a two-step strategy: ‘first analyze the model as a confirmatory factor 
analysis model and then put in the one-headed arrows and analyze the full model’. 
Blunch’s recommendation was followed in the test of the four hypotheses, i.e. first the 
CFAs, then the assessment of the causal relationships between the constructs. 
4.4 Research question 3: the maintenance and modification work study 
Unlike the first two research questions (and unlike the majority of previous safety 
compliance research), the third research question is addressed on the basis of a 
qualitative study. As mentioned in the description of the research context, the study 
consisted of interviews of contract workers employed by a large maintenance and 
modification company which operates within the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The 
purpose was to identify, categorize and gain a comprehension of the most significant 
factors that affect these workers’ knowledge of safety rules and procedures. That is – to 
gain a deeper understanding of the factors that hinder or facilitate such knowledge. 
As discussed briefly in the introductory chapter, such insight is believed to be important 
for several reasons. First, previous research primarily has been concerned with factors 
that affect workers’ attitudes and motivation towards safety compliance and less with 
the factors that affect their knowledge of rules and procedures (Barber, 2002). Thus, on 
the basis of Reason’s already described distinction between intentional and 
unintentional violations and their different origins, it could be argued that the 
accumulated insight into the root causes of intentional violations far exceeds the 
accumulated insight into the root causes of unintentional violations, and that a more 
complete understanding of the antecedent of safety-compliant behaviour will benefit 
from reducing this research gap. Secondly, such insight is believed to be important 
because in fact (as described in chapter three) a larger proportion of actual accidents in 
the oil and gas industry are linked to unintentional violations than to intentional 
violations (Walker et al., 2012; see also OGP, 2013). This could indicate that 
appropriate knowledge of rules and procedures is a bigger challenge than the attitudes 
towards following them. 
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The particular branch of the oil and gas industry that this study deals with, and the 
respondents interviewed in the study were selected by means of purposive sampling 
(Patton, 2002). This means that the branch and the interviewees were not selected 
randomly, but on the basis of some particular characteristics – some predefined criteria. 
Four such criteria were set. The first criterion was that the selected branch of the oil and 
gas industry had to be highly regulated by safety rules and procedures. The second was 
that the particular branch had to be high risk. The third was that the respondents selected 
had to be sharp-end workers who directly interact with some type of hazardous process. 
The last criterion was that some variation between the respondents with respect to their 
professional background and experience was required in order to provide a rich 
collection of information. Based on the recommendations of Bailey (2007) it was also 
deemed necessary to have at least 20 respondents and then to add new respondents into 
the sample until little new information could be added to the analysis. 
Based on these criteria (and with extraordinary and indispensable help from a 
gatekeeper in the company who provided me with full access to the field), 24 sharp-end 
workers from the maintenance and modification company were asked to participate in 
the study. Twenty-three of these were men, one a woman, and none of them refused to 
participate in the study. They were all interviewed on-site – at their workplace.
As described earlier, twelve of the participants worked offshore on a fixed production 
platform, and twelve worked onshore on a large gas receiving terminal. Within both 
onshore and offshore contract work, the use of subcontractors is frequent. This was also 
reflected in the study sample, as 10 of the respondents were employed by subcontractor 
companies hired by the contractor: five worked offshore and five worked onshore. 
Three different subcontractor companies were represented. All of these are also large-
scale actors within the Norwegian oil and gas industry. As regards occupation, six of the 
onshore workers were mechanics/welders, three were scaffolding installers, two were 
electricians and one was an engineer. Three of the onshore workers also functioned as 
regional safety delegates/HSE coordinators, and two had supervisory responsibilities. 
Among the offshore workers eight were electricians/automation workers and four were 
65
mechanics/welders. Four of these also functioned as regional safety delegates, and two 
had supervisory responsibilities. 
Questions related to safety, and in particular questions related to the respondents own 
safety behaviour, can be extremely sensitive within the oil and gas industry. Prior to the 
interviews all interviewees were therefore informed that their answers would be treated 
anonymously and in strict confidence, and that the recordings and the transcriptions 
would be stored on a secure server and deleted after use. The respondents were also 
informed that they could break off the interview whenever they wanted and refuse to 
answer questions they found too sensitive (none made use of this opportunity).  
The interviews conducted were about one hour long, and they were semi-structured. 
Semi-structured interviews are usually used to identify factors, variables, items and 
attributes, and typically they combine the flexibility of unstructured and open-ended 
interviews with the rigidity of the structured interviews and the survey instruments 
(Schensul et al., 1999). In this study this was done by first producing an interview guide 
(attached to article #3) with some predefined open-ended questions and topics. Then, 
during the interviews, the order of the questions and topics was modified when 
appropriate, and questions were added, deleted, probed, and modified in order to elicit 
relevant and informative answers from the interviewees. This is typical for semi-
structured interviews, because the basic assumption behind them is that ‘the researcher 
does not know all the necessary questions regarding the topic and therefore cannot 
know in advance the full range of questions that will be needed’ (Cargan, 2007: 108). 
The interview guide (which can correctly be referred to as a ‘guide’ and not a rigid 
‘instruction’) was developed on the basis of a pre-study with a length of about three 
months. This pre-study included several meetings and informal conversations with 
blunt-end representatives (senior managers and HSE managers) at the company’s main 
office, and with sharp-end representatives at the gas terminal and the platform, such as 
installation leaders, supervisors, safety delegates, HSE personnel and craftsmen from 
different disciplines. In addition the pre-study included observations of actual work, 
both onshore and offshore, attendance at toolbox meetings, work permit meetings and 
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safety rounds, and an examination of relevant documents such as the company’s HSE 
policy, project contracts, work permits and work packages. A review of previous 
research and relevant literature was also included in the pre-study period. 
There are numerous approaches for identifying and analysing emerging and recurring 
patterns and themes in qualitative data. In this study content analysis was employed. 
Content analysis has a long history within the social sciences and was first used as a 
method for analysing texts in, for example, newspapers, magazines, articles and 
political speeches, by reducing the complexity of a phenomenon into defined content 
categories. Basically, the purpose of a content analysis is to attain a condensed and 
broad description of the study object, and the end result of the analysis is (or should be) 
concepts and categories which describe the phenomenon (Harwood and Garry, 2003). 
The type of content analysis that was employed in this study was open coding (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008). Open coding is primarily an inductive content analysis. This implies 
that the findings and the thematic categories emerge out of the data and not from an 
already existing theoretical framework. By following the guidelines of Corbin and 
Strauss (2008), the method of open coding in the study of maintenance and modification 
work implied a process in which the interviewees’ statements (which were recorded and 
transcribed) were given conceptual labels (statement by statement), based on their 
content. Then, by comparing similarities and differences between the labels, the 
statements and their corresponding labels were grouped under more abstract categories. 
These categories (or factors) were then named according to their core consistencies and 
meanings.  
In contrast to the inductive character of the first part of the analysis, the second part had 
a more deductive character. This means that the appropriateness and authenticity of the 
content analysis and the thematic categories that had been developed were tested and 
affirmed. This deductive approach is recommended by Patton (2002), and includes a re-
examination of the data which focuses particularly on identifying cases that do not fit 
the categories developed in the inductive part of the analysis.
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4.5 Research question 4: the labour inspection study 
As described briefly in the introductory chapter the fourth research question, regarding 
the impact of labour inspections, is addressed on the basis of two field experiments 
conducted within the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA). The design and 
implementation of the experiments are the end result of a project that I was responsible 
for in a period of more than two years, prior to my PhD scholarship. I was then 
employed at the NLIA as a health and safety adviser, and the goal of this particular 
project was (1) to assess and measure the (eventual) effect that labour inspections have 
on enterprises’ compliance with health and safety regulations and (2) to present the 
(eventual) effect by means of a quantitative indicator. 
In the period between 2008 and 2012 (when the project was active) all inspections 
performed by the NLIA were divided among seven different priority areas. These were 
(1) chemical hazards, (2) technical safety, (3) work-related musculoskeletal disorders, 
(4) work-related psychological disorders, (5) workplace adaption, (6) social dumping, 
and (7) young workers. The goal of the project was to develop five separate indicators 
for the first five priority areas. Hence, separate field experiments were conducted within 
each of the five priority areas. However, since the current thesis deals with safety rather 
than health-related issues or employment conditions, it is important to underline that the 
fourth research question is based solely on the field experiments linked to the two 
priority areas that are most clearly related to safety, namely chemical hazards and 
technical safety. Hence, the experiments that were conducted within the other priority 
areas are not referred to in the labour inspection study. 
Essentially, an experiment is a form of research methodology which examines the effect 
that an independent variable has on a dependent variable by means of comparing two 
groups – an experimental group and a control group. The difference between the two 
groups is that the experimental group is exposed to the conditions of the experiment (i.e. 
the independent variable), whereas the control group is not. The independent variable is 
usually under the control of the experimenter and it is typically of the dichotomous type 
(e.g. treatment or no treatment). To assure comparability and to eliminate spurious 
variables, the two groups must be as equal as possible. This is usually obtained by 
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means of random assignment, but it can also be obtained by matching pairs (Clarke and 
Dawson, 1999). 
During the last five to six decades there has been a rapid growth in the use of 
experiments in the social sciences (Webster and Sell, 2007), in particular within social 
psychology, where some classical experiments have had a profound impact on the 
development of the research field (e.g. Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1963; Sherif, 1935). If 
conducted correctly, the experimental research design provides effect measures that 
have a high level of internal validity. That is, experiments enable relatively firm 
conclusions to be drawn with regard to the causal relationship between the independent 
and the dependent variable (Babbie, 2010). However, when they are conducted inside a 
laboratory with a high degree of artificiality, simplicity, and experimental control, the 
external validity (generalizability outside the laboratory) will typically be low (Walker 
and Willer, 2007). Within the social sciences, including safety science, the pure 
experimental design is therefore usually replaced with different types of quasi-
experimental designs, where some of the characteristics of the true experimental design 
are altered (Shannon et al., 1999). 
The two experiments that form the empirical basis of the labour inspection study were 
both conducted with a specific type of quasi-experimental design. This design is often 
referred to as the post-test-only control group design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963)9 – 
which means that there were no pre-tests of the dependent variable (or any other 
variables) within the experimental groups or the control groups. In addition, the 
experiments were framed as field experiments, where the study objects were studied 
within their naturally occurring environment (not within a laboratory).  
In both the chemical hazard experiment and the technical safety experiment the goal 
was to compare the level of compliance with national safety regulations in inspected 
versus previously uninspected enterprises. Thus, the difference between the 
experimental groups and the control groups was that enterprises within the former 
groups had been previously subject to inspections which either focused on chemical 
9 This design has also been referred to as after-only measures and a control group, see Robson et al. 
(2001). 
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hazards or technical safety (during the previous calendar year), whereas enterprises 
within the latter groups had never before been subject to labour inspections. 
Assignment of enterprises to the experimental group in the chemical hazard experiment 
was done by means of randomization, where 100 enterprises were selected randomly 
from a list of enterprises that previously had been subject to inspections which focused 
on chemical hazards. Assignment of enterprises to the experimental group in the 
technical safety experiment was similar, but with one noticeable difference. First, 40 
enterprises were selected randomly from a list of enterprises which had previously been 
subject to an inspection due to an accident. Then, another 40 enterprises which had 
previously been subject to a preventive inspection (not motivated by an accident) were 
selected. These last 40 enterprises were, however, not selected randomly, but by means 
of matched pairs. This means that each enterprise in the first group had a matching 
enterprise in the second group. Three variables were used as matching criteria: branch 
of industry, geographical localization and number of employees. The establishment of 
two experimental groups in the technical safety experiment mirrored the fact that two 
different types of inspections exist within this priority area – accident inspections and 
preventive inspections. 
To assure comparability between the experimental groups and the control groups, the 
assignment of enterprises to the control groups was done by using matched pairs. This 
implied that enterprises which had not previously been subject to an inspection were 
selected to match those in the experimental groups. Again, the three variables, branch of 
industry, geographical localization and number of employees were used as criteria for 
matching. In total, 100 enterprises were selected to match those from the experimental 
chemical hazard group, and 40 enterprises were selected to match those selected from 
the two experimental technical safety groups. 
In order to compare the experimental groups and the control groups, follow-up 
inspections were conducted by regular inspectors from the NLIA. During these 
inspections the inspectors applied a checklist to report the level of compliance with 
safety regulations within the enterprises. The checklists consisted of eight variables 
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developed by the project group (one list for the chemical hazard experiment and one for 
the technical safety experiment – both are included in article #4). All eight variables 
were dichotomous, and were either assigned a ‘yes’, indicating compliance, or a ‘no’, 
indicating non-compliance. A ‘yes’ gave a score of 1, and a ‘no’ gave a score of 0. 
Thus, on the basis of the checklists all enterprises were assigned an index-score of 
between 0 and 8. This score was treated as a measure of compliance with safety 
regulations on the enterprise level (dependent variable), and was thus used to test 
whether inspected enterprises displayed a significantly higher level of compliance with 
safety regulations than did previously uninspected enterprises.
It is important to note that all variables in the checklists represented compliance with a 
specific relevant statutory demand. If an enterprise was assigned a ‘no’ on a given 
variable, this would therefore also generate a formal order. Hence, the potential for 
systematic errors, positive bias and reduced validity were reduced by the fact that a 
‘yes’ or a ‘no’ would trigger a juridical consequence. 
The statistical test employed in the chemical hazard experiment was the independent 
samples t-test (Field, 2005). The t-test tested whether the mean safety compliance index 
scores in the experimental group were significantly higher than those in the control 
group. A t-test was not appropriate in the technical safety experiment since the data 
consisted of three groups (the two experimental groups and the control group). Thus, a 
one-way ANOVA, which can test mean differences between three or more groups, was 
conducted (Field, 2005).
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5. Summary of research findings 
In the following, the research findings related to the four research questions will be 
summarized. First, the findings from the offshore service vessel study will be presented 
(article #1). This is followed by a presentation of the results from the offshore platforms 
study (article #2). Then the findings from the maintenance and modification work study 
(article #3) are presented, and lastly the results from the labour inspection study (article 
#4). The summary of the research findings will prepare for a more thorough discussion 
and conclusion in chapter six. 
5.1 A multi-factorial approach (article #1) 
The findings related to the first research question are published in the article titled 
Antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour on offshore service vessels: a multi-factorial 
approach (Dahl et al., 2013). Based on previous research within other industries, the 
aim of the article is to develop and test a research model which measures the relation-
ship between a set of explanatory factors and safety compliance. This is relevant, not 
only for shedding light on the first research question, but also for the offshore service 
vessel industry in isolation – where such research has never previously been conducted 
and where a lack of safety compliance constitute a significant causal factor in for 
example collisions between vessels and petroleum installations (Kvitrud, 2011; PSA, 
2011c). The developed model is multi-factorial and includes elements related to the
individual worker, the organization (in terms of the vessels’ safety climate) and the
body of procedures that governs the vessel workers’ work tasks. 
In essence, three key findings were revealed by the already described binary logistic 
regression analysis (BLR). Each of these was related to the three elements of the 
research model. 
As regards the individual worker, the BLR revealed that the older vessel workers are 
more compliant than their younger colleagues. This was as expected from the first 
hypothesis of the article and in accordance with previous findings from other industries 
(e.g. Gyekye and Salminen, 2009; Lu and Yang, 2011). Additionally, as regards the 
individual worker, it was found that job experience was significantly and negatively 
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related to safety compliance. This finding was the opposite of what was expected from 
the article’s second hypothesis and the literature review (e.g. Hobbs and Williamson, 
2002b). Though significant, it should be noted that the effect that these individual 
variables were found to exert on safety compliance was relatively low. The vessel 
workers’ age accounted for only 5.7% of the variation in safety compliance. When job 
experience was entered into the BLR, the explained variation increased slightly, to 
8.6%.
A substantial increase in the explained variance (from 8.6% to 18.9%) was obtained 
when the first contextual variable was included in the regression model – safety 
climate.10 The relationship between safety climate and safety compliance was found to 
be significantly and highly positively related. More specifically, the BLR demonstrated 
that vessel workers who perceived the safety climate on board their vessel as positive 
(i.e. safety climate = 5) had a predicted probability of reporting always to follow 
procedures of 67.7% (all other variables held constant with minimum values). For 
vessel workers who perceived the safety climate as negative (i.e. safety climate = 1) this 
probability was 1.3%. This finding is illustrated in Figure 6.  
10 The second order factor safety climate consisted of five first order factors. These were: (1) captain’s 
safety leadership, (2) risk, (3) safety training, (4) general safety orientation on board, and (5) efficiency
demands.
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The findings related to safety climate imply that vessel workers who perceive safety as 
valued on the vessel where they work have a far greater probability of reporting always 
working in accordance with the procedures. This is consistent with previous safety 
climate research conducted within other industries, as described in chapter 3 (e.g. 
Agnew et al., 2013; Cavazza and Serpe, 2009; Sinclair et al., 2010) and with review 
studies on the topic (Alper and Karsh, 2009; Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006). The 
finding is also consistent with Zohar (2010) who asserts that the safety climate acts as a 
frame of reference for safety-specific behaviour, and that employee behaviour will tend 
to align with the sort of role behaviour employees perceive is expected, supported and 
rewarded within their work context. 
As regards the body of procedures that governs the vessel workers’ work tasks, the BLR 
revealed that the explained variation in safety compliance increased additionally when 
procedure vagueness was entered into the model (from 18.9% to 23.4%). As expected 
from the last hypothesis of the article and from previous research described in chapter 
three (e.g. Laurence, 2005), the BLR demonstrated that the more vague the procedures 
were perceived by the respondents the less frequent they reported that they always 
followed the procedures. More specifically, the BLR demonstrated that vessel workers 
who perceived the safety procedures as clear (i.e. procedure vagueness = 1) had a 
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predicted probability of reporting always to follow procedures of 74.7% (safety climate 
held constant with maximum value, age and job experience held constant with 
minimum values). For vessel workers who perceived the safety procedures as vague 
(i.e. procedure vagueness = 5) this probability was 33.1%. This finding is illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
In sum, the findings from the offshore service vessel study demonstrate that the multi-
factorial research model, which was primarily built on research from sectors other than 
the oil and gas industry, has high predictive value within the oil and gas industry.  As 
regards the first research question, the study therefore illustrate that safety-compliant 
behaviour among front-line oil and gas workers can be understood and explained (at 
least partly) on the basis of explanatory variables that have been found relevant within 
other industries. The study also implies that shipowners, captains, and other 
stakeholders within the offshore service vessel industry should consider increasing 
safety compliance from a broad multifactorial perspective. 
5.2 Leadership involvement (article #2) 
The article Safety compliance on offshore platforms: a multi-sample survey on the role 
of perceived leadership involvement and work climate (Dahl and Olsen, 2013), presents 
the results related to the second research question. As described earlier, previous 
research on the relationship between leadership and safety compliance has focused on 
the clearly safety-specific dimensions of leadership, such as monitoring, correction, and 
reward for safe behaviour (e.g. Inness et al., 2010; Kapp, 2012; Zohar, 2002), whereas 
few studies have focused on the more general dimensions, such as trust, cooperation, 
and involvement (Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004). The purpose of the article is 
therefore to examine the causal relationship between one such general dimension, 
namely leadership involvement, and safety compliance, and thereby also to shed light 
on the thesis’ second research question. In the article, leadership involvement is 
operationalized as workers’ perceptions of the degree to which leaders participate in the 
planning and preparation of work, follow up the execution of the work, and contribute 
to good cooperation among team members.  
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The structural equation modelling (SEM), which is described in section 4.3 and 
illustrated graphically in Figure 5, revealed that leadership involvement has a positive 
influence on safety compliance. This was found in all the six sub-samples (from January 
2009 and till October 2010), and in the total sample. This indicates that the more 
involved offshore oil and gas leaders are in their subordinates’ work the higher is the 
subordinates’ (self-reported) propensity to work in accordance with safety procedures. 
This was as expected from the first hypothesis of the article. It was also consistent with 
what can be expected from accident investigations and analyses in the petroleum 
industry, where non-compliance is often seen as a result of lacking leadership 
involvement (Austnes-Underhaug et al., 2011; Hayes, 2012; PSA, 2005a). In addition, 
the finding was in accordance with the relatively limited amount of research that has 
been done in this area of safety leadership research, for example O’Dea and Flin’s 
(2001) study of leadership in the UK offshore oil and gas industry. In their study it was 
found that high leadership involvement in work operations and frequent communication 
between workers and leaders was important for safety compliance. The direct effect of 
leadership involvement in the current study was, however, only moderate and not even 
significant in the fifth sub-sample.  
Based on the SEM, leadership involvement seemed to have a more powerful indirect 
effect, by affecting the work climate positively – and in turn the work climate had a 
Figure8
Thehypotheticalmodelappliedintheoffshoreplatformsstudy,withresultsfromtheSEMͲanalysisof
thetotalsample.Pathvaluesarestandardizedbetacoefficients.Allpathsaresignificant:*p<0.001
(adaptedfromDahlandOlsen,2013:23).
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significant influence on safety compliance. This finding is illustrated in Figure 8, which 
is the outcome version of Figure 5 (with path values estimated on the basis of data from 
the total sample, i.e. all six sub-samples). As can be seen from the figure, the indirect 
effect of leadership involvement is positive and significant through all three work 
climate dimensions. More specifically, this implies (1) that there is a powerful, positive 
and significant relationship between leadership involvement and all three work climate 
dimensions (the standardized beta values vary from 0.59 and to 0.68). This was as 
expected from the last three hypotheses of the study, and in accordance with, for 
example, Stringer’s (2002) work climate research which demonstrates that leadership 
can explain up to 67% of the total variance in the work climate. The finding also implies 
(2) that there is a positive and significant relationship between the three work climate 
dimensions (workers’ competence and involvement, role clarity and follow-up of 
contractors) and safety compliance (the standardized beta values vary from 0.13 and to 
0.46). This finding was as expected from the last three hypotheses of the study. It was 
also in accordance with scholars such as DeJoy et al. (2004) and Reiman and Oedewald 
(2004) who have argued for a broadening of the scope of safety climate research which 
focuses primarily on the safety-specific aspects of the climate and not the broader 
climate characteristics. 
More specifically, the finding was also in accordance with previous studies that have 
argued for a positive relationship between the work climate dimensions applied in this 
study and safety compliance. For example (a) the studies of Bourrier (2005) and 
Antonsen et al. (2008) have argued for a positive link between employee involvement 
and safety compliance, (b) Sneddon et al.’s (2006) study of UK offshore drillers has 
argued for a negative link between role ambiguity and safety compliance, and (c) 
Mearns et al.’ (2003) study of safety management practices in UK offshore environ-
ments have argued that active follow-up of contractors is important for safety 
performance and compliance.  
In summary, the results from the offshore platforms study draw attention to the 
important role that offshore leaders play as providers of a climate which fosters a high 
level of safety compliance. Furthermore, and relevant with regard to the second research 
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question, the results of the study demonstrate that good safety leadership extends 
beyond the clearly safety-specific dimensions of leadership and that high leadership 
involvement in the work of employees is important. This finding also points to the need 
of offering offshore leaders sufficient time outside their offices and on the front line of 
operations.
5.3 Context and knowledge of rules and procedures (article #3) 
The results from the qualitative study of maintenance and modification work, which 
deals with the third research question, are presented in the article Safety compliance in a 
highly regulated environment: a case study of workers’ knowledge of rules and 
procedures within the petroleum industry (Dahl, 2013). As described earlier, the article 
points to the fact that previous safety compliance and violation research primarily has 
been concerned with factors that affect workers’ attitudes and motivation towards 
following safety rules and procedures, whereas little research has been done on factors 
that affect workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures. This imbalance is not new, 
safety violations and unsafe behaviour in general has long been seen as a product of 
improper attitudes and motivation (e.g. Heinrich, 1931; Slocombe, 1941). Hence, the 
focus has traditionally been on factors that can explain (and prevent) variation in these. 
For example, in the 1970s Andriessen (1978) claimed that… 
…in normal work situations, work behaviour will probably be determined 
more by motivation because the pre-requisite knowledge and skills needed 
will usually be present as a result of selection and training. Whether work 
will be done more or less safely, will then be a matter of motivation.
(Andriessen, 1978: 364) 
The results from the maintenance and modification work study quickly revealed that 
such claims, more than 30 years later, are not valid within the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry. This industry is highly regulated, but pre-requisite knowledge of rules and 
procedures cannot be taken for granted. As regards the actual level of knowledge, three 
groups of workers were identified in the interview material. The first group of workers 
(7 of 24 interviewees) reported active use of the IT-based safety management system 
(where all rules and procedures were accessible): they knew how to use it, they knew 
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how to locate the relevant procedures, they frequently searched for updates and they 
regularly read through all relevant procedures they did not know well enough or had not 
understood. Formally, this was also expected from the workers. Because, in order to 
ensure that all workers have acquired the necessary knowledge of the rules and 
procedures that regulated a given work task, each worker involved in the task had to 
confirm, by signing the work permit, that a specified set of rules and procedures relating 
to the given work task were fully known and understood. This practice is common 
within the entire Norwegian oil and gas industry, and no workers are allowed to 
participate in a given work task without confirming up-to-date knowledge of the rules 
and procedures that govern the task (Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, 2013). 
However, interviewees identified within the second group (4 of 24 interviewees) knew 
how to use the safety management system and how to locate the relevant procedures 
within it, but they did not regularly check the system for updates, and rarely did they 
read through procedures they felt they did not know well enough or had not understood 
properly. As such, their knowledge of rules and procedures was medium. The third 
group of workers (13 of 24 interviewees), however, differed considerably from the two 
other groups. In addition to not checking the IT-based safety management system for 
updates, these workers seldom or never used the system at all and they did not know 
how to use it. Since all the relevant rules and procedures were available in the IT-based 
safety management system (and only there) their knowledge of rules and procedures 
was poor.
By analysing the interview material it was found that the onshore workers and the 
offshore subcontractor workers were overrepresented within this last group, and that 
eight different factors within the workers’ work context could explain the variation 
related to knowledge of rules and procedures among the interviewees.  
The first three of the identified factors were related to the IT-based safety management 
system itself, wherein the body of rules and procedures was assembled. The three 
factors were (1) access to the safety management system, (2) the user-friendliness of the 
system and (3) training in how to use it. For example, one of the main reasons why the 
onshore workers seemed to be overrepresented within the low-knowledge group was 
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related to the fact that they lacked sufficient training and adequate access to the safety 
management system. This effect was negative, not only because these conditions were 
disadvantageous to the workers’ practical skills in terms of how to use the safety 
management system and how to find the relevant procedures, but also because it 
signalled to the workers that an in-depth knowledge of rules and procedures was not as 
necessary as had been stated formally through their signature on the work permit.  
The next three factors that were identified were related to the characteristics of the work 
itself and to the conditions of employment that the workers were bound by. The first of 
these factors was (4) routinized work. This means that interviewees who saw their work 
as being unpredictable and varied often reported that their acquired skills were not 
sufficient to solve their tasks in a safe way and that this increased their need to become 
familiar with safety rules and procedures. On the other hand, interviewees who saw 
their work as highly routinized often reported that the repetitive character of their work 
led to a reduced need for such familiarization. The next factor within the group of work 
characteristics was (5) perceived risk level. This means that interviewees who perceived 
the risk level in their work to be high were usually of the opinion that knowledge of 
rules and procedures was important for safe practice, whereas interviewees who 
perceived the risk level in their work to be low were more often of the opposite opinion. 
Several of the interviewees also reported that an increased and explicit management 
focus on risks could encourage more workers to realize the important role that rules and 
procedures play in risk reduction. The last factor related to the characteristics of work 
was (6) subcontracting. Subcontracting had a clear negative effect on knowledge of 
rules and procedures. This negative effect was primarily visible among the offshore 
subcontractor workers who frequently moved between different installations and 
worked for different operating companies. Their nomadic existence reduced their 
opportunity to become familiar with the operator-specific safety management system 
and the installation-specific body of rules and procedures. In addition they felt that their 
number-one priority was to perform the tasks they were hired for, and not to spend time 
making themselves familiar with a body of rules and procedures that might only be 
relevant for a limited period of time. 
80
The last two factors identified in the analysis were related to the impact of social 
interaction. These were (7) leadership influence and (8) co-worker influence. As 
described earlier, the impact that leaders have on subordinates with regard to safety is 
well recognized. Thus, the emergence of the leadership factor in the interview material 
was not unexpected. Neither was the emergence of co-worker influence unexpected as 
previous research also has recognized the important role that co-workers play, in 
particular the influence that experienced workers have on newcomers (e.g. Choudhry 
and Fang, 2008; Mullen, 2004). The two factors worked in the same direction as they 
were both important for how the workers’ perceived the true priority of knowledge of 
rules and procedures in the organization. For example, despite the fact that up-to-date 
knowledge of governing documentation was formally required through the work permit 
system, a lack of explicit leadership and co-worker focus on rules and procedures was 
frequently interpreted as implying that in-depth knowledge of rules and procedures was 
in practice not so important. 
In summary, the findings from the maintenance and modification work study 
demonstrate that appropriate knowledge of rules and procedures depends on a multitude 
of factors within the workers’ work context. The identification and categorization of 
these factors shed light on the third research question of the thesis. Moreover, the 
findings are believed to be important for understanding some of the contextual 
mechanisms that can underlie unintentional violations, since these per definition are 
caused by a lack of knowledge and understanding of relevant rules and procedures. The 
findings do also clearly illustrate that formal demands, such as requiring workers to 
confirm by signature that a specified set of rules and procedures is fully known and 
understood, are not at all sufficient to ensure adequate knowledge. Such formal 
demands must be followed up by measures which clearly communicate that knowledge 
of rules really is expected, supported, and rewarded (to repeat the words of Zohar, 2010 
again).
5.4 Labour inspections and enterprise safety compliance (article #4) 
The findings related to the fourth research question are presented in the article Labour
inspection and its impact on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations (Dahl and 
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Søberg, 2013). Based on the two field experiments conducted within the Norwegian 
Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA) referred to in chapter four, the aim of the article 
was to examine the effect (if any) that labour inspections actually have on enterprises’ 
compliance with safety regulations. As described earlier, this was done by comparing 
inspected versus previously uninspected enterprises with regard to their level of 
compliance with national labour safety regulations.
By analysing the scores on the eight-point safety compliance index, the results of the 
empirical analyses demonstrated that enterprises which had previously been subject to 
inspections by the NLIA exhibited a significantly higher level of compliance with safety 
regulations compared to enterprises which had previously not been subject to 
inspections. This result was found in both experiments, i.e. both in the chemical hazards
experiment and the technical safety experiment.  
More specifically, in the chemical hazards experiment the experimental group 
(enterprises which previously had been inspected by the NLIA) had a mean score of 
6.70 on the eight-point safety compliance index, whereas the control group (previously 
uninspected enterprises) had a mean score of 4.85. This represents a 38.1% difference 
and the t-test confirmed that the difference was significant. In the technical safety 
experiment the difference between the groups was slightly smaller. The two 
experimental groups (preventive inspections and accident inspections) had a mean score 
of 6.10 and 6.03 respectively, whereas the control group had a mean score of 4.76. This 
implies that the two experimental groups on average scored 26.7% higher than the 
control group on the safety compliance index. The ANOVA (and an accompanying least 
significant difference test, LSD) confirmed that the mean score within both experi-
mental groups was significantly higher than the mean score of the control group, but 
that there was no significant difference between the two experimental groups (see 
Figure 9 for a graphical illustration of the findings).
These findings were as expected from the hypotheses of the study, and also in 
accordance with the relatively limited amount of research that has been conducted in 
this area previously (e.g. Andersen et al., 2009; Baldock et al., 2006). In view of the fact 
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that comparability between the experimental groups and the control groups in both 
experiments was assured through matched pairs, it would also be reasonable to conclude 
that the difference between inspected and previously uninspected enterprises was caused 
by variation in the independent labour inspection variable and not by some spurious 
variable.
In summary, and relevant to the thesis’ fourth research question, the findings from the 
labour inspection study indicate that labour inspections represent an effective govern-
mental policy instrument in the regulatory authorities’ effort to ensure compliance with 
existing safety legislations. Considering the fact that relatively few previous studies 
have examined the effect that company external factors in general, and labour 
inspections in particular, have on safety compliance, this result should be important.  
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
The four research articles summarized in the previous chapter constitute the fundament 
of the thesis as they all address different aspects of the main objective. In this chapter, 
the key findings from the articles will be discussed in relation to the main objective. 
This discussion will be accompanied by a discussion of the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings. Then, the methodological limitations of the studies will be 
addressed and discussed in relation to useful avenues for future research. This leads to 
the final conclusion of the thesis. 
6.1 Key findings 
6.1.1 Five key findings and the implications of these 
Given the width of the main objective and the variation in data sources, research 
methods, and research contexts it is no surprise that the thesis entails several findings. 
Some of these have indirect relevance to the main objective of the thesis, such as the 
detection of a safety climate factor structure on board the offshore service vessels. Other 
findings have direct relevance, such as the impact that this factor structure was found to 
have on safety compliance. This last group of results represents the key findings of the 
thesis. Five of these deserve a more detailed description. 
6.1.1.1 Leadership 
The first key finding of the thesis is related to leadership. As described in chapter three, 
previous leadership and compliance research has primarily been concerned with the 
safety-specific aspects of leadership. In general, this type of leadership research 
indicates that leaders who emphasize, discuss, reward, monitor, and encourage safe 
performance generate safer performance within their work group, including increased 
safety compliance (e.g. Kapp, 2012; Lu and Yang, 2010; Zohar, 2002). The offshore 
service vessel study indicates that this is also transferable to the oil and gas industry. In 
that study, the captains’ emphasis of safety issues was a part of the safety climate 
measure, and safety climate was, in turn, highly related to safety compliance. This 
indicates that safety-specific leadership behaviour can be viewed as a vital part of the 
safety climate and, thus, that it constitutes a vital part of the overall patterns and signals 
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that employees use to sort out which type of role behaviour is (to use the words of 
Zohar, 2010 again) expected, supported and rewarded.
A similar effect of leadership can also be seen in the study of maintenance and modific-
ation work. In that study, the lack of an explicit leadership focus on rules and 
procedures, combined with a strong leadership focus on safe and attentive work 
performance, was by many of the interviewees interpreted as if safe work performance 
was dependent on experience alone and not at all on in-depth knowledge of rules and 
procedures. Thus, many of the interviewees interpreted signals sent from the leaders as 
if up-to-date knowledge of rules and procedures was not expected, despite the fact that 
they had to confirm by signature that all relevant rules and procedures were known and 
understood.
All in all, the offshore service vessel study and the study of maintenance and 
modification work imply that the signals that leaders send to their crew is of vital 
importance for how they interpret the necessity of compliance. However, not only is it 
important that leaders send clear signals about the priority of safety, but also that they 
send clear signals about the fact that also knowledge of rules and procedures is a real 
priority and not just a bureaucratic necessity symbolized by the signature on the work 
permit. This could result in the impression that the rules and procedures are only there 
to cover the company’s back if something goes wrong. According to Tinmannsvik 
(2009) this is actually a common impression among oil and gas workers on the NCS. In 
her study roughly half of the respondents reported that some rules are only there to 
cover the managers’ backs. Similar results are found on the UK Continental Shelf in a 
study by Chunlin and Chengyu (1999). 48% of the offshore employees in their study 
were of the opinion that some rules are only there to cover management’s back. 
As regards leadership and safety compliance, the offshore platforms study demonstrates 
that the importance of leadership can also be studied and understood from a general 
leadership approach. The results from the study indicate that good safety leadership 
extends beyond the clearly safety-specific dimensions of leadership, and that safety 
compliance is highly dependent on active leadership involvement in work operations. 
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Such involvement is characterized by leaders who participate in the planning and 
preparation of work, follow up the execution of the work, and contribute to good 
cooperation among team members. This finding adds additional insight into how 
leadership influences safety compliance and it implies that it is important to increase 
leaders’ awareness of the importance of high involvement in the work of employees. It 
also implies that it is important to give offshore leaders sufficient time to spend on the 
front line of the operations. However, as underlined in the conclusion of the offshore 
platforms study, a study by Lamvik et al. (2008) on Norwegian offshore leaders has 
revealed that a recent increase in administrative work and bureaucratic routines 
represents a significant obstacle to high leadership involvement. 60% of the offshore 
managers in their study wished they could spend more time on the front line and 72% 
were of the impression that hands-on management would prevent accidents from 
occurring. These findings, combined with the results related to leadership involvement 
and safety compliance, indicate that operator companies on the NCS should assess the 
possibility of reducing the administrative responsibilities of offshore leaders. 
6.1.1.2 Climate 
The second key finding of the thesis is related to the concept of climate. In accordance 
with previous safety climate research (e.g. the review studies by Christian et al., 2009; 
and Clarke, 2006) the offshore service vessel study demonstrates that there is a positive 
relationship between safety climate and safety compliance. The study clearly illustrates 
the fact that the visible priority of safety in the organization is decisive for the safety-
related behaviour of employees; those who perceive safety to have a low priority in the 
organization seems to be far less prone to work in accordance with safety procedures 
compared to those who perceive safety to have a high value. A favourable safety 
climate was found to be characterized by: 
o Positive evaluations of the captain as a role model for safety work 
o Low levels of perceived risk 
o Positive evaluations of the time and priority given to safety training 
o A positive perception of how safety is taken care of  
o A positive evaluation of the relative priority of safety versus efficiency 
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The practical implication of this is that in order to improve the safety climate in a 
direction which is favourable for increased safety compliance, it is important to give 
these areas high and visible priority. This should signal to the crew that safety is a real 
priority in the organization, and thus, that this is also expected to be a high priority 
among the employees. 
As regards the relationship between climate and safety compliance, the offshore 
platforms study also indicates that the more general aspects of the work climate must be 
taken into consideration. This finding is in accordance with, for example, DeJoy et al. 
(2004), Reiman and Oedewald (2004) and Antonsen (2009) who have argued for a 
broadening of the scope of safety culture and climate research by including more 
general (non-safety-specific) climate variables in the analyses. The offshore platforms 
study demonstrates that such general work climate characteristics are also of 
significance to the variation in safety compliance, and that the behaviour of leaders has 
a high influence on these characteristics. Such a climate is characterized by clearly 
stated roles, active follow-up of contractor workers, and workers who are involved in 
decisions related to their work situation and receive the training that is necessary to 
handle their work tasks. 
6.1.1.3 Procedure quality and clarity 
The third key finding of the thesis is related to the rules and procedures themselves. In 
accordance with, for example, Laurence (2005) and Antonsen et al. (2008), the findings 
from the offshore service vessel study clearly imply that creating a body of procedures 
is not sufficient to ensure compliance. The results from the analyses demonstrate that 
the propensity to act in accordance with safety rules and procedures is strongly 
determined by the perceived quality and clarity of the procedures. Considering the fact 
that the study also reveals that as much as 37% of the vessel workers find the 
procedures difficult to understand, this finding is assumed to be of particular 
significance to the industry.
This assumption is also strengthened by the fact that other studies within the Norwegian 
oil and gas industry demonstrate that there is a problem with procedure quality and 
clarity. For example, a study of Norwegian offshore workers conducted by Tinmannsvik 
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(2009) found that 37% were of the opinion that the procedures were written in a 
language that was difficult to understand, and that 70% were of the opinion that there is 
too much focus on developing new procedures and too little focus on familiarization of 
the already existing ones.
But how can procedure quality and clarity be ensured? There is no complete answer to 
this question and the offshore service vessel study in itself does not offer concrete 
guidance on this topic. The study of maintenance and modification work, however, 
points to some important areas – such as, for example, appropriate training, user-
friendliness of and adequate access to the safety management systems. In addition, 
employee involvement in the design of procedures should be considered an important 
topic. As previously described, this has been highlighted in the studies of for example 
Antonsen et al. (2008), Bourrier (2005), and Mohamed (2002). Simpson et al.’s (2009) 
basic principles of procedure preparation in the mining industry may also be of 
importance and applicable to the oil and gas industry. These basic principles are (1) 
functional simplicity, (2) tailoring, (3) use of plain, positive language and (4) piloting. 
Simpson et al.’s principles might seem obvious, but in light of the findings related to the 
relationship between procedure vagueness and safety compliance they should be highly 
relevant.
6.1.1.4 Knowledge 
The fourth key finding of the thesis is related to the factors that affect workers’ 
knowledge of rules and procedures, an under-researched area of safety compliance 
research (Alper and Karsh, 2009; Barber, 2002). The study of maintenance and 
modification work demonstrates that adequate knowledge of rules and procedures is not 
a question about individual willingness or unwillingness. Rather, adequate knowledge 
seems to be highly dependent on contextual factors which hinder the workers from 
being active users of the safety management system (wherein the body of rules and 
procedures are assembled). These factors do also affect the workers’ perception of how 
important it is to achieve greater knowledge of rules and procedures. In summary, the 
eight different factors that were identified in the study of maintenance and modification 
work and their paramount thematic categories are as follows: 
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o The safety management system 
x Access 
x User-friendliness 
x Training
o Work characteristics 
x Routinized work 
x Perceived risk level 
x Subcontracting
o Social interaction 
x Leadership influence 
x Co-worker influence 
The identification of these factors has some important practical implications: 
First of all, the identification of the factors related to the safety management system 
points to the importance of offering all workers adequate access to relevant rules and 
procedures and to the importance of receiving the necessary training that could enable 
them to locate and interpret the regulations. Access and training are certainly needed as 
practical tools, but proper access and training also signal that knowledge of rules and 
procedures is a real priority. In addition, as previously also stressed by Antonsen et al. 
(2008), the body of rules and procedures should be characterized by simplicity and user-
friendliness.  
Second, the identification of the factors related to the work itself and the workers’ 
conditions of employment should be of significance. For example, the results clearly 
point to the importance of paying specific attention to nomadic subcontractor workers, 
and to the importance of recognizing that this group of workers needs to be offered 
extra time and resources. Furthermore, the results indicate that sharp-end workers’ 
awareness of the importance of a high knowledge of rules and procedures could be 
improved by making them more conscious of the relationship between the procedures 
and the risks that they are meant to reduce. The results related to the work 
characteristics category also indicate that it is important to pay particular attention to 
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knowledge of rules and procedures among workers who find their work to be routinized 
and predictable. As described earlier, workers who saw their work as highly routinized 
were of the opinion that knowledge of rules and procedures was not that important. In 
such instances it will also be important to ensure that the routines do not drift too far 
away from the initial written guidance, as previously also stressed by Snook (2000) and 
Dekker (2006).
Third, the identification of the factors related to social interaction points to the 
importance of giving particular attention to the signals that leaders send to their 
subordinates and to the influence that experienced workers have on newcomers. If 
adequate knowledge of rules and procedures is a goal, then high and visible priority of 
rules and procedures should be demonstrated by leaders and experienced workers. This 
signals that such knowledge is of real importance and not just a bureaucratic necessity.
6.1.1.5 Regulatory authorities 
The fifth and last key finding of the thesis is related to a company external factor, 
namely labour inspections. The results from the labour inspection study show that 
previously inspected enterprises have a higher level of compliance with national safety 
regulations compared to previously uninspected enterprises. Few studies have paid 
attention to compliance at the enterprise level and even fewer have examined the impact 
that labour inspections have on enterprises’ propensity to act in accordance with 
prevailing safety regulations (Baldock et al., 2006). Thus, this finding should fill a 
research gap within safety research and add new knowledge to our understanding of the 
impact of labour inspections. It should, however be stressed that this result is not only 
important and relevant for the research gap it fills, but even more so because the result 
per se says something about the value of the continued use of inspections in the 
regulatory authorities’ effort for improved compliance. As such, this key finding could 
serve as a well-founded argument for the necessity of labour inspections in a period 
where the impact that labour inspections actually have is debated (Levine et al., 2012) 
and where funding cuts and a reduction in the frequency of labour inspections is a fact 
in many countries (Johnson, 2012; Tombs and Whyte, 2010, 2012). 
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The findings related to the effect of labour inspections also illustrate an important point 
previously made by Rasmussen (1997), namely that safety in organizations is a result of 
the interplay between actors operating on different societal levels and that the creation 
of organizational safety can hardly be seen as a pure product of company internal 
conditions. By this, he means that the state of safety within an organization cannot be 
fully accounted for by ignoring factors that are external to the companies. 
6.1.2 Summary of key findings 
From what has been described above it should be clear that the key findings of the 
thesis do not point in vastly different directions. In fact, they are highly related and they 
all point to one common denominator, namely that safety compliance is highly 
influenced by different environmental factors. This demonstrates that safety compliance 
cannot be fully understood without taking the context into consideration. In a highly 
regulated environment, such as the oil and gas industry, it is particularly important to be 
aware of this because it implies that safety compliance can be managed and that safety 
violations can hardly be seen as isolated from their surroundings. 
6.2 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
In order to shed light on the main objective of the thesis the choice of research methods 
has varied considerably – from content analysis of qualitative interview data, via 
comparative analyses of experimental data, to structural equation modelling of 
quantitative questionnaire data. The different data sources have also varied considerably 
with respect to depth and sample sizes – from an extensive study of more than 10,000 
respondents to an intensive study of 24 interviewees. This combination of different 
research methods and data sources (referred to as ‘triangulation’, see Denzin, 1970 or 
‘mixed method research’, see Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) is believed to represent a 
significant methodological strength of the thesis because the different methods can 
answer different questions and thus provide different insights regarding the research 
objective. As such, the combination of different research methods and data sources has 
therefore served a complementary function. Despite this, the research designs and the 
methods employed do also have some limitations which should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the findings. Three of these are particularly important. 
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First, the offshore service vessel study, the offshore platforms study and the study of 
maintenance and modification work are all based on self-report measures – either 
collected through questionnaires or through interviews. Hence, the data could be 
distorted by recall errors and inaccurate responses or by bias related to social 
desirability – that is, the tendency to answer questions in such a way as to represent 
oneself in a favourable light (Edwards, 1953). Bias related to social desirability could 
certainly also be a challenge in the labour inspection study, since people also engage in 
impression management of units other than themselves. Potential biases related to social 
desirability in the thesis could have been overcome if the findings had been underpinned 
by observations of actual work. In general, there is a limited use of observational 
methods in studies of safety compliance, where most studies rely on self-report 
measures. Future studies of safety compliance should thus consider observational 
studies and strive to develop reliable behavioural observation measures.  
Second, the quantitative studies included in the thesis do not go into detailed analyses or 
explanations of causal mechanisms. For example, the labour inspection study 
demonstrates that labour inspections have a positive effect on the enterprises’ 
compliance with safety regulations. However, the same study says less about why. The 
positive correlation between labour inspections and compliance can be interpreted as a 
result of enforcement actions and formal orders, but it would be just as valid to interpret 
the positive correlation as a result of guidance and information offered during 
inspection. The problem is that the study does not provide the necessary data for robust 
interpretations to be made with regard to this mechanism. Similarly, the offshore service 
vessel study demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between safety climate and 
safety compliance, but again a comprehensive causative explanation is difficult because 
the study does not offer detailed analyses of possible causal mechanisms. Such analyses 
depend on the introduction of mediator variables (such as, for example, safety 
knowledge and safety motivation: Neal and Griffin, 2004), because these can shed light 
on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It would therefore 
be valuable for future research to explore mediational models.  
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Third, none of the studies shed empirical light on the relationship between safety 
compliance and safety. As stated in chapter two, it falls out of the scope of the thesis to 
examine this relationship. Despite this, the implications of the findings would have been 
strengthened by a closer examination of the relationship between safety compliance and 
actual safety performance data, such as near-misses, lost time injuries, and hydrocarbon 
leakages. In general, safety compliance studies seldom include such data. It would 
therefore be useful for future studies to include safety performance data in the analyses. 
This would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of safety compliance. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Accidents at work are rarely the result of a single cause. Rather, they develop from a 
multitude of different causal factors and from a complex interplay between these 
factors. The purpose of this thesis has not been to examine this assembly of different 
technical, behavioural and organizational factors, but to follow one of them more 
closely – namely safety violations. This choice has not been random. Rather it is rooted 
in the fact that accident investigations and analyses regularly identify non-compliance 
as a significant contributory factor and that this is also the case in the type of industry 
that has been the focus of this thesis – the oil and gas industry. 
With the Norwegian oil and gas industry as the primary research context, the main 
objective of the thesis with its accompanying research articles has been to go behind 
safety violations and to examine and identify the conditions that affect the propensity to 
act in accordance with prevailing rules, procedures and regulations. This has been 
done (1) by addressing safety violations from a viewpoint which is believed to be more 
constructive than that which is common within accident investigations and traditional 
safety research, which typically has been more concerned with the conditions that 
hinder safety than with the ones that nurture it. To the empirical inquiries of the thesis, 
this has meant an explicit focus on safety compliance rather than on safety violations. In 
addition, (2) the study objective has been analysed by the application of a system 
perspective. This has implied that the empirical research embedded in the thesis has 
been primarily concerned with investigating how contextual, and not how individual, 
aspects affect safety compliance. 
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The key findings of the thesis are highly related as they all clearly illustrate that safety 
compliance does not occur in a vacuum. Hence, they all point to the importance of 
taking the context into consideration. Within this context, the findings of the thesis point 
to some areas that need particular attention, such as the importance of a favourable 
safety climate, leaders who send clear messages about the priority of safety, leaders who 
stay close to the front-line activities, clarity in rules and procedures and unambiguity 
with regard to the importance of knowledge and understanding of rules and procedures. 
Similarly, the thesis illustrates that safety compliance at the enterprise level is also a 
result of the interplay between the organization and actors operating outside the 
organization, and thus that safety can hardly be seen as a pure product of company 
internal conditions. 
Finally, it should be added that the findings of the thesis are not at all depressing. In fact 
they are really encouraging, because in essence they implicate that safety (like most 
other aspects of business) can be managed, and in particular that variations in safety 
compliance is not a result of mere chance and individual variations. Hence, the 
implications of the key findings of the thesis should be of importance for proactive 
measures which aim at improving safety compliance within the oil and gas industry. 
The findings and the practical implications of these should also be relevant to other 
high-risk industries, in particular to those where rules and procedures constitute a vital 
part of the system of safety barriers. 
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Antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour on
offshore service vessels: a multi-factorial approach
ØYVIND DAHL*, JØRN FENSTAD and TROND KONGSVIK
NTNU Social Research Ltd., Loholt Allè 81, Trondheim 7491, Norway
Procedure violations are commonly identiﬁed as an essential causal factor in maritime
accidents. This also applies to the Norwegian offshore service vessel sector. This
illustrates that there is a need to study compliance and non-compliance in a broad
context and to explore the factors that affect the propensity to act in accordance with
prevailing procedures. The aim of the present study was therefore to examine the
antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour among workers on offshore service vessels
operating on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. With reference to a survey of 1108
offshore service vessel workers, this was done by analysing the relationship between a
set of predictor variables and a self-report measure of safety-compliant behaviour.
Using binary logistic regression analysis, the present study revealed that the safety
climate and the vessel workers’ age were positively related to safety compliance,
whereas job experience and perceived procedure vagueness were negatively related
to safety compliance. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed. In sum,
the ﬁndings indicate that shipowners, captains and other stakeholders within the off-
shore service vessel industry should consider a broad multi-factorial approach to
increase safety compliance.
1. Introduction
Organizational safety research has demonstrated that the level of compliance with rules
and procedures is an important aspect of a work organization’s state of safety, and that
safety-compliant behaviour is inﬂuential in lowering the risk of accidents (Didla, Mearns,
and Flin 2009). This also applies to the maritime industry, where procedure violations are
commonly identiﬁed as a causal factor in accident scenarios such as collisions and
groundings (Macrae 2009). However, in the quest for effective preventative measures,
there is also a need to study violations and non-compliance in a broader context and to
explore conditions that could lead to such unsafe acts. This implies investigating ‘second
stories’ (Woods et al. 2010) and the multiple factors that could foster procedure
deviations.
The present study is based on a survey of employees working on offshore service
vessels operating on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) and explores the factors that
can inﬂuence compliance in their work. Three different types of vessels are included in the
study: anchor handling vessels, platform supply vessels and standby vessels. These vessel
types serve different functions. The anchor handling vessels’ primary function is to handle
anchors for ﬂoating oil rigs, to tow the rigs to their locations and to anchor them up. The
primary tasks for workers on board such vessels consist of operating cranes and winches
with chains and wires under high tension and to navigate the vessel so that external forces
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acting on the ship during anchor handling is accounted for. The platform supply vessels
transport equipment, bulk products, hazardous chemicals and supplies to and from
onshore supply bases and offshore installations. Lifting operations with cargo containers
and bulk loading hoses under challenging conditions close to offshore oil installations
comprise the key task for workers on board supply vessels. The standby vessels are respon-
sible for emergency preparedness and guard duties for the installations. During exercises and
real-life situations hoisting and lowering of fast rescue crafts, deployment of oil spill equip-
ment (oil booms, skimmers and tug boats) and rescuing personnel after evacuation of oil
installations comprise the primary task for workers on board standby vessels.
Irrespective of the different functions that the vessels serve, they are all characterized by
operating with complex and hazardous technology and equipment in harsh environments.
Most work operations are also highly regulated by a number of rules and procedures.1
Common guidelines for offshore supply and rig move operations have been developed on
the European level, which prescribe detailed ‘best practices’ regarding these operations
(NWEA 2009). On the national level, the Norwegian Oil Association and the Norwegian
Shipowners’ Association (2011) have developed an operations manual for offshore service
vessels. Also, the different shipowners and petroleum companies have company speciﬁc
procedures. A foundation for these procedures, guidelines and ‘best practices’ are interna-
tional regulations provided by the International Maritime Organization, e.g. the Safety Of Life
At Sea (SOLAS) convention and the International Ships Management (ISM) code. The
extensive body of procedures combined with the high risk level implies that offshore service
vessels are particularly relevant for studies assessing the antecedents of safety-compliant
behaviour in the maritime industry.
The safety level in the offshore petroleum industry in Norway has generally improved
since the 1990s, but offshore service vessels have lagged behind (Kongsvik et al. 2012).
According to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s database (2011), there were 12 fatal-
ities on offshore service vessels from 2000 to 2010, including eight people lost when the
Bourbon Dolphin capsized in 2007. In the same period, 777 people were injured.
Although the number of occupational injuries signiﬁcantly decreased in that period,
offshore service vessels still represent one of the most dangerous working environments
in the Norwegian petroleum industry.
In addition to occupational accidents and injuries, offshore service vessels also pose a
threat in terms of major accidents. Collisions with petroleum installations, especially in
loading/unloading situations, and damage to hydrocarbon-bearing pipes have the potential
to start off a chain of events that could lead to loss of life, extensive property damage and
serious environmental consequences. According to the Petroleum Safety Authority
Norway (PSA 2011), there was a reduction in the frequency of collisions between
offshore service vessels and ﬁxed offshore installations between 1988 and 2001. The
frequency of such collisions, however, increased between 2004 and 2010 on the NCS, in
which 28 collisions between offshore service vessels and ﬁxed offshore installations have
occurred. Six of these were considered to have major accident potential.
From their investigations of such collisions, the PSA has concluded that a lack of
compliance with procedures is one of the most frequently identiﬁed underlying causal
factors (PSA 2011). This phenomenon is neither unique to the offshore service vessel
sector nor restricted to accidents with catastrophic potential. Accident analyses and
investigations routinely identify a lack of compliance with rules and procedures as a
central contributory factor to accidents at work (Hopkins 2011).
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The PSA explain the lack of compliance with procedures aboard the offshore service
vessels by a poor safety culture within the vessel sector (PSA 2011). This explanation is
plausible and it is also very much in accordance with Reason (1998), who claims that
organizations with a poor safety culture tend to encourage an atmosphere wherein a lack
of safety compliance among frontline workers evolves. Other lines of research, however,
illustrate a need to broaden this explanation. First, the safety culture concept is not
sufﬁciently speciﬁc about the mechanisms through which it affects the level of compli-
ance or other aspects of organizational practices (Guldenmund 2007). Second, non-
compliant behaviour can hardly be reduced to one single explanatory factor, such as
safety culture. A comprehensive review study by Alper and Karsh (2009) demonstrates
that the roots of non-compliant behaviour are linked to several different factors within the
organization. Some of these factors are related to the individual worker, some are related
to the organization and some are related to the procedures or rules themselves. Thus, the
use of safety culture as a broad, all-embracing factor is a simpliﬁcation, and could reduce
the concept to a ‘buzzword’ (Rosness 2001) with a diffuse content.
In sum, this illustrates a need for more applicable knowledge about the measures which
should be taken in order to improve the level of safety compliance within the offshore
service vessel sector. To gain such knowledge, it is necessary to assess the antecedents of
non-compliant behaviour or its opposite, the antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour.
Based on previous research within other sectors, the present study aims therefore to develop
and test a quantitative model which measures the relationship between a set of explanatory
factors and safety compliance. The model is multi-factorial and measures characteristics
related to the individual worker, the organization and the body of procedures in terms of
offshore service vessels. The principal research model is presented in Figure 1. This model
will be further extended and concretized with hypotheses in the next section.
2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses
As already outlined, the claim that accidents in work organizations are caused largely by a
lack of compliance with rules and procedures is not unique to the offshore service vessel
sector (Didla, Mearns, and Flin 2009; Hopkins 2011). Within the mining industry, for
example, Lenné et al. (2012) found that non-compliant actions can be identiﬁed in 57% of
accidents. Studies which assess a broader range of unsafe work behaviours often reach
Figure 1. The principal research model of the present study.
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even higher proportions. An example of this is a study of all occupational fatalities
occurring in Australia over a 3-year period, which reported that unsafe work behaviour
was involved in 91% of the fatalities (Willamson and Feyer 1990). The fact that unsafe
work behaviour is a signiﬁcant contributor to accidents in work organizations is, however,
not a new ﬁnding. As early as 1931, Heinrich (1931) reported from case studies of 75 000
accident records that 88% of industrial accidents were caused by unsafe work behaviour.
The recognized signiﬁcance of unsafe work behaviour in the aetiology of accidents has
led researchers within the ﬁeld of organizational safety research to increase their effort to
identify the antecedents of such practices. A relatively large proportion of these studies
focus on the antecedents of non-compliant or safety-compliant behaviour (Didla, Mearns,
and Flin 2009; Cavazza and Serpe 2009; Johnson 2007; Lawton 1998; Lu and Yang 2011;
Mearns et al. 2010; Neal et al. 2000; Pousette et al. 2008; Simard and Marchand 1997;
Torp and Grøgaard 2009; Zhou et al. 2008). An important message from these studies is
that non-compliant behaviour does not occur in a vacuum, but is largely shaped by social
and cultural aspects within the organizational context (Didla, Mearns, and Flin 2009).
Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review study identiﬁes six causal categories within this orga-
nizational context: (1) individual characteristics, (2) information/education/training, (3)
design to support worker needs, (4) safety climate, (5) competing goals and (6) problems
with rules. In the present study, the six categories identiﬁed by Alper and Karsh are
reduced to the three more general characteristics referred to in Figure 1: (1) individual
characteristics, (2) organizational characteristics and (3) procedure/rule characteristics.
These three broad categories will be presented in more detail in the following sections.
2.1. Individual characteristics
According to Neal and Grifﬁn (2004), individual differences in safety-speciﬁc behaviour,
such as compliance/non-compliance, must be understood on the basis of individual
differences in the three determinants of behaviour: knowledge, skills and motivation.
These determinants represent factors that are directly related to behaviour. Hence, Neal
and Grifﬁn label them proximal drivers of safety behaviour. These drivers are affected by
more distal antecedents, which could be related to the individual itself or the organizational
context. Organizational and procedure/rule characteristics are therefore always potential
distal antecedents, but individual characteristics could be both distal and proximal.
Person-related distal antecedents which are typically examined in studies of safety-
compliant behaviour are personality characteristics (Wallace and Chen 2005), job attitudes
(Henning et al. 2009) and demographic attributes (Chan et al. 2002). With regard to
individual characteristics, the present study focused on the latter by assessing the impact
of vessel workers’ age and job experience on safety compliance.
According to Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review study, evidence in previous studies for
the relationship between age and safety compliance is contradictory. Some of the studies
to which they refer have found no signiﬁcant relationship between age and safety
compliance (Ji et al. 2005; Naing et al. 2001), others have found a negative impact of
age (Ben-David and Gaitini 1997) and still others have found a positive impact of age
(Chan et al. 2002; Gershon et al. 1995).
The studies which Alper and Karsh (2009) refer to with respect to age, however, were
all carried out within the health sector and deal with compliance with procedures related to
biological hazards. These hazards are quite different from the physical ones present in the
offshore service vessel sector. Studies of sectors where physical hazards are present point
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more clearly in one direction, i.e. young employees tend to be more non-compliant than
their older colleagues, albeit the amount of variance that age accounts for is quite small
(Lu and Yang 2011; Gyekye and Salminen 2009; Siu et al. 2003; Tesluk 2004). In
addition, young workers, especially young men, are at greater risk of workplace injuries
than their older colleagues (Loughlin and Frone 2004; Salminen 2004). To our knowl-
edge, no universally accepted explanation exists as to why young employees are often
found to be more accident-prone and slightly more non-compliant than their older
colleagues. Some explanations have, however, been offered. Gyekye and Salminen
(2009), for instance, note that it could be caused by an age-related decline in certain
personality traits found by Costa and McCrae (1988). Costa and McCrae have noted that
activity and excitement seeking decline with age, and that this results in younger indivi-
duals being more active and keener to launch into new experiences than older individuals.
Additionally, studies of driving behaviour have explained the higher frequency of viola-
tion of trafﬁc regulations among young drivers as a result of age differences in risk
perception, i.e. young drivers tend to perceive less risk in most driving situations than do
older drivers (Boyce and Geller 2002; Jonah and Dawson 1987).
Despite some conﬂicting ﬁndings within the health sector, and in line with previous
ﬁndings within sectors where physical hazards are present, this study hypothesized that:
H1: Vessel workers’ age will be positively related to safety compliance.
Another explanation offered in the literature which attempts to clarify why older workers
tend to be more safety-compliant than their younger colleagues is related to job experience
and the fact that age is highly correlated with job experience (Gyekye and Salminen 2009;
Siu et al. 2003). Older workers have acquired skills, organizational knowledge and
knowledge of procedures which should lead to enhanced performance (Gyekye and
Salminen 2009); hence, age could be spuriously related to safety compliance when
controlled for job experience. This spurious relationship has been found with regard to
age and injury risk within the US mining industry. Butani (1988) found that the signiﬁcant
negative relationship between age and injury risk disappeared when controlled for job
experience. This might also be the case for safety compliance, but again it should be noted
that Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review study revealed some conﬂicting ﬁndings. One of the
studies which they refer to found a negative relationship between job experience and
safety compliance (Rebok et al. 2005) and another found a positive relationship of job
experience (Hobbs and Williamson 2002). Both of these studies were performed within
the aviation sector, among pilots and mechanics, respectively.
Based on what is described above, and despite some conﬂicting ﬁndings in Alper and
Karsh’s (2009) review study, this study hypothesized that:
H2: Vessel workers’ job experience will be positively related to safety compliance.
2.2. Organizational characteristics
Organizational characteristics are by deﬁnition distal antecedents of safety-compliant beha-
viour, i.e. they are considered to affect behaviour by inﬂuencing the proximal determinants
safety knowledge, safety skills and safety motivation (Neal and Grifﬁn 2004). This division
between distal organizational antecedents and proximal individual drivers is clearly illu-
strated in the article by Wagenaar (1998) entitled ‘People Make Accidents But
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Organizations Cause Them’. Wagenaar’s principal notion is that non-compliant behaviour
(or any human behaviour which affects personal and organizational safety) is not a random
phenomenon; rather, it is a phenomenon caused by organizational conditions.
Wagenaar’s (1998) notion is not unique. Since the 1980s, a string of organizational
disasters have indicated that it is beneﬁcial to move the focus away from proximal
individual issues to distal organizational issues (Mearns et al. 2003). A considerable
amount of research has also been carried out in order to identify the organizational
antecedents of non-compliant behaviour. A variety of different organizational issues
have been studied, such as leadership (Inness et al. 2010; Lu and Yang 2010), job
demands and resources (Hansez and Chmiel 2010; Turner et al. 2012), psychological
climate (Larsson et al. 2008) and job autonomy (Parker et al. 2001). The organizational
factor which has probably attracted most research interest since the 1980s is, however,
safety climate. Safety climate can be deﬁned as the set of perceptions that employees
share regarding safety in their work environment (Zohar 1980) and is the preferred term
when psychometric questionnaire studies are employed to uncover such perceptions (Flin
et al. 2000). According to Neal and Grifﬁn (2004), safety climate studies typically try to
reveal perceptions of the organization’s policies, procedures and practices associated with
safety. Further, these speciﬁc perceptions, which in a factor analysis would be labelled
ﬁrst-order factors, should load onto a general second-order factor which constitutes the
general safety climate. This factor reﬂects the extent to which employees perceive safety
as valued within the organization (Grifﬁn and Neal 2000; Neal et al. 2000).
According to Clarke (2006), the safety climate of an organization acts as a frame of
reference for safety-speciﬁc behaviour and attitudes of both individuals and groups of
employees. Further, Zohar (2010) assumes that it is within this frame of reference that
employees receive, interpret and make sense of signals from a complex web of sources
(colleagues, policies, leadership, competing domains, etc.) about what sort of role beha-
viour is expected, supported and rewarded. Employee behaviour will then tend to align
with these perceived expectations.
Clarke’s (2006) and Zohar’s (2010) theoretical explanations of the role that safety
climate plays with respect to workers’ safety behaviour are strongly supported in studies
of the relationship between safety climate and safety compliance. Several safety climate
studies have demonstrated that a positive safety climate promotes safety-compliant beha-
viour. This ﬁnding is relatively consistent across a broad range of industries, such as the
manufacturing and mining industries (Grifﬁn and Neal 2000), the construction industry
(Zhou et al. 2008), the mechanic, textile and food industries (Cavazza and Serpe 2009), the
container shipping industry (Lu and Tsai 2010) and the nuclear power industry (Martínez-
Córcoles et al. 2011). The positive relationship between safety climate and safety com-
pliance is also one of the more consistent ﬁndings in Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review
study and in two other in-depth review studies performed by Clarke (2006) and Christian
et al. (2009). Hence, this relationship should be considered relatively ﬁrmly established.
This study therefore hypothesized that:
H3: Vessel workers’ safety climate will be positively related to safety compliance.
As already noted, Neal and Grifﬁn (2004) recommend comprehending and operationalizing
the safety climate construct as a second-order (or higher-order) factor. This has been done in
the present study, but it should be noted that this is not the case in all safety climate studies.
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Several studies put more emphasis on the various sub-dimensions of the construct than on
the supreme dimension (Lu and Yang 2011; Lu and Tsai 2010; Olsen 2010). Which sub-
dimensions are prioritized varies; but in a review study by Flin et al. (2000), the ﬁve most
common themes identiﬁed were related to employee perceptions of (1) safety management
and leadership, (2) the safety system, (3) risk, (4) work pressure and (5) safety competence
and training. In the present study, we focused on a second-order factor composed of ﬁve
ﬁrst-order factors which did not differ fundamentally from Flin et al. (2000) ﬁndings. These
were (1) captain’s safety leadership, (2) general safety orientation on board, (3) risk, (4)
efﬁciency demands and (5) safety training. This will be elaborated in Section 3.
2.3. Rule/procedure characteristics
According to Reason (1998) for the safe running of organizations, it is necessary to
formulate safety rules, not only because the rules are important for guiding safe behaviour
in relation to identiﬁed hazards, but also because the rules constitute a vital record of the
organization’s learning about the operational risks involved in its activities. Reason (1998)
stresses, however, that rules and procedures will never be fully comprehensive or uni-
versally applicable. Hence, the body of rules and procedures will never be able to cover
all imaginable hazards and accident scenarios within an organization or particular work
operation. The appropriateness of rules and procedures is also associated with limitations
related to their comprehensibility. In brief, if safety rules and procedures are to work in
accordance with their intent, they must be understood by those to whom they are
addressed, and they must be perceived as valid for the particular work operation which
is in progress. This depends, at least partly, on the degree of clarity within the body of
rules and procedures (Battmann and Klumb 1993; Reason 1990; Lawton 1998).
What we have described above might seem self-evident, but studies which emphasize the
quality of safety rules and procedures demonstrate that clarity and comprehensibility are a
challenge. A study by Elling (1987), referred to in Hale (1990), involving Dutch railway
workers’ opinion of the rules governing work on and near railway lines is one example.
Some 85% of the workers found it hard to ﬁnd what they were looking for in the rule book,
and 70% found the rules too complex and hard to read when they ﬁnally found them. A
study by Laurence (2005) of Australian mine workers obtained similar ﬁndings. When
asked to indicate their reasons for not complying with the rules, close to 35% answered that
there was some sort of problem with the rules. The workers were then probed more
thoroughly about the cause of this problem: some 10% of the workers thought that the
content of the rules was poor or contained errors, 12% that the rules were not written in plain
language, 16% that the rules were too complex and 18% that there were too many rules to be
remembered. Simpson et al. (2009) might therefore have a very relevant argument when
they claim that safety rules frequently are far from being appropriate, practical, well-written
and well-communicated, and that this is often at the expense of compliance.
Laurence’s (2005) study within the mining industry demonstrates that there is a link
between rule clarity, comprehensibility and compliance. Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review
study points in the same direction. Each of the variables in their ‘problems with rules’
category was positively associated with violations and hence negatively associated with
safety compliance. In the present study, however, we did not focus on problems with rules
and procedures in general, as Alper and Karsh do. Instead we focused on procedures in
terms of clarity and vagueness, and hypothesized that:
H4: Perceived procedure vagueness will be negatively related to safety compliance.
Antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour 7
3. Method
3.1. Survey, data collection and sample
The present study is based on a survey which was administered as a self-report ques-
tionnaire to monitor safety and working environment issues within an offshore service
vessel ﬂeet consisting of 85 vessels. Each vessel has two work shifts, so the total number
of shifts is 170. All vessels included in this study operate on the NCS and are chartered by
one Norwegian oil company. The contracting oil company demands that the crew
members speak one of the Scandinavian languages ﬂuently and use one of these as
their working language. The great majority of the crew members are of Norwegian
nationality, with some representatives from Denmark, Sweden and the Faroe Islands.
The questionnaire was developed and piloted in 2000 and has been employed for data
collection within the same population every second year since then and also in other
maritime settings (Oltedal and Wadsworth 2010).2 The questionnaire has also been subject
to revisions and adjustments every second year. The data on which the present study is
based were collected from August to November 2010. The questionnaires (consisting of
82 items) and an accompanying letter which explained how the questionnaires should be
distributed, collected and returned were sent by mail, addressed to the vessels’ captains.
The crews were asked to return the questionnaires in a sealed envelope within a week of
receipt. The questionnaire was given in Norwegian, as most of the crew members were
Norwegian. The Norwegian language is also comprehensible for other Scandinavians.
All work shifts (n = 170) were included in the target sample and a total of 2022
questionnaires were distributed. On the work shift level, the response rate was 66%, as
113 work shifts returned the questionnaire. On the individual level, the response rate was
55%, as 1108 vessel workers returned the questionnaire. The individual response rate is a
conservative estimate (based on the number of distributed questionnaires), however, as the
exact size of each unique work shift was unknown. The estimate is considered conserva-
tive due to the fact that the number of questionnaires deemed necessary to distribute was
slightly overestimated.
The age distribution in the net sample shows that the majority of respondents (57.5%)
were aged 40 years or under and that 38.7% of the respondents were aged between 41 and
60 years (Table 1). A minority of the respondents were aged above 60 years (3.8%).3 As
regards job experience, a majority of the respondents had over 3 years of experience on
offshore service vessels (62.5%) and 37.5% of the respondents had three years or fewer of
experience.
Sailors (30.1%) constituted the largest occupational group among the respondents,
followed by ofﬁcers (23.7%) and engineers (18.0%). As regards vessel type, the largest
group of respondents was employed on supply vessels (46.3%), followed by respondents
employed on anchor handling vessels (32.4%) and standby vessels (21.3%).
3.2. Measures and statistical procedures
3.2.1. Independent variables and factor analysis. In the survey, the respondents were
asked nine questions related to demographic characteristics (sex was omitted to preserve
conﬁdentiality) and 73 questions related to safety and working environment conditions.
The two items were used to measure age and job experience, respectively. No recoding of
these items was deemed necessary, and they were consequently implemented in the
analyses by means of the same grouping categories as those in Table 1.
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As regards safety climate and procedure vagueness, 18 items were used to measure
these characteristics. The items were selected on face value and on the basis of safety
climate literature (Flin et al. 2000). Descriptive statistics for the items are presented in
Table 2. Fifteen of the items were presented as statements with which the respondents
were asked to specify their level of agreement on a ﬁve-point Likert scale. The scale
ranged from ‘totally disagree’ (=1) to ‘totally agree’ (=5). Further, on two of the items (Q4
and Q5 in Table 2), the response categories ranged from ‘very likely’ (=1) to ‘not likely’
(=5), and on one item (Q6 in Table 2) the response categories ranged from ‘very unsafe’
(=1) to ‘very safe’ (=5). In addition, a ‘don’t know’ option was included in all items.
In order to uncover the underlying factor structure of the items and to reduce the
number of items to a manageable size, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted.
In addition, a second-order EFA was conducted to examine the interrelationship between
the safety climate dimensions and to examine whether or not they loaded on one supreme
safety climate dimension. The applied EFA (both ﬁrst and second orders) was principal
component analysis with varimax rotation, and factor loadings above 0.40 were consid-
ered sufﬁcient to relate the item to the factor (Meyers et al. 2006). The number of factors
to be extracted was based on Kaiser’s criterion (Field 2005). This meant that only factors
with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1 were retained. Further, internal consistency and
reliability were assessed by Cronbach’s alpha.
3.2.2. Dependent variable and binary logistic regression. The dependent variable,
safety compliance, was measured by an item which was formulated as a statement
regarding compliance with safety procedures (Table 2). The statement was presented as
‘I always follow the procedures’. It was not possible for the respondents to specify their
agreement with this statement on a scale. Instead, they either ticked the statement
Table 1. Respondents’ demographics.
Characteristics Group Frequency %
Age <31 364 33.1
31–40 268 24.4
41–50 243 22.1
51–60 182 16.6
>60 42 3.8
Job experience on offshoreservice vessels (years) <1 132 12.0
1–3 281 25.5
4–10 445 40.4
>10 244 22.1
Job title Captain 87 8.0
1./2. Ofﬁcer 259 23.7
Engineer 196 18.0
Electrician 58 5.3
Sailor 328 30.1
Steward 70 6.4
Apprentice 91 8.3
Vessel type Supply 486 46.3
Anchor handling 340 32.4
Standby 223 21.3
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(demonstrating agreement) or they did not (demonstrating disagreement). This was coded
as yes = 1 and no = 0, respectively.
Regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesized relationship (H1 to H4)
between the set of independent variables and the dependent variable. Ordinary least
squares (OLS), the basis of linear regression, is not appropriate when the dependent
variable is binary or dichotomous. This is because a series of assumptions will then be
broken (Meyers et al. 2006). For instance, OLS can produce predicted values greater than
one and less than zero, i.e. values that are inadmissible when binary coding is applied.
Thus, binary logistic regression (BLR) was chosen to test the hypotheses.
The advantage of applying BLR in cases where the dependent variable is binary is that
it allows one to predict group membership (yes or no, one or zero) from a set of
independent variables that may be continuous, discrete or dichotomous. More speciﬁcally,
the BLR model predicts the probability of a case falling into the higher value (i.e. one) on
the dependent variable, in our case the probability of a given individual reporting that he/
she always follows the procedures on board the vessel.
Similarly to OLS, BLR will also produce a constant (β0), a regression coefﬁcient
(β1X1 þ β2X2 þ    þ βnXn) for each predictor in the model, and an accompanying
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for items.
Item N Mean SD
Q1 My captain appreciates that the employees take up safety issues 897 4.74 0.67
Q2 I am sure to get support from my captain if I prioritize safety in all
situations
898 4.74 0.67
Q3 My captain sets a good example regarding attention to safety 904 4.68 0.67
Q4 How likely is it that you will be involved in an accident on the
vessel where you work?
890 3.64 0.93
Q5 How likely is it that someone in the crew will be involved in an
accident on the vessel where you work?
889 3.35 1.00
Q6 To what extent do you feel safe when you think about the risks
associated with the work on board?
905 4.53 0.83
Q7 We have sufﬁcient time to train employees on board 890 3.83 1.15
Q8 New employees receive sufﬁcient training to work safely 893 4.12 1.04
Q9 We always perform the emergency exercises which we are ordered
to perform
883 4.39 1.00
Q10 On my vessel, we strive to achieve zero harm to people, prevent
accidents, and reduce negative effects on the environment
917 4.73 0.69
Q11 Safety has ﬁrst priority in the shipping company where I work 909 4.63 0.75
Q12 Safety is well taken care of on my vessel 918 4.72 0.68
Q13 Following safety procedures is not rewarded in the shipping co-
mpany where I work
812 2.95 1.53
Q14 As long as the work is done, the shipping company do not care
about the way we do the work
859 2.06 1.25
Q15 Sometimes I feel forced to continue working, although safety can
be threatened
913 2.01 1.31
Q16 In some situations it is necessary to expose oneself to danger to
get the job done
910 2.42 1.39
Q17 The procedures are difﬁcult to understand/vaguely formulated 905 2.66 1.26
Q18 I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to know which procedures are applicable 896 2.45 1.30
Q19 I always follow the procedures 924 0.42 0.49
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p-value. A positive βn indicates that there is a positive relationship between the particular
independent variable and the dependent variable. A negative βn indicates a negative
relationship. p-Values below 0.05 indicate that this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition to the regression coefﬁcients, the BLR will also produce odds ratios (ORs)
assigned to each independent variable. An OR of one indicates that there is no relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. ORs lower than 1 indicate a
negative relationship and, vice versa, ORs greater than 1 indicate a positive relationship.
The general form of the BLR is: L = ( β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 +    + βn Xn). The logit (L) is
not intuitively interpretable, but is used in the antilog function that transforms L to
predicted probabilities; P = 1/[1+ EXP(–L)], that is, the predicted probability of a given
case falling into the higher value on the dependent variable. If the predicted probability of
a given case is greater than or equal to 0.50, then the case is classiﬁed as probably
belonging to group 1 (always follow the procedures).
In order to test the hypotheses, the present study assessed the regression coefﬁcients,
the ORs and the p-values, but the regression model as a whole was evaluated by
Nagelkerke’s R² and the Hosmer–Lemeshow test. Nagelkerke’s R² (Field 2005) is an
effect size measure which varies between 0 (indicating that the independent variables in
the model are useless at predicting the dependent variable) and 1 (indicating that the
independent variables in the model predict the dependent variable perfectly). The Hosmer
and Lemeshow test is a measure of the match between the predicted values and the
observed values, and thus it is often referred to as a goodness-of-ﬁt measure. A non-
signiﬁcant p-value (p > 0.05) is preferred in this test, since this indicates no signiﬁcant
difference between predicted values and observed values (Meyers et al. 2006).4
4. Results
4.1. Exploratory factor analysis
4.1.1. Factor extraction and factor labelling. The initial considerations and analysis of
the sample veriﬁed that the data and the included variables were appropriate for factor
analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity and Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin’s measure of sampling
adequacy showed satisfactory results (see notes in Table 3). The sample size was reduced
to n = 754, because respondents with missing values were removed from the factor
analysis. However, the common requirement for at least 10–15 respondents per item
was still fulﬁlled (Field 2005).
The application of Kaiser’s criterion resulted in a six-factor solution, presented in Table 3.
This solution accounted for 65% of the total variance. From Table 3, it is clear that all of the
18 items had sufﬁcient loadings (above 0.40) on a factor to be retained in the ﬁnal factor
solution. At the same time, no items had loadings above 0.40 on more than one factor,
indicating a simple factor structure. The six factors were thematically labelled as follows:
Factor 1 – Captain’s safety leadership, consisting of three items related to the captain
as a role model for safety work and openness towards safety issues.
Factor 2 – Risk, consisting of three items related to how risk is perceived and the
perceived probability of being involved in accidents on the vessel.
Factor 3 – Safety training, consisting of three items related to the crew’s evaluation of
the time and priority given to safety training.
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Factor 4 – General safety orientation on board, consisting of three items related to
how safety is taken care of and prioritized on board.
Factor 5 – Efﬁciency demands, consisting of four items related to the relative priority
of safety versus efﬁciency.
Factor 6 – Procedure vagueness, consisting of two items related to the crew’s
perception of the procedures with regard to their comprehensibility and user-
friendliness.
4.1.2. Internal consistency, reliability and second-order factor analysis.
Intercorrelations between the measurement constructs and Cronbach’s alphas within the
constructs are presented in Table 4. According to Nunnally (1978), alpha scores greater
than 0.70 are indications of adequate internal consistency and reliability. As Cortina
(1993) has noted, however, the alpha score is not only a function of item intercorrelations
but also to a large extent a function of the number of items in a scale and ‘…it must be
interpreted with the number of items in mind’ (p. 102). Despite the relatively small
number of items per construct in the present study, the alpha scores proved satisfactory
for four of the six items. For the two remaining items, efﬁciency demands and procedure
vagueness, the alpha scores were 0.61 and 0.65, respectively. According to George and
Mallery (2003), alpha scores between 0.70 and 0.60 should be considered questionable,
but not poor. Hence, the internal consistency and reliability of the two constructs were
Table 3. Exploratory factor analysis: PCA, varimax with Kaiser normalization.
Factor loadings
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 h2
Q1 0.857 0.755
Q2 0.844 0.768
Q3 0.814 0.780
Q4 0.892 0.760
Q5 0.874 0.792
Q6 0.487 0.380
Q7 0.852 0.672
Q8 0.804 0.717
Q9 0.530 0.539
Q10 0.791 0.546
Q11 0.769 0.577
Q12 0.684 0.526
Q13 0.687 0.457
Q14 0.650 0.820
Q15 0.632 0.409
Q16 0.543 0.798
Q17 0.822 0.700
Q18 0.795 0.723
Eigenvalue 4.90 1.89 1.44 1.32 1.16 1.00
% explained variance (after rotation) 13.32 11.12 11.04 10.83 10.18 8.62 65.10
Notes: Bartlett’s test of sphericity: χ2 = 4222.75, p < 0.001. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = 0.819.
Factor loadings below 0.40 are suppressed.
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considered questionable, but were still within a tolerable limit when the number of items
and the intercorrelations between the items were taken into consideration. The average
item intercorrelations for efﬁciency demands and procedure vagueness were 0.28 and
0.49, respectively.
In order to assess the adequacy of a second-order factor solution for safety climate an EFA
which included constructs 1–5 was conducted (efﬁciency demands items were reversed).
This analysis resulted in a one-factor solution (Kaiser’s criterion) with factor loadings
varying from 0.59 (risk) to 0.72 (safety training). This factor had an eigenvalue of 2.28
and accounted for 45.7% of the total variance. The Cronbach’s alpha between the items in
this solution was 0.81. According to Milfont and Duckitt (2004), second-order factor
solutions derived from EFA should be checked by conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA),
since the CFA provides indices of goodness of ﬁt. This was done and the CFA supported
the one-factor solution for safety climate (RMSEA = 0.053, IFI = 0.945, CFI = 0.945).
4.2. Logistic regression
The results from the BLR analysis are presented in Table 5. As shown in the table, the
analysis was conducted in four steps (model 1 to model 4). In the ﬁrst model, age was
entered into the regression analysis. In the second model, job experience was entered. In
the third model, the second-order factor safety climate was entered, and in the fourth
model, procedure vagueness was entered. To investigate multi-collinearity, the tolerance
Table 5. Logistic regression with safety compliance as dependent variable.
Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
variable β OR β OR β OR β OR
Constant −1.227** 0.293 −0.384 0.681 −5.720** 0.003 −3.104* 0.045
Age 0.363** 1.438 0.498** 1.645 0.450** 1.568 0.442** 1.556
Job experience −0.411** 0.663 −0.333* 0.717 −0.331* 0.718
Safety climate 1.269** 3.558 0.905** 2.471
Procedure vagueness −0.447** 0.640
Nagelkerke R2 0.057 0.086 0.189 0.234
Hosmer & Lemeshow (sig.) 0.332 0.101 0.537 0.442
Notes: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.001.
Table 4. Pearson correlation between measurement constructs (Cronbach’s alpha in diagonal).
Construct
Number of
items 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Captain's safety leadership 3 (0.856)
2 Risk 3 0.196* (0.730)
3 Safety training 3 0.302* 0.342* (0.709)
4 General safety orientation on
board
3 0.413* 0.234* 0.343* (0.712)
5 Efﬁciency demands 4 −0.339* −0.310* −0.396* −0.316* (0.606)
6 Procedure vagueness 2 −0.208* −0.219* −0.318* −0.208* 0.391* (0.653)
Note: *p < 0.01.
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statistic was examined for each variable in all models. The minimum tolerance value was
0.80, which is well above the critical value of 0.20 (Field 2005). To investigate the
presence of highly inﬂuential cases, Cook’s distance (Di) was examined for each case. The
maximum Dj was 0.01, which is well below the cut-off value of 1 (Field 2005).
As shown in model 1, the vessel workers’ age is positively and signiﬁcantly related to
safety compliance. Thus, the data gave support to H1. The OR of the age variable
indicates that when the age variable increases by 1 (i.e. a 10-year increase in age), the
odds of following procedures increases by 1.44. The constant (β0) and the regression
coefﬁcient (βage) result in a logit of –0.86 and 0.59 for the youngest and the oldest
workers, respectively. By means of the antilog function, the predicted probability of
reporting always following procedures among the youngest workers is estimated to be
29.7%, compared with 64.3% among the oldest workers.
Even though the Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicates that the predicted values in
model 1 are not signiﬁcantly different from the observed values (indicating adequate
model ﬁt), the R² statistics show that the model only accounts for 5.7% of the variance in
safety compliance. The explained variance increases to 8.6% when the vessel workers’ job
experience is included in model 2. The relationship between job experience and compli-
ance was not in the expected direction, however. That is, the β value is negative and the
OR is below one. In addition, the β value is signiﬁcantly different from 0. This indicates
that the vessel workers’ job experience is negatively related to safety compliance, the
opposite of what we expected from H2.
As shown in model 3, the introduction of safety climate leads to a substantial increase
in explained variance (an increase in Nagelkerke’s R² from 8.6% to 18.9%). The model ﬁt
is still adequate and the relationship between safety climate and safety compliance is
signiﬁcant, positive and strong, with an OR of 3.56. This indicates that safety climate has
a positive impact on safety compliance, thus supporting H3. By holding age and job
experience constant (with minimum values, i.e. 1), the logit for vessel workers who
perceive the safety climate as negative (i.e. safety climate = 1) is –4.33, whereas it is
0.74 for vessel workers who perceive the safety climate as positive (i.e. safety climate = 5).
By means of the antilog function, the predicted probability of reporting always following
procedures among the former group of workers is estimated to be 1.3%, compared with
67.7% among the latter group of workers.
The strong positive effect that safety climate exerts on safety compliance is slightly
moderated in model 4, when procedure vagueness is included in the model. The effect of
age and job experience is, however, not affected. As expected, the effect that procedure
vagueness exerts on safety compliance is signiﬁcantly negative and the OR is below 1.
Thus, the analysis gives support to H4 which postulated that perceived procedure vague-
ness would be negatively related to safety compliance. At the same time, the explained
variance has increased from 18.9% to 23.4%, and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test
indicates good model ﬁt. By holding age and job experience constant (with minimum
values, i.e. 1) and safety climate constant (with maximum values, i.e. 5), the logit for
vessel workers who perceive the safety procedures as vague (i.e. procedure vagueness = 5)
is –0.70, whereas it is 1.09 for vessel workers who perceive the safety procedures as clear
(i.e. procedure vagueness = 1). By means of the antilog function, the predicted probability
of reporting always following procedures among the former group of workers is estimated
to be 33.1%, compared with 74.7% among the latter group of workers.
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In order to test whether the results obtained in model 4 could be caused by some
underlying variables, we controlled model 4 by entering two sets of control variables in a
ﬁfth model; job title and vessel type. This resulted in an increase in explained variance
(Nagelkerke’s R² = 25.6%) and still an adequate model ﬁt (Hosmer and
Lemeshow = 0.066). None of the new variables entered contributed signiﬁcantly to the
model, however, and they did not moderate the effect of the variables in model 4. Hence,
we concluded that the results obtained in model 4 were robust.
5. Discussion and implications
5.1. Key ﬁndings and discussion
This study was designed to examine the antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour among
workers on offshore service vessels operating on the NCS. The principal research model
of the study was multi-factorial and measured characteristics related to the individual
worker, the organization and the body of procedures on the vessels.
As regards the individual worker, we focused on two demographical attributes, age and
job experience, and hypothesized that both would be positively related to safety compli-
ance. The logistic regression analysis gave support to the hypothesized positive relation-
ship between age and safety compliance. This implies that older vessel workers are more
compliant than their younger colleagues, but it should be noted that the amount of
variance that age accounted for was quite small (5.7% in model 1). This ﬁnding is in
line with previous ﬁndings (Lu and Yang 2011; Gyekye and Salminen 2009; Siu et al.
2003; Tesluk 2004).
The hypothesized positive impact of job experience on safety compliance was, how-
ever, not supported. In fact, the analysis demonstrated that job experience was signiﬁ-
cantly negatively related to safety compliance. This implies that vessel workers with long
experience of vessel work tend to be less safety-compliant than those with less experience.
This ﬁnding also implies that the positive relationship between age and safety compliance
is not caused by the fact that older workers are more experienced than their younger
colleagues (even though these two attributes correlate positively in the data set, r = 0.42).
Hence, the positive relationship between the vessel workers’ age and safety compliance
must be caused by other factors than job experience. As suggested by Jonah and Dawson
(1987) and Boyce and Geller (2002), it can be an effect of age differences in risk
perception. Costa and McCrae’s (1988) ﬁndings linked to age-related declines in certain
personality traits, like activity and excitement seeking, is also a reasonable explanation.
The signiﬁcant negative relationship between job experience and safety compliance is in
line with Rebok et al. (2005) ﬁnding in the aviation sector, among pilots. Although Rebok
et al. fail to offer an explanation for this ﬁnding, the work of Snook (2000) could shed light
on the results related to job experience in the present study. According to Snook, factual and
non-compliant work practices within organizations must be understood as a result of a
practical drift, a ‘slow uncoupling of local practice from written procedure’ (Snook 2000,
225), where deviance from established procedures is redeﬁned as acceptable. Snook’s main
point is that the initial design of the system (with its accompanying rules and procedures)
often proves to be unworkable at the local level. Hence, units develop local variations that
over time drift away from the original set of established rules and procedures.
Snook’s purpose is to explain how and why the collective practices over time turn into
routine violations as a result of practical drift. The effect of practical drift that Snook
Antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour 15
observes with regard to collective practices might also manifest itself on the individual
level, however. At least, the results of the present study indicate that vessel workers with
long job experience tend to drift further away from the written procedures than their less
experienced colleagues.
As regards organizational characteristics, we focused on safety climate. Safety climate
was measured by applying 16 items, and the EFA resulted in a reduction into ﬁve
underlying safety climate dimensions; captain’s safety leadership, general safety orienta-
tion on board, risk, efﬁciency demands, and safety training. In order to assess the
adequacy of a second-order factor solution for safety climate, an EFA which included
these dimensions was conducted. In line with previous research (Neal and Grifﬁn 2004;
Grifﬁn and Neal 2000), we found support for a second-order one-factor solution for safety
climate. Further, the logistic regression analysis gave support to the hypothesized positive
relationship between safety climate and safety compliance. This is in line with previous
review studies (Alper and Karsh 2009; Clarke 2006; Christian et al. 2009) and consistent
with ﬁndings from a broad range of other industries (Cavazza and Serpe 2009; Zhou et al.
2008; Grifﬁn and Neal 2000; Lu and Tsai 2010; Martínez-Córcoles et al. 2011). The
ﬁndings are also consistent with Clarke (2006) and Zohar (2010) who assert that the safety
climate acts as a frame of reference for safety-speciﬁc behaviour, and that employee
behaviour will tend to align with what employees perceive as expected behaviour. The
ﬁndings in the present study clearly illustrate that vessel workers who perceive safety as
valued on the vessel where they work have a greater probability of reporting always
working in accordance with the procedures.
When it came to the rule/procedure characteristics, we focused on procedure vagueness
and hypothesized that this would be negatively related to safety compliance. The logistic
regression analysis supported this. This implies that workers who perceive the procedures
as vague have a lower probability of always adhering to safety procedures. This ﬁnding is
in line with Alper and Karsh’s (2009) review study and Laurence’s (2005) study of mine
workers.
5.2. Implications of the key ﬁndings
The empirical ﬁndings in the present study have both theoretical and managerial implica-
tions. A signiﬁcant contribution of the study is the empirical testing in a maritime context
of ﬁndings from previous studies of safety compliance. The empirical testing indicates
that the antecedents of safety-compliant behaviour on offshore service vessels are very
similar to those identiﬁed within other industries. Hence, this industry does not appear to
be unique in this context. A possible exception is job experience, however, which proved
to be negatively associated with safety compliance.
Another signiﬁcant contribution of the study is that it points to some important aspects
related to safety improvement efforts on offshore service vessels. The results of the
present study demonstrate that several factors need to be addressed in order to improve
the level of safety compliance.
The ﬁrst factor is the individual worker. The fact that the vessel worker’s age is
positively related to safety compliance indicates that shipowners, captains and other
stakeholders within the industry should put extra effort into training and attitude formation
of young vessel workers. The negative relationship between job experience and safety
compliance could indicate that parts of this training need to be formalized and extended
beyond on-the-job training. The negative impact of job experience further demonstrates
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that safety-compliant behaviour is a quality which tends to erode with increased experi-
ence. This could indicate that work practices over time are uncoupled from written
procedures, and that rule-based logics of action are gradually being replaced with skill-
based logics of action. It is management’s responsibility to ensure that the balance
between these logics of action is within the boundaries of safe practice.
The second factor which needs to be addressed to improve the level of safety
compliance is the safety climate of the vessels. In the present study vessel workers who
perceived the safety climate as positive reported more frequently that they always
followed the procedures. A favourable safety climate was moreover characterized by (1)
positive evaluations of the captain as a role model for safety work, (2) low levels of
perceived risk, (3) positive evaluations of the time and priority given to safety training, (4)
a positive perception of how safety is taken care of and (5) a positive evaluation of the
relative priority of safety versus efﬁciency. In order to improve the safety climate of the
vessels in a direction which is favourable for increased safety compliance, it is important
to give these areas high priority. High and visible priority of these areas signals to the
crew that safety is valued within the company and aboard the individual vessel. According
to Zohar (2010) this in turn signals what sort of role behaviour is expected, supported and
rewarded.
The third factor of importance for improved safety compliance is related to the quality
of the procedures. The ﬁndings in the present study clearly imply that creating a body of
procedures is not sufﬁcient to ensure compliance. Compliant behaviour turned out to be
strongly determined by the quality and clarity of the procedures, but how can quality and
clarity be ensured? There is probably no ﬁnal answer to this question, but Simpson et al.’s
(Simpson et al. 2009) basic principles of procedure preparation in the mining industry
may well be applicable to the offshore service vessel industry. These basic principles are
(1) functional simplicity, (2) tailoring, (3) use of plain, positive language and (4) piloting.
The four principles might seem self-evident, but considering the fact that 37% of the
vessel workers in the present study found the procedures difﬁcult to understand, these
basic principles should be very relevant.
5.3. Limitations and future research
The ﬁndings and the implications of the present study should be interpreted with some
methodological limitations in mind. First, all data were based on self-report measures
drawn from the same source and could therefore be vulnerable to both common method
bias and responses biased by social desirability. It would therefore be a useful avenue for
future research to replicate this study with the use of measures drawn from other sources,
e.g. observations of actual work on board vessels. Second, the cross-sectional design makes
it difﬁcult to test and establish sequential relationships between the independent variables
and safety compliance. Future research should therefore consider a longitudinal design in
order to further validate the proposed cause and effect relationships. Third, as we described
in Section 2, individual differences in safety-speciﬁc behaviour must be understood on the
basis of factors that are directly related to safety behaviour: knowledge, skills and motiva-
tion, the so-called proximal drivers of safety behaviour (Neal and Grifﬁn 2004). This study,
however, focused solely on the proposed distal antecedents of safety behaviour and the
direct relationship between these antecedents and safety-compliant behaviour. By omitting
the proximal drivers of safety behaviour and the mediating effect that these drivers might
have, we miss valuable insight into the mechanisms through which the distal antecedents
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affect safety compliance. Hence, future research should include measures of knowledge,
skills and motivation in order to reach a more profound understanding of how the effect of
distal antecedents affects the level of safety-compliant behaviour.
Despite these limitations, the study ﬁndings and the implications that we have drawn
from them should be relevant and important for safety improvement efforts within the
offshore service vessel industry. The ﬁndings and the implications should also have
relevance for the maritime industry as a whole, where previous research has identiﬁed
procedure violations as a common causal element in accidents (Macrae 2009). The multi-
factorial model applied in the present study points to some important factors that should
be addressed in order to deal with such violations. Further, the topics that these factors
address are generic and not restricted exclusively to the offshore service vessel industry.
An interesting direction for future research would therefore be to examine the explanatory
power of these factors within other sub-sectors of the maritime industry and within other
operational and cultural contexts.
6. Conclusion
Based on previous research within other sectors, the present study aimed to develop and
test a quantitative model which measured the relationship between a set of explanatory
factors and safety compliance on offshore service vessels operating on the NCS. The
explanatory factors in the model included three relatively broad categories: individual
characteristics, organizational characteristics and procedure/rule characteristics. Within
these categories the logistic regression analysis revealed that safety compliance was
related to safety climate, vessel workers’ age, job experience and perceived procedure
vagueness. In sum, this implies that shipowners, captains and other stakeholders within
the offshore service vessel industry should consider increasing safety compliance from a
broad multi-factorial perspective. Due to the fact that procedure violations are an impor-
tant causal factor for maritime accidents (Macrae 2009), this should also have relevance
for the maritime industry as a whole.
Notes
1. A procedure is in general a detailed guide to action, describing the steps to be followed, and in
what order in a recurring situation or problem. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are
written procedures aiming at standardizing general activities (Cook 1998).
2. The corresponding author can be contacted in order to receive the complete questionnaire.
3. The relatively low percentage of respondents above 60 years old is because many offshore
service vessel workers can retire at the age of 60 years and receive a maritime worker’s pension.
4. All analyses were conducted with SPSS 18.0 software.
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Accident analyses and investigations regularly identify a lack of compliance with rules and procedures as
a central contributing factor to workplace accidents. This underlines the importance of identifying the
organizational factors that affect the level of safety compliant behavior. The purpose of the present study
was to examine how workers’ perception of leadership involvement in daily work operations affects the
level of safety compliant behavior among workers employed on offshore platforms operating on the Nor-
wegian Continental Shelf. The effect that leadership involvement exerts on safety compliance was mea-
sured both directly and indirectly through the intervening variable work climate. Using survey data from
six different measure periods (N = 10003), exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor analysis identiﬁed three
dimensions of work climate; (1) workers’ competence and involvement, (2) role clarity and (3) follow-
up of contractors. The following SEM analyses revealed that leadership involvement in daily work oper-
ations has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on the level of safety compliance on offshore platforms. The
effect of leadership involvement was found to be both direct and indirect, mediated by the three work
climate dimensions selected for this study. Theoretical and managerial implications of the ﬁndings are
discussed.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the ﬁrst exploration well was drilled on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf (NCS) in 1966, both the authorities and the oil
and gas industry have been repeatedly reminded of the high risks
involved in offshore petroleum activity. After more than 40 years
of production, occupational and major accidents on the shelf have
caused the death of 268 offshore workers (Petroleum Safety
Authority Norway [PSA], 2011c). The risk level has gradually
reduced in the industry over the last years (Kongsvik et al.,
2012), but accidents still happen and there is a continuous need
for improvement.
Although the standard of the technical equipment on the off-
shore installations is deﬁnitely a critical aspect of safety and acci-
dent causation, it is also recognized that the safety level within
such complex work systems is highly dependent on human behav-
ior (Adie et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 1996; Johnson, 2007). Hence,
the oil and gas industry is now increasing its efforts in developing
human risk management systems which aim at enhancing safety
behavior (Didla et al., 2009). According to Neal et al. (2000, p.
101), safety behavior consists of two different behavioral dimen-
sions: safety participation and safety compliance. Whereas safety
participation refers to voluntary work which aims at supporting
and promoting safety in the organization, safety compliance ‘‘in-
volves adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a
safe manner’’. Human risk management systems within the off-
shore oil and gas industry pay considerable attention to safety
compliance. This is due to the fact that virtually all work opera-
tions within this industry are regulated by rules and procedures,
and because investigations of offshore accidents repeatedly iden-
tify lack of compliance with the regulations as a central contribut-
ing factor (e.g., PSA, 2005, 2007, 2011b). This ﬁnding is, however,
not restricted to offshore accidents, but is a recurring conclusion
in accident investigations in general (Hopkins, 2011).
Thewell-recognized importanceof safety compliance as a barrier
against workplace accidents has sparked off a considerable amount
of researchwith the aim of identifying the antecedents of non-com-
pliant behavior (e.g., Krause et al., 1999; Lu and Yang, 2010; Matilla
et al., 1994;Mearns et al., 2010; Neal et al., 2000; Zohar, 2002; Zohar
and Luria, 2003). A common research topic within these studies is
that of leadership. Two relatively different, but still complementary
perspectives can be identiﬁed in leadership studies (Hofmann and
Morgeson, 2004). One of them links safety compliance to the
safety-speciﬁc dimensions of leadership such asmonitoring, correc-
tion, and reward for safe behavior (e.g. Kapp, 2012; Zohar, 2002).
The other focuses more on the general dimensions of leadership
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behavior, such as trust, cooperation, and involvement, andhow such
dimensions are related to safety compliance (e.g.Matilla et al., 1994;
O’Dea and Flin, 2001). The vastmajority of the leadership studies ap-
ply a safety-speciﬁc perspective, while considerably less research is
undertaken from a more general leadership perspective (Matilla
et al., 1994). However, according to Hofmann and Morgeson
(2004, p. 170), ‘‘it is important, when either reviewing or investigat-
ing the relationship between leadership and safety, tomove beyond
the safety-speciﬁc literature to consider the broader leadership lit-
erature. This is important because it may yield additional insight
into how leadership can impact safety.’’ The present study seeks to
explore this relatively untapped area of leadership research. The fo-
cus is on leadership’s involvement in work operations, which is
understood as workers’ perceptions of the degree to which leaders
participate in the planning and preparation of work, follow up the
execution of the work, and contribute to good cooperation among
team members, and the signiﬁcance of such involvement for safety
compliance.
In addition to examining the direct relationship between leader-
ship involvement and workers’ safety compliance, the present
study aims to explicate this relationship by examining the role such
involvement plays in establishing a work climate that is favorable
to safety compliance. A number of studies have linked safety com-
pliance to both leadership and work climate characteristics such as
workers’ perceptions of communication, roles, and inﬂuence (e.g.,
DeJoy et al., 2004; Larsson et al., 2008; Matilla et al., 1994), but little
research has been done to examine the relationship between these
variables (Thompson et al., 1998). The question that is addressed in
the present study is therefore how leadership involvement in work
operations on offshore platforms directly inﬂuences safety compli-
ance, and also how it inﬂuences safety compliance indirectly
through the work climate. The principal research model is pre-
sented in Fig. 1, but it will be further extended by hypotheses which
are considered in the following sections of this paper.
This study is based on a multi-sample survey of employees
working for a Norwegian oil company on 28 different offshore
installations on the NCS. The survey aimed to map the offshore
workers’ perceptions of their leaders’ behavior, the perceived cli-
mate of their work group, and the level of safety compliance. The
survey was administered six times in the same study population.
The advantage of such a study design is that it allows for repeated
testing of both the factorial structure and the hypothesized rela-
tionships, thus increasing the validity of the study.
1.1. Theoretical background and research hypotheses
Studies which stress the safety-speciﬁc dimensions of leader-
ship all indicate that leaders who emphasize, discuss, reward,
monitor, and encourage safe performance generate safer perfor-
mance within their work group (Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004).
Within these studies the safety-speciﬁc variants of Bass’s (1985)
concepts of transactional and transformational leadership styles
have stimulated great research interest. Safety-speciﬁc transac-
tional leadership is characterized by the establishment of appropri-
ate safety goals, by monitoring workers’ performance in relation to
those goals, and by rewarding or correcting behavior which sus-
tains or improves safety performance (Kapp, 2012; Zohar, 2002).
Safety-speciﬁc transformational leadership is characterized by
leaders who challenge workers to achieve exceptional safety stan-
dards, who display concern for the safety and well-being of
employees, who challenge the workers to develop improved prac-
tices for solving safety-related problems, and who stand out as role
models for their staff by working in a safe way themselves (Kapp,
2012; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009).
Both safety-speciﬁc transactional and safety-speciﬁc transfor-
mational leadership styles have been proven to be positively re-
lated to workers’ safety compliance (Kapp, 2012; Krause et al.,
1999; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009; Zohar, 2002; Zohar and Luria,
2003). Studies of offshore platforms also indicate that this is the
case in these high risk settings. Mearns and Reader’s (2008) study
of UK offshore workers is an example of this. In their study they
found support for a positive relationship between supervisors’ con-
cern for the safety and well-being of employees, and the level of
safety behavior of the employees. Further, Bryden’s (2002) analysis
of a safety behavior program, implemented in an operator company
on the UK continental shelf, demonstrated that safety speciﬁc
transformational leadership is a key element in enhancing safety
compliance. Consistent with these ﬁndings, Zohar (2002, 2010) rec-
ommended that studies of leadership and safety should choose a
safety-speciﬁc leadership perspective as opposed to a general lead-
ership perspective. Zohar’s argument is that safety often conﬂicts
with other aspects of performance and that safe behavior under
such conditions will only emerge if safety is given high priority rel-
ative to these.
Zohar’s argument is plausible, but studies that have investi-
gated the relationship between a broader set of leader actions
and safety compliance suggest that good safety management ex-
tends beyond the clearly safety-speciﬁc characteristics of leader-
ship. Matilla et al.’s (1994) study of safety compliance within the
building construction industry is an example of this. The results
of their study indicated that supervisors who give feedback on per-
formance, monitor performance, spend time communicating with
workers about non-work related topics, and display a participatory
style of leadership are the most effective supervisors with respect
to both safety compliance and ﬁnancial performance.
In line with these ﬁndings, O’Dea and Flin (2001) argue, in a
study of leadership in the offshore oil and gas industry, that good
safety leadership is not restricted exclusively to the safety-speciﬁc
dimensions of leadership. The qualities of good safety leadership
which they emphasize can be subsumed under the term ‘‘partici-
pative management.’’ In addition to high involvement in safety ini-
tiatives, a critical activity in participative management is
leadership involvement in work operations and frequent commu-
nication between workers and leaders (O’Dea and Flin, 2001).
Empirical support for this view can be found in an early review
of research into successful occupational safety programs, con-
ducted by Cohen (1977). Cohen’s study revealed that frequent
interaction and daily contact between supervisors and line workers
has a positive effect on safety improvement efforts. In a follow-up
study which evaluated and compared low versus high accident
companies, similar conclusions were drawn (Smith et al., 1978):
leaders in companies with low accident rates were more actively
involved in supervising, planning, and monitoring the work pro-
cesses in general; that is to say, they spent more time at the front
end of the work operations. A recent study by Yagil and Luria
(2010) of 11 manufacturing organizations gives support to Cohen
Fig. 1. The principal research model of the present study.
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(1977) and Smith et al.’s (1978) conclusions. This study found that
the frequency of interactions and the quality of communication be-
tween leaders and subordinates has a direct effect on safety com-
pliance. Similar ﬁndings are reported by Simard and Marchand
(1997), who found that a cooperative and participative supervi-
sor–employee relationship is among the most important variables
for safety compliance. A study by Fleming et al. (1996) of offshore
supervisors’ role in safety management points in the same direc-
tion. The most effective supervisors in their study, with respect
to safety, displayed a participative style of management where
they discussed jobs with their work group and actively partici-
pated in the planning and preparation of work tasks.
The topic which seems to emerge from all of the studies that
highlight the broader dimensions of leader behavior is the impor-
tance of supervisors who are close to the front end of the work
operations and have a cooperative and participative relationship
with their subordinates and the work that they perform. This can
be referred to as leadership involvement. The signiﬁcance of high
leadership involvement in work operations does not only emerge
in empirical studies of safety and safety compliance, but it can also
be identiﬁed in investigations of accidents on offshore platforms on
the NCS (e.g., PSA, 2005, 2007, 2011b). An example of this is an
accident on a production platform in 2005, where the bottom-hole
string was unintentionally loosened from the elevator collar and
fell towards the drill ﬂoor, seriously injuring the derrickman. The
PSA’s investigation report concluded that a lack of compliance with
procedures was the result of insufﬁcient leadership involvement in
the work operations on the drill ﬂoor. The supervisors were not
taking an active part in the work process, and were thus not aware
of the fact that the drill operations were in breach of the relevant
procedures (PSA, 2005).
The PSA report indicated that a high level of leadership involve-
ment is important because it enables leaders to reveal unsafe work
practices. This effect of leadership involvement is also emphasized
inWeick and Sutcliffe’s, 2007 literature on high reliability organiza-
tions (HROs). According to them, leadership involvement, in terms
of demonstrating an ongoing attention to operations and spending
time at the front end of the operations, is of signiﬁcant importance
for safety because it ‘‘creates a context where surprises are more
likely to be surfaced and corrected before they grow into problems’’
(p. 155). A supplementary effect of high leadership involvement
that is emphasized in O’Dea and Flin’s (2001, p. 53) study of leader-
ship in the offshore oil and gas industry is that it enables ‘‘good
interpersonal relationships with subordinates, relationships which
are characterized by trust, openness and honesty.’’ Such relation-
ships, they argue, are favorable to safety discussions and getting
workers to accept ownership of safety. Consistent with these pre-
sumed effects, the present study hypothesized that:
H1. Leadership involvement will positively inﬂuence safety
compliance.
In addition to the direct effect hypothesized in H1, previous
studies of both safety-speciﬁc leadership and general leader behav-
ior have indicated that the effect of leadership is indirect as well as
direct, and that leadership interventions serve to change behavior
via a change in the safety climate of the work group within which
worker behaviors occur (Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000; Zohar, 2010). For
example, Hofmann et al. (2003) have found that high-quality social
exchanges between leaders and employees (known as leader mem-
ber exchange, or LMX) is positively correlated to safety climate, and
that constructive LMX relationships are signiﬁcantly related to
safety behavior when the safety climate is positive. Thus Hofmann
et al. conclude that ‘‘front-line leaders, and the climates they help
create within their work groups, can have a signiﬁcant impact on
the safety performance of their subordinates’’ (p. 176).
Hofmann et al.’s ﬁndings indicate that in order to reach high
safety performance, leaders need to have collaborative working
relationships with their staff and to create a positive safety climate.
Safety climate can be deﬁned as the set of perceptions that
employees share regarding safety in their workplace (Zohar,
1980), and is regarded as a signiﬁcant frame of reference for the
safety-speciﬁc behavior and attitudes of both individuals and
groups of employees (Clarke, 2006). The positive link between
safety climate and safety compliance is well documented in previ-
ous research (Cavazza and Serpe, 2009; Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000; Lu
and Tsai, 2010; Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2008).
However, studies which have explored the relationship between
safety compliance and a broader set of organizational climate per-
ceptions which extend beyond mere safety perceptions, have indi-
cated that such climate characteristics are important as well
(DeJoy et al., 2004; Larsson et al., 2008; Parker et al., 2001). For
example, Larsson et al.’s (2008) study of construction workers
found that climate characteristics, such as clearly deﬁned job
descriptions, feedback on work performance, and inﬂuence over
one’s own work, have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on safety compliance.
Hence, Larsson et al. concluded that broad climate factors which
extend beyond safety climate constitute important conditions for
safety compliance.
In the present study these broader climate characteristics are re-
ferred to aswork climate perceptions. Work climate perceptions are
typically related to some general dimensions of the work unit
environment such as role clarity, teamwork, and commitment
(Anderson and West, 1998; Stringer, 2002), and not to the clearly
safety-speciﬁc dimensions which are typical of safety climate
perceptions (Flin et al., 2000). Further, it is well documented that
leadership is of signiﬁcant importance in the formationanddevelop-
ment of the work climate (Koene et al., 2002; Litwin and Stringer,
1968). For example, Stringer (2002) has found that leadership can
explain up to 67% of the total variance in the work climate. This
makes leadership the single most important antecedent of climate.
According to Tharaldsen et al. (2011), the broad climate charac-
teristics which are considered important in investigations into
accidents on offshore petroleum platforms are (1) workers’ compe-
tence and involvement, (2) role clarity, and (3) follow-up of con-
tractors. Based on research which has found that leadership
practices are the most important variable for the prediction of var-
iance in work climate (Stringer, 2002), we can expect that leader-
ship involvement will positively inﬂuence these three climate
characteristics. The three climate characteristics were therefore
examined as possible mediator variables between leadership
involvement and safety compliance for the present study. The ex-
pected signiﬁcance of the three climate characteristics as mediator
variables between leadership involvement and safety compliance
is clariﬁed in more detail in the following discussion.
The ﬁrst climate characteristic, competence and involvement, and
its positive link to safety compliance, is highly supported in the
empirical literature. Competence and involvement is usually
examined in terms of safety-speciﬁc training and workers’ involve-
ment in the development of safety policies (Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000;
Lu and Yang, 2011; Mohamed, 2002). Although important, safety-
speciﬁc competence and involvement is seldom sufﬁcient for safe
operating practices (Cooper, 2001). As Barling et al. (2003) have
stressed, safe performance is also highly dependent on general
involvement and training that extends beyond the speciﬁc conﬁnes
of safety training. According to Barling et al., increased involve-
ment promotes learning and enables proactive problem-solving
and preventive action. Moreover, they argue that competence in
general work skills is required for all aspects of a job, including
safety. This might be particularly evident within highly complex
technical systems such as offshore platforms, where several acci-
dent investigations have identiﬁed a lack of speciﬁc work skills
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and competence as underlying contributors to non-compliant ac-
tions (e.g., PSA, 2007, 2009a, 2011a). Lack of competence has also
been identiﬁed as one of the most important underlying causes
of the Montara blowout (Hayes, 2012). However, according to
Hayes, the lack of competence alone cannot explain the blowout
or the unsafe actions carried out by the drilling personnel prior
to the blowout. His analysis suggests that active and hands-on
supervision of the offshore activities should have revealed whether
the personnel had the appropriate competencies and were operat-
ing in accordance with standards and procedures. Thus, Hayes
draws a line between competence and safety compliance, and also
between leadership involvement and competence. Consistent with
this, the present study hypothesized that:
H2. Leadership involvement will positively inﬂuence safety com-
pliance by means of increased workers’ competence and involve-
ment.
The second climate characteristic, role clarity, is also highlighted
in Hayes’ analysis of the Montara blowout, where ambiguity in the
roles and responsibilities of senior managers led to several ﬂawed
decisions which contributed to the blowout. Whereas Hayes deals
with the signiﬁcance of role clarity and ambiguity at the supervisor
level, other investigations of offshore accidents have found this to
be of critical importance for compliant behavior at the subordinate
level as well (e.g., PSA, 2007, 2009b, 2010). Empirical research
points in the same direction. Sneddon et al.’s (2006) study of safety
and situational awareness within the offshore oil and gas industry
is an example of this. In their study, role ambiguity was seen as a
potential source of occupational stress, and such stress was nega-
tively related to safety compliance. Sneddon et al. suggested that
the negative relationship between occupational stress and safety
compliance is mediated by reduced attention or awareness, such
that occupational stress leads to decreased situational awareness
and ultimately to short-cuts and rule breaking. The results of Hem-
ingway and Smith’s (1999) study of organizational climate in the
nursing profession is another example. By applying a six-item role
ambiguity scale, which assessed perceived clarity/ambiguity
regarding job responsibilities, they found that nurses who experi-
enced high degrees of role ambiguity were more likely to incur a
reportable injury at work when compared to nurses who experi-
enced lower degrees of role ambiguity. In addition, they found that
role ambiguity was negatively related to support from supervisors.
In line with these ﬁndings, the present study hypothesized that:
H3. Leadership involvement will positively inﬂuence safety com-
pliance by means of increased role clarity.
The third climate characteristic, follow-up of contractors, might
be particularly important for safe behavior within the Norwegian
oil and gas industry, where almost 70% of all offshore personnel
are employed by contractors (PSA, 2006). Typically, the contractor
workers are involved in some of the most accident-prone work
processes, such as drilling, repair work, maintenance, and lifting
operations. It is also well documented that contractor workers on
the NCS experience occupational injury accidents more frequently
than operator workers (Norwegian Government, 2011). Contrac-
tors are typically hired on contracts of a limited duration. This
means that employees working for a contractor company perform
their work under framework conditions similar to so-called contin-
gent workers. In a review study of contingent work, Clarke (2003)
found empirical support for the hypothesis that contingent work-
ers have less positive safety attitudes and engage in fewer safety
behaviors than core workers. This should imply that the active fol-
low-up of contractors is important for safety compliance, an
assumption which is supported in Mearns et al. (2003) study of
safety management practices in offshore environments. This con-
cluded that effective operator–contractor coordination is associ-
ated with lower incident rates. Consistent with this, the present
study hypothesized that:
H4. Leadership involvement will positively inﬂuence safety com-
pliance by means of increased follow-up of contractors.
In summary, the four hypotheses of the present study suggest
that leadership involvement has both a direct and an indirect inﬂu-
ence on safety compliance. This is illustrated graphically in Fig. 2,
which is an extended versionof the principal researchmodel (Fig. 1).
2. Methodology
2.1. Survey and participants
The present study was based on a survey which was adminis-
tered as an anonymous self-report questionnaire to monitor effec-
tiveness and safety during the merger process of two Norwegian
petroleum companies. A research group consisting of safety advis-
ers and scientists with psychometric competence was established
to develop the questionnaire. A review of available survey instru-
ments was also explored in the literature, but none of these ﬁtted
the multifaceted needs speciﬁed in the project. Thus a new ques-
tionnaire was developed and applied. The new instrument was
named the Leadership and Compliance Tool (LCT). The questionnaire
was distributed via e-mail to both onshore and offshore workers,
but onshore workers were excluded from our analysis.
All respondents in the study were employed by the operator
company; hence contractors were not included in the study. The
survey was administered six times in the same study population
in the period between January 2009 and October 2010. The target
population in each response period incorporated 50% of all offshore
workers on 28 different platforms in the integrated company
(everyone who was offshore during the response period). This
Fig. 2. The hypothetical model of the present study with letters referring to the speciﬁed hypotheses.
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means that some of the respondents participated in the survey sev-
eral times. The response rates, shown in Table 1, varied between
52% (T4) and 86% (T6). The relatively large response rates at T3
and T6 are due to the fact that the response deadline for these peri-
ods was six weeks, while it was only 10 days for the other response
periods. The total response rate for all six response periods was
65%. This resulted in a total sample size of 10,003 respondents.
The number of respondents on each installation varied between
21 and 138, which reﬂects the fact that the installations vary con-
siderably in size.
The gender distribution in the total net sample (T1–T6) shows
that 88% of the respondents were men. This is representative of
the gender distribution on the NCS as a whole where approxi-
mately 90% of the offshore workers are men (PSA, 2012). As regards
age, 56.7% of the respondents were above 45 years, 31.7% were be-
tween 36 and 45 years, and 11.6% were below 36 years.
2.2. Measures and statistical procedures
In the survey the respondents were asked to assess their agree-
ment with 39 statements concerning local workplace factors. The
level of agreement was assessed on a six-point scale. The scale ran-
ged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). A not relevant
option was included, but it was not possible to make neutral agree-
ments such as neither agree nor disagree. Thus, the applied scale
was a so-called forced choice scale.
Sixteen of the 39 items were used to measure leadership
involvement, workers’ competence and involvement, role clarity,
follow-up of contractors, and safety compliance. In order to un-
cover the underlying factor structure of the items and to reduce
the number of items to a manageable size, exploratory factor anal-
ysis (EFA) was conducted in the T1 sample. The applied EFA was
principal component analysis with varimax rotation. Missing val-
ues were replaced with mean scores (an average of 3.0% of missing
values on each item). The number of factors to extract was based
on Kaiser’s criterion (Field, 2009). This means that only factors
with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1 were retained. Internal
consistency and reliability were assessed by Cronbach’s alpha
(Cronbach, 1951). Discriminant validity was assessed by investi-
gating intercorrelations (Pearson’s r) between constructs (Pearson,
1896). Factor loadings above .40 were considered sufﬁcient to re-
late the item to the factor (Meyers et al., 2006). The EFA and its
accompanying analyses were conducted using SPSS 18.0.
To evaluate the replicability of the factor structure generated by
the EFA, ﬁve separate conﬁrmatory factor analyses (CFA) were con-
ducted for samples T2–T6. Since the chi-square value is directly re-
lated to sample size and therefore tends to reject models as the
sample size increases (Meyers et al., 2006), four other ﬁt indices
were examined: RMSEA (root mean square error approximation),
NFI (normed ﬁt index), IFI (incremental ﬁt index) and CFI (compar-
ative ﬁt index). The RMSEA was interpreted as follows: values less
than .08 indicate good ﬁt; values between .08 and .10 indicate
moderate ﬁt; and values greater than .10 indicate poor ﬁt. The
three other ﬁt indices were interpreted as follows: values above
or equal to .95 indicate good ﬁt; values between .90 and .95 indi-
cate acceptable ﬁt; and values below .90 indicate poor ﬁt (see
Meyers et al., 2006).
In order to test the hypotheses included in our research model,
structural equation modeling (SEM) was conducted separately for
T1–T6 and for the total sample. SEM was preferred since this sta-
tistical technique allows the assessment of both direct and indirect
effects (Meyers et al., 2006). The model comprised the latent vari-
ables which were uncovered in the EFA and tested in the CFA. Max-
imum likelihood was used to estimate the model’s path
coefﬁcients. Each path coefﬁcient was then examined to assess sig-
niﬁcance, effect, and whether or not it showed the expected sign.
RMSEA, NFI, IFI, and CFI were examined to assess model ﬁt. The
ﬁt indices were interpreted under the same guiding rules as the
CFA. Both the CFAs and the structural model assessments were
conducted using AMOS 18.0.
3. Results
3.1. Exploratory factor analysis
3.1.1. Factor extraction and factor labeling
The initial considerations and analysis of the T1 sample veriﬁed
that the data and the included variables were appropriate for factor
analysis. Sixteen variables were included in the analysis and the
sample size was N = 1330. Hence, the common requirement of at
least 10–15 respondents per variable was fulﬁlled (Field, 2009).
In addition, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin’s
measure of sampling adequacy showed satisfactory results (see
notes to Table 2).
The application of Kaiser’s criterion resulted in a ﬁve-factor
solution, presented in Table 2. This solution accounted for 74% of
the total variance. From Table 2 it is clear that all of the 16 vari-
ables have sufﬁcient loadings (above .40) on a factor to be retained
in the ﬁnal factor solution. Simultaneously, no variables have load-
ings above .40 on more than one factor, indicating a simple factor
structure. The ﬁve factors were labeled as follows:
Factor 1 – leadership involvement. This factor consists of three items
concerning workers’ perceptions of the degree to which their lea-
der participates in planning and preparing the work, follows up
the execution of the work, and contributes to good cooperation.
This factor accounted for 41.7% of the total variance. The factor
loadings varied from .77 to .88.
Factor 2 – workers’ competence and involvement. This factor consists
of three items concerning workers’ perceptions of the degree to
which they are involved in decisions, able to utilize their expertise,
and they have received necessary training. This factor accounted
Table 1
Response rates, demographics and N for all response periods.
Response period January 2009
(Tl) (%)
May 2009
(T2) (%)
October 2009
(T3) (%)
January 2010
(T4) (%)
May 2010
(T5) (%)
October 2010
(T6) (%)
Total
(T1–T6) (%)
Response rate 65 55 75 52 62 86 65
Gender (male) 87 85 91 85 85 90 88
Ages <26 3.2 2.6 1.4 4.1 4.7 1.3 2.7
26–35 8.1 9.0 8.5 9.3 8.8 9.4 8.9
36–45 29.5 31.6 31.9 32.2 32.9 31.7 31.7
46–57 46.6 47.2 49.3 47.7 46.2 49.0 47.9
>57 12.6 9.5 8.9 6.7 7.4 8.6 8.8
N 1330 1438 2 063 1788 1316 2 068 10 003
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for 10.0% of the total variance. The factor loadings varied from .69
to .81.
Factor 3 – role clarity. This factor consists of three items concerning
workers’ perceptions of the degree to which responsibilities,
authority, and skill requirements are unambiguously or clearly
documented. This factor accounted for 8.4% of the total variance.
The factor loadings varied from .68 to .87.
Factor 4 – follow-up of contractors. This factor consists of three
items concerning workers’ perceptions of the degree to which con-
tractors are followed up, their feedback is followed up, and they
have received necessary training. This factor accounted for 7.6%
of the total variance. The factor loadings varied from .70 to .83.
Factor 5 – safety compliance. This factor consists of four items con-
cerning the degree to which safe job analysis is performed before
risk-exposed tasks are executed, the degree to which the unit lives
by governing documentation, the degree to which non-conformi-
ties are handled in conformity with governing documentation,
and the degree to which governing documentation is systemati-
cally used in the planning, preparation, and execution of the work.
This factor accounted for 6.3% of the total variance. The factor load-
ings varied from .75 to .81. Since most work on offshore installa-
tions is performed by teams or units, it was found to be not
particularly relevant to the present statements of the respondents
that were related to individual safety compliance. A safe job anal-
ysis, for example, is and should never be performed by a single
worker.1
3.1.2. Discriminant validity, internal consistency, and reliability
Intercorrelations between the measurement constructs and
Cronbach’s alphas within the constructs are presented in Table 3.
Measures that correlate too highly with measures from which they
are supposed to differ can be considered to show low discriminant
validity (Netemeyer et al., 2003). In Table 3 all correlations are
moderate. This indicates that the ﬁve constructs measure different
underlying factors, hence the discriminant validity can be consid-
ered to be acceptable.
Alpha scores greater than .70 are indications of adequate inter-
nal consistency and reliability (Nunnally, 1978). The alpha scores
(diagonal in Table 3) for the ﬁve constructs in the T1 sample range
from .75 to .89. Hence internal consistency and reliability should
be considered adequate.
Table 2
Exploratory factor analysis: PCA, Varimax with Kaiser normalization (Tl).
Items Factor loadings
1 2 3 4 5 Communalities
Ql My leader participates actively in planning and preparing the work .88 .11 .18 .16 .14 .86
Q2 My leader systematically follows up the execution of the work .87 .13 .17 .19 .20 .88
Q3 My leader contributes to a good cooperation between units /involved groups .77 .24 .15 .16 .19 .73
Q4 1 am sufﬁciently involved in/have a say on decisions related to my work situation .17 .78 .16 .14 .12 .70
Q5 1 am able to utilize my expertise and abilities in my present position .10 .81 .08 .10 .11 .70
Q6 1 receive the necessary training to handle new work tasks and responsibilities .14 .69 .25 .16 .14 .61
Q7 The responsibilities of my position are unambiguously documented .18 .14 .87 .12 .17 .86
Q8 The authority of my position is unambiguously documented .20 .15 .87 .09 .17 .86
Q9 The ski II requirements for my present position are clearly documented .12 .24 .68 .22 .20 .62
Q10 In my unit we closely follow up suppliers/contractors we work with .16 .13 .11 .83 .23 .79
Qll In my unit we systematically follow up the feedback we receive from suppliers/contractors .18 .16 .15 .79 .26 .77
Q12 The suppliers/contractors we work with have received the training they need to carry out their tasks in a
safe manner
17 15 17 .70 25 64
Q13 If we are uncertain about the execution of risk-exposed tasks, we always execute a ‘‘safejob analysis’’ (SJA) .08 .10 .08 .14 .76 .62
Q14 In my unit we live by governing documentation .15 .12 .16 .25 .81 .78
Q15 In my unit we handle non-conformities in conformity with governing documentation .19 .13 .19 .25 .76 .72
Q16 In my unit we systematical ly use governing documentation in planning, preparation and execution of the
work
20 12 19 18 .75 68
Mean 4.30 4.57 4.51 4.42 4.77
Standard deviation 1.00 .87 .93 .80 .71
Eigenvalues 6.68 1.59 1.34 1.22 1.00
Extraction sums of squared loadings (% of variance) 41.74 9.95 8.36 7.63 6.26 (Total = 73.96)
Bartlett’s test of sphericity (approx. chi-square) = 100048 (p < .001). Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = .89.
Table 3
Pearson correlation between measurement constructs, with Cronbach’s alpha in
diagonal (Tl).
Construct Number of
items
1 2 3 4 5
1. Leadership
involvement
3 (.89)
2. Competence and
involv.
3 .42 (.75)
3. Role clarity 3 .46 .46 (.85)
4. Follow-up of
contractors
3 .47 .42 .43 (.82)
5. Safety compliance 4 .46 .38 .46 .58 (.85)
All correlations are signiﬁcant at the p < .01 level.
Table 4
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis: maximum likelihood extraction.
Fit indices T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
RMSEA .060 .051 .066 .052 .053
NFI .962 .972 .958 .971 .976
IFI .968 .977 .963 .977 .979
CFI .968 .976 .962 .977 .979
X2 573.19* 594.21* 823.24* 434.28* 635.64*
N 1438 2063 1788 1316 2068
Note: All regression weights between items and constructs are signiﬁcant at the
p < .001 level in all measurement periods.
* p < .001(df = 94).
1 A safe job analysis (SJA) is a safety management/risk assessment tool used prior to
the execution of hazardous activities and/or activities which not are covered by
existing procedures. All personnel involved in the particular activity shall participate
in reviewing the SJA (NORSOK Standard S-012, 2002).
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3.2. Conﬁrmatory factor analysis
The CFA with the use of maximum likelihood extraction con-
ﬁrmed that the same factor structure that the EFA uncovered could
be replicated in the ﬁve succeeding samples. Hence, it was con-
cluded that the measurement model was stable across different
time periods. All RMSEA values were within the range of good ﬁt,
varying from .051 (T3) to .066 (T4). The NFI, IFI, and CFI values
were above .95 in all measurement periods, indicating good ﬁt (Ta-
ble 4). Further, all regression weights between items and con-
structs were positive and signiﬁcant at the p < .001 level in all
measurement periods.
3.3. Test of the hypothetical model
After having established and conﬁrmed a measurement model
(factor structure) with good ﬁt, structural equation modeling
(SEM) was conducted to test the hypotheses. The results of the
tests of the model are presented in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, all ﬁt indices were within the range of good
ﬁt for the total sample (T1–T6). Further, the RMSEA values for each
measurement period were within the range of good ﬁt, except at
T4 (RMSEA = .081). The NFI values were above or equal to .95 at
T3 and T6, and within the range of acceptable ﬁt for the other peri-
ods. The IFI values indicated a slightly better ﬁt with values above
or equal to .95 at T1, T3, T5, and T6, and within the range of accept-
able ﬁt at T2 and T4. The CFI values were above .95 at T1, T3, and
T6, and within the range of acceptable ﬁt in the other periods. In
sum, this should indicate that the full model displays adequate
ﬁt across different time periods.
The hypotheses in the model appear in the horizontal rows in
Table 5. In the SEM analyses the hypotheses were tested seven
times, one test for each measurement period and one test for the
total sample (T1–T6). The data points in Table 5 are standardized
beta coefﬁcients (b values), and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients (p < .05 or
better) indicate support for the corresponding hypothesis. A b va-
lue of, for example, .50 means that when the independent variable
increases or decreases with one standard deviation, the dependent
variable increases or decreases with .50 standard deviations.
As shown in Table 5, leadership involvement affected safety
compliance positively and signiﬁcantly in all measurement peri-
ods, except at T5. Thus, the data gave support to H1, but with some
limitations. Further, the signiﬁcant b values varied from .10 to .20.
This indicates that leadership involvement has only a moderate
direct effect on safety compliance. For the full sample (T1–T6)
the direct effect was .14.
The test of H2, which hypothesized an indirect effect of leader-
ship involvement by means of workers’ competence and involve-
ment, demonstrated (1) a positive effect of leadership
involvement on workers’ competence and involvement, and (2) a
positive effect of workers’ competence and involvement on safety
compliance. Both paths were signiﬁcant in all measurement peri-
ods; thus, the tests supported H2. The b values in H2’s ﬁrst path
varied between .51 and .78, with an average of .68. The b values
in H2’s second path varied between .09 and .23, with an average
of .13. This implies that the indirect effect of leadership involve-
ment through workers’ competence and involvement was moder-
ate. In the total sample the indirect effect was .09 (.68  .13).
The test of H3, which hypothesized an indirect effect of leader-
ship involvement by means of increased role clarity, demonstrated
(1) a positive effect of leadership involvement on role clarity, and
(2) a positive effect of role clarity on safety compliance. Both paths
were signiﬁcant in all measurement periods; thus, the tests sup-
ported H3. The b values in H3’s ﬁrst path varied between .50 and
.63, with an average of .59. The b values in H3’s second path varied
between .16 and .25, with an average of .21. This implies that the
indirect effect of leadership involvement through role clarity was
also moderate. In the total sample the indirect effect was .12
(.59  .21).
The test of H4, which hypothesized an indirect effect of leader-
ship involvement by means of increased follow-up of contractors,
demonstrated (1) a positive effect of leadership involvement on
follow-up of contractors, and (2) a positive effect of follow-up of
contractors on safety compliance. Both paths were signiﬁcant in
all measurement periods; thus, the tests supported H4. The b val-
ues in H4’s ﬁrst path varied between .56 and .66, with an average
of .63. The b values in H4’s second path varied between .41 and .51,
with an average of .46. This implies that the indirect effect of lead-
ership involvement through follow-up of contractors was strong.
In the total sample the indirect effect was .29 (.63  .46).
The total effect of leadership involvement (for the full sample
T1–T6), which includes the sum of the direct effect (.14) and the
indirect effects (.09+.12+.29 = .50), was .64.
4. Discussion and conclusion
It has long been realized that leadership practices exert a pow-
erful inﬂuence on workers’ propensity to act in accordance with
safety rules and procedures (e.g., Lu and Yang, 2010; Matilla
et al., 1994; Zohar, 2002). Most of the research that forms the basis
for this realization has focused on the clearly safety-speciﬁc
dimensions of leadership such as leaders’ reward practices and cor-
rective measures (e.g., Zohar, 2002), their role-modeling behavior,
their ability to challenge workers to develop improved practices for
solving safety-related problems (e.g., Mullen and Kelloway, 2009),
Table 5
Structural equation modeling: maximum likelihood extraction.
Hypothesis and ﬁt indices Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T1–T6
(HI) Lead involv.? compliance .100* .148*** .175*** .201*** .070 .109** .141***
(H2) Lead involv.? competence and involv. .511*** .577*** .723*** .667*** .776*** .703*** .681***
(H2) Competence and involv.? compliance .094** .107*** .132*** .092** .225*** .152*** .132***
(H3) Lead involv.? role clarity .495*** .530*** .616*** .594*** .591*** .626*** .592***
(H3) Role clarity ? compliance 194*** .206*** .158*** .245*** .202*** .241** .210***
(H4) Lead involv.? follow-up contractors .555*** .622*** .637*** .609*** .655*** .640*** .630***
(H4) Follow up contractors? compliance .511*** .429*** .482*** 409*** .457*** .459*** .458***
RMSEA .066 .074 .070 .081 .077 .076 .072
NFI .944 .943 .950 .937 .943 .952 .953
IFI .952 .949 .955 .942 .950 .956 .954
CFI .952 .949 .954 .942 .949 .956 .954
X2 (df = 97) 651.86*** 864.39*** 1064.11*** 1226.26*** 845.64*** 1257.33*** 5120.63***
N 1330 1438 2063 1788 1316 2068 10003
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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etc. The fact that empirical research has conﬁrmed this relation-
ship is important, and it demonstrates that leaders who place a
high priority on safety achieve greater levels of safety compliance
from their subordinates than do leaders who place a low priority
on safety. However, in order to gain supplementary insight into
how leadership can have an inﬂuence on safety, it is important
to broaden the scope and investigate how the more general dimen-
sions of leadership practices can inﬂuence safety compliance (Hof-
mann and Morgeson, 2004). In the present study this was done by
examining how leadership involvement in subordinates’ work
inﬂuences safety compliance on offshore platforms, both directly
and indirectly through the work climate.
Leadership involvement and work climate were measured by
applying 12 items which mapped workers’ perceptions of these
conditions. The EFA process resulted in a reduction of these into
four underlying dimensions: leadership involvement, workers’
competence and involvement, role clarity, and the follow-up of
contractors. In addition, the EFA identiﬁed safety compliance as a
separate dimension (four items). The CFA’s conducted on the sub-
sequent ﬁve measurement periods showed that this factor struc-
ture was stable across different time periods.
The results of the empirical analyses demonstrated that leader-
ship involvement has a signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on the level
of safety compliance. This implies that the degree to which leaders
participate in the planning and preparation of work, follow up the
execution of the work, and contribute to good cooperation among
team members has a positive effect on safety compliance. The di-
rect effect was, however, moderate and not signiﬁcant in the ﬁfth
measure period. The degree of leadership involvement seemed to
have a more powerful indirect effect, by affecting the three work
climate dimensions selected for this study. In turn, these three
dimensions had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on safety compliance.
Among these three, the degree to which contractors are followed
up by the operator company had the most powerful inﬂuence, fol-
lowed by role clarity, and workers’ competence and involvement.
In sum, the ﬁndings indicate that leadership involvement in subor-
dinates’ work operations is of vital importance for the level of
safety compliance on offshore platforms, and that the work climate
(as operationalized in the present study) has a signiﬁcant mediat-
ing effect on the relationship between leadership involvement and
safety compliance. These results draw attention to the importance
of offshore leaders as providers of a climate which fosters a high
level of safety compliance.
4.1. Limitations, future research and implications
The ﬁndings of the present study should be interpreted with
some methodological limitations in mind. First, all measures were
self-reported and drawn from the same source, thus the results
could be vulnerable to common method bias. It would therefore
be valuable if future research could replicate this study with the
use of measures drawn from other sources, for example, by letting
leaders report on their subordinates’ safety compliance and/or
observing actual work or leaders’ behavior as it is performed. Sec-
ond, the cross-sectional multi-sample design makes the sequential
relationships between the independent variable, the mediator vari-
ables, and the dependent variable difﬁcult to validate fully. Future
research should consider an alternative study design to validate
further the proposed cause and effect relationships. Third, the
study did not differentiate between different leadership levels.
Hence, we do not know the hierarchical position of the leaders,
who were evaluated by the respondents. The ﬁndings of the pres-
ent study would have been strengthened if the design of the study
had made it possible to differentiate between different leadership
levels, especially when one considers that previous research has
indicated that different leadership behaviors are effective in safety
depending on the hierarchical position of the leader (Flin and Yule,
2004). Fourth, the work climate factor structure is made up of
items which differ with respect to which level of the work group
they refer to. Some items refer to the individual worker, while oth-
ers refer to perceptions of the work unit. The use of such mixed-le-
vel statements represents a potential threat to the conceptual
validity of the term work climate.
Despite these limitations, the empirical ﬁndings of the present
study have both theoretical and practical implications. A signiﬁ-
cant theoretical contribution of the study is that it demonstrates
that a broader theoretical perspective on leadership could indeed
serve as a useful supplement to the perspectives most commonly
applied in safety-speciﬁc leadership studies, and yield additional
insight into how leadership inﬂuences safety compliance. This in-
sight should be viewed as complementary to safety-speciﬁc leader-
ship literature, rather than contradictory. Another important
theoretical contribution of the study is that it highlights the rela-
tionship between leadership, the work climate, and safety compli-
ance. Despite the widespread acceptance of both leadership and
the work climate as signiﬁcant antecedents of safety compliant
behavior, few studies have examined the structural relationship
between these variables (Thompson et al., 1998). The model ap-
plied here underlines that leaders play an important role in pro-
moting safety by inﬂuencing the quality of the work climate,
which in turn, inﬂuences safety compliance.
The most important practical implication of the ﬁndings of the
present study is that they reveal that good safety leadership ex-
tends beyond the clearly safety-speciﬁc dimensions of leadership.
More speciﬁcally, the results demonstrate that safety improve-
ment efforts on offshore platforms should focus on active leader-
ship involvement in work operations in the search for improved
safety compliance. The importance of this has also been empha-
sized in previous empirical research (Cohen, 1977; Fleming et al.,
1996; O’Dea and Flin, 2001; Simard and Marchand, 1997; Smith,
1978), management literature (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), and in
offshore accident analysis and investigations (Hayes, 2012; PSA,
2005, 2007, 2011b). However, the ﬁndings of the present study
demonstrate that high leadership involvement does not only have
a direct effect on safety compliance. A high level of leadership
involvement is also an important key to the formation of a work
climate that stimulates workers’ to act in accordance with safety
rules and procedures. Such a climate is characterized by clearly
stated roles, active follow-up of contractor workers, and workers
who are involved in decisions related to their work situation and
receive the training that is necessary to handle their work tasks.
Leadership training, according to these ﬁndings, is therefore of sig-
niﬁcance when aiming for improved safety compliance. An impor-
tant goal of this training should be to increase leaders’ awareness
of the importance of high involvement in the work of employees.
In addition it is necessary to give offshore leaders sufﬁcient time
to spend outside their ofﬁces and on the frontline of the operations.
Previous research of offshore leaders, however, indicates that a re-
cent increase in administrative work and bureaucratic routines
represents a signiﬁcant obstacle to leadership involvement (Lam-
vik et al., 2008). Hence, operator companies within the offshore
petroleum industry should examine the possibility of reducing
the administrative responsibilities of offshore leaders, thus en-
abling high leadership involvement on the frontline.
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a b s t r a c t
Violations of rules and procedures are commonly identiﬁed as an important causal factor in workplace
accidents. Essentially, there are two different types of violations: intentional and unintentional violations.
Whereas the former term refers to deliberate violations of rules and procedures that are known and
understood by the actor, the latter refers to violations of rules and procedures that the actor has no
awareness or knowledge of and therefore operates without any reference to. The vast majority of previ-
ous research has been concerned with intentional rather than unintentional violations. This implies that
researchers have put a particular focus on the aspects of work that affect workers’ safety motivation and
their attitudes towards compliant behavior, and that they have been less concerned with the factors that
affect workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures. On the basis of semi-structured interviews of 24 con-
tract workers within the Norwegian petroleum industry, this research gap is addressed in the present
paper. The objective is to identify, categorize and gain a comprehension of the most signiﬁcant factors
that affect workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures. Analysis revealed that eight different factors
within the workers’ organizational context are important. These are sorted into three paramount catego-
ries: the safety management system, work characteristics and social interaction. The theoretical and
practical implications of the ﬁndings are discussed.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A recurring conclusion of accident investigations across differ-
ent industries is that a lack of compliance with rules and proce-
dures is an important contributory factor (Dekker, 2005;
Hopkins, 2011). The exact proportion of accidents that such non-
compliance accounts for varies between industries, but some writ-
ers have claimed that violations of rules and procedures within
high-risk industries are a signiﬁcant contributor to as much as
70% of the total number of accidents (Mason, 1997). This demon-
strates that adherence to rules and procedures, usually referred
to as safety compliance, is of critical importance in maintaining
safety at work and, further, that there is a need to identify and ex-
plain the reasons why workers violate procedures and to address
factors that can improve safety compliance.
According to Battmann and Klumb (1993), a broad range of
behaviors that deviate from written rules and procedures can be
classiﬁed as violations. Thus, they argue that violations should be
conceived as actions which belong to a dimension, which can vary
from the ﬂexible application of rules and procedures to complete
ignorance of them. A useful and relatively clear-cut distinction
can be made, however, between intentional and unintentional viola-
tions (Reason, 1990, 1997). The former are deliberate violations of
procedures that are known and understood by the actor, such as
knowingly breaking procedures to get a job done with less effort
or because the procedures are considered impractical in a given sit-
uation. The latter are violations of procedures that the actor has no
awareness or knowledge of and therefore operates without any
reference to (Lawton, 1998), such as operating hazardous machin-
ery in breach of regulations because no operating instructions are
available. In such instances, a violation has been committed
unknowingly. That is without the actor being aware of the relevant
rules or procedures, and not for example because non-compliance
has been perceived as an easy pathway towards a goal. In addition
to this distinction, both intentional and unintentional violations
should be distinguished from malevolent acts, such as sabotage,
in which both the act and the damaging consequences are in-
tended. Also, they should be distinguished from acts of human er-
ror, such as slips, lapses and mistakes that arise from cognitive and
perceptual failures (Reason, 1990) where the plan was good (i.e. to
follow the known rules), but the execution failed.
The recognized signiﬁcance of violations in the aetiology of
accidents at work has led researchers to increase their efforts to
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detect the antecedents of such unsafe practices, and to identify fac-
tors that can improve safety compliance. Some of this research has
focused on characteristics related to the individual worker, such as
personality (e.g. Salgado, 2002) and demographic attributes (e.g.
Chan et al., 2002). During the last two to three decades, however,
researchers have become increasingly aware of the importance of
the social and organizational context of work and the role that it
plays in reducing the frequency of violations and in achieving a
high level of safety compliance (Didla et al., 2009). A variety of dif-
ferent contextual factors have been studied, such as job demands
and resources (e.g. Hansez and Chmiel, 2010), ethical work cli-
mates (e.g. Parboteeah and Kapp, 2008), cooperative relationships
(e.g. Simard and Marchand, 1997), job autonomy (e.g. Parker et al.,
2001), safety climate (e.g. Cavazza and Serpe, 2009) and leadership
(e.g. Lu and Yang, 2010).
The vast majority of this research has been concerned with
intentional rather than unintentional violations (Alper and Karsh,
2009). This implies that researchers have been particularly focused
on the aspects of work that affect workers’ safety motivation and
their attitudes towards compliant behavior, and that they have
been less concerned with the factors that affect workers’ knowl-
edge of the rules and procedures that govern their work (Barber,
2002). Hence, the accumulated insight into the root causes of
intentional violations far exceeds the accumulated insight into
the root causes of unintentional violations. If the goal is to grasp
the full extent of non-compliant behavior, this research gap should
be addressed. This is believed to be important, particularly within
highly regulated industries, such as the petroleum, aviation and
nuclear power industries, where the body of rules and procedures
is extensive and complex and where it could be a challenge for
workers to have knowledge of these.
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to shed light on
this gap in safety compliance research, based on a qualitative case
study of contract workers within one such highly regulated indus-
try, the Norwegian petroleum industry. This is done by examining
how the contextual aspects of work affect contract workers’
knowledge of the rules and procedures that regulate their work.
The overall objective is to identify, categorize and gain understand-
ing of the most signiﬁcant factors that affect such knowledge.
Addressing this objective may yield insights into some of the con-
textual mechanisms that underlie unintentional violations, which
would therefore complement research that focuses on the contex-
tual mechanisms that underlie intentional violations.
Such insights should be particularly relevant to the petroleum
industry. First, because virtually all work operations in this indus-
try are highly regulated by a relatively extensive and complex set
of rules and procedures. Hence, it would be reasonable to assume
that knowledge of these rules and procedures depends on more
than just common sense. Second, because investigations of acci-
dents within this industry frequently identify non-compliance
with rules and procedures as a central contributory factor (Karish
and Siokos, 2004; Thunem et al., 2009). It should also be added that
contract workers are of particular interest, because they constitute
the group of workers that are most frequently involved in and ex-
posed to accidents within the petroleum industry (Hofmann et al.,
1995; PSA, 2012; Walker et al., 2012).
2. Background
As already described, previous research on violations and safety
compliance in work settings has focused primarily on the causes of
intentional violations and has not been particularly concerned
with the causes of unintentional violations (Alper and Karsh,
2009). According to Fogarty and Buikstra (2008), intentional and
unintentional violations follow different psychological pathways,
whereby the former is associated with workers’ safety motivation
and safety attitudes and the latter with workers’ knowledge of
rules and procedures. Previous research has been more concerned
with identifying the contextual origins of workers’ safety motiva-
tion and attitudes than with the contextual origins of their knowl-
edge of rules and procedures.
A number of different social and organizational attributes have
proved to be of signiﬁcance within the research on intentional vio-
lations. For example, studies of safety climate, deﬁned as the set of
perceptions that employees share regarding safety in their work
environment (Zohar, 1980), have demonstrated that workers’ per-
ception of safety priorities within their organization positively af-
fects safety motivation and attitudes and, further, that positive
motivation and attitudes in turn promote safety-compliant behav-
ior (e.g. Biggs and Banks, 2012; Cavazza and Serpe, 2009; Zhou
et al., 2008). Studies of leadership point in the same direction. Sev-
eral leadership studies have found that leaders who emphasize re-
ward and encourage safe performance generate a lower level of
deliberate rule-breaking within their work group by positively
affecting workers’ attitudes and motivation towards safe conduct
(e.g. Lu and Yang, 2010; Tomas et al., 1999). Researchers have also
found the balance between job demands and job resources to be
important. For example, Hansez and Chmiel’s (2010) study of
non-compliant behavior within the Belgian energy sector demon-
strated that imbalances between job demands and resources affect
the frequency of intentional violations negatively because of strain
and lack of motivation.
The observation that workers’ safety attitudes and motivation
are important for reducing the number of intentional violations
is not new. Neither is it a new observation that contextual factors
are important in the formation of both attitudes and motivation.
For example, as early as the 1930s, Heinrich (1931) reported from
case studies based on 75,000 accident records that poor attitudes
were a major obstacle to safe behavior and that supervisors were
highly inﬂuential in the formation of such attitudes. Later, Slo-
combe (1941) argued that ignorance of safety rules at work was
the result of poor attitudes and motivation caused by improper
safety training. Nearly four decades later, Andriessen (1978)
claimed that management’s prime task with respect to improved
safety performance, which is understood as a reduction in deliber-
ate risk-taking and rule-breaking, is to implement measures that
aim to enhance safety motivation.
Despite this long-held proposition, other lines of research have
indicated that non-compliant behavior should not be analyzed and
understood solely in terms of the interplay between the social and
organizational context on the one hand, and workers’ safety moti-
vation and attitudes on the other. This research also demonstrates
the need to expand the research ﬁeld beyond the scope of inten-
tional violations. An example of this is a study by Elling (1987), ci-
ted in Hale (1990), of railway workers’ perceptions of the rules
governing work on and near railway lines: 85% of the respondents
in Elling’s study found it hard to ﬁnd what they were looking for in
the rule book, and when they ﬁnally found it 70% found the rules
too complex and hard to read. Hence, the eventual gap that
emerged between work performance as formally described in the
rule book and the way work was actually carried out is not always
intentional; thus, it cannot be understood exclusively in terms of
the interplay between context, motivation and attitudes. More-
over, Elling’s study illustrates that safety compliance within highly
regulated industries depends to a large degree on an organization’s
ability to support workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures.
A study by Laurence (2005) of the Australian mining industry
draws similar conclusions to those that can be drawn from Elling’s
study. When asked to indicate their reasons for not complying with
the rules, 18% of the mine workers reported that there were too
many rules for them to remember, 16% reported that the rules
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were too complex, 12% reported that the rules were not written
in plain language and 10% reported that the content of the rules
was poor or that they contained errors. Like the results of
Elling’s (1987) study, this indicates that confusion relating to
the rules or procedures themselves can lead to violations. Fur-
ther, these types of violations are not primarily provoked by
inappropriate safety attitudes or motivation but by a lack of
adequate knowledge of the regulations, and thus must be con-
sidered as unintentional.
A study which demonstrates this more explicitly is that of Dahl
et al. (in press) of the Norwegian offshore service vessel industry.
This study revealed that 37% of the vessel workers found the pro-
cedures difﬁcult to understand, and that such perceived vagueness
about procedures was negatively related to compliant work perfor-
mance. More precisely, 75% of those who perceived that the proce-
dures were clear reported that they always worked in accordance
with the procedures, compared with only 33% of the group of
workers who perceived that the procedures were vague. This indi-
cates that workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures is highly
important for safety-compliant behavior. Further, this indicates
that not only should intentional non-compliance be considered
but that the unintentional aspects of violations need to be ad-
dressed as well.
This last point is even more clearly illustrated in a study by
Walker et al. (2012) which mapped the contributory factors in ac-
tual incidents within the petroleum industry. This study showed
that unintentional violations were a contributory factor in 19% of
the 108 analyzed fatalities in 2010 and 2011, whereas intentional
violations were a contributory factor in 15%. In addition, Walker
et al.’s study showed that unintentional violations were a contrib-
utory factor in 24% of the 174 analyzed high potential incidents in
2010 and 2011, whereas intentional violations were a contributory
factor in only 9%. This skewed distribution illustrates clearly that
there is a need to know more about the organizational factors that
hinder or facilitate workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures,
and that the objective of the present study might be particularly
relevant to the petroleum industry.
3. Method
The majority of research on violations and safety compliance
has applied a quantitative research methodology, such as linear
regression analysis and structural equation modelling, since its
purpose is frequently to test hypotheses about cause and effect
relationships derived from previous research or theory (e.g. Biggs
and Banks, 2012; Cavazza and Serpe, 2009; Dahl and Olsen,
2013; Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000; Lu and Yang, 2010; Martínez-Córc-
oles et al., 2011). However, the exploratory nature of the present
study calls for the qualitative methodology. Thus, semi-structured
interviews were conducted with the purpose of gaining a deeper
understanding of the factors that hinder or facilitate workers’
knowledge of rules and procedures.
3.1. Research respondents
The industry to be studied and the research respondents inter-
viewed in this study were selected by means of purposive sam-
pling (Patton, 2002). This meant that the industry and the
respondents were not selected randomly, but by the researcher,
according to predeﬁned criteria that ﬁtted with the objective of
the study. Four predeﬁned criteria were set: (1) the industry to
be studied had to be highly regulated by safety rules and proce-
dures, (2) the industry to be studied had to be a high-risk industry,
(3) the respondents selected had to be sharp-end workers who di-
rectly interact with some type of hazardous process, and (4) some
variation between the respondents with respect to their profes-
sional background and experience was required in order to pro-
vide a rich array of information. In addition to these four
criteria, it was deemed necessary to start with at least 20 respon-
dents, and then to include further cases in the sample until little
new information could be added to the analysis, as recommended
by Bailey (2007).
The application of these criteria resulted in 24 workers from a
maintenance and modiﬁcation company within the Norwegian
petroleum industry being asked to participate in the study (23
men and one woman). None of them refused to participate. All
of the interviewees were contract workers. Twelve of them
worked offshore on a ﬁxed production platform on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf, and the remaining twelve worked onshore on a
large gas-receiving terminal (where compressed gas arrives in
pipes from the shelf). The production platform and the gas-
receiving terminal were owned and operated by a large
petroleum company.
Of the offshore workers, eight were electricians/automation
workers and four were mechanics/welders. Four of the offshore
workers also functioned as regional safety delegates, and two
had supervisory responsibilities. Of the onshore workers, six were
mechanics/welders, three were scaffolding installers, two were
electricians and one was an engineer. Three of the onshore workers
also functioned as regional safety delegates/HSE coordinators, and
two had supervisory responsibilities (data about age, education
and experience were not collected in the interviews).
Within both onshore and offshore contract work, the use of sub-
contractors (often on short-term contracts) is common practice.
This was reﬂected in the study sample, as 10 of the respondents
were employed by subcontractor companies hired by the contrac-
tor: ﬁve were offshore and ﬁve onshore.
3.2. Semi-structured interviews
In order to obtain relevant information about the objective of
the study in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted.
This means that the interviews consisted of some predeﬁned
open-ended questions and topics from an interview guide, but that
the order of questions and topics was modiﬁed when appropriate
and that questions were added, deleted, probed, modiﬁed and so
on during each interview in order to elicit relevant and informative
answers from the respondents (Cargan, 2007).
The predeﬁned questions and topics in the interview guide
(attached in the Appendix A) covered a broader range than the
focus of the present paper. However, all of the questions,
whether predeﬁned or added during the interview, focused
directly or indirectly on safety in general and on safety compli-
ance/violations in particular. All of the predeﬁned questions and
topics were developed on the basis of a pre-study which included
the following: (1) observation of actual work, both onshore and
offshore; (2) informal conversations with senior managers, HSE
managers, installation leaders, supervisors, safety delegates, HSE
personnel and sharp-end workers from different disciplines; (3)
attendance at toolbox meetings, work permit meetings and safety
rounds; (4) an examination of relevant documents such as the
company’s HSE policy, project contracts, work permits and work
packages; and (5) a review of previous research and relevant
literature.
For practical reasons all interviews, except for two, were
conducted with two respondents at a time. The interviews were
carried out at the respondents’ workplace, and the duration of
each interview was approximately 1 h. All interviews were
recorded and later transcribed into text. The interviewees were
informed that all answers would be treated anonymously and
in strict conﬁdence.
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3.3. Data analysis
To detect emerging and recurring patterns and themes in the
data, content analysis was employed (Patton, 2002). This means
that the qualitative material was analyzed with the aim of identi-
fying core consistencies and meanings related to the topic of the
study. The type of content analysis that was employed was open
coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Open coding is primarily an
inductive content analysis, where the ﬁndings and the thematic
categories emerge out of the data and not from an already existing
theoretical framework. In the present study, this implies that the
data material was analyzed without explicit reference to previous
research or theory. This is a technique which is recommended
within the grounded theory approach because it avoids researcher
bias arising out of preconceived categories coming from the work
of other researchers (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, this tech-
nique does not restrict the researcher from discussing the research
ﬁndings and the relevance of the discovered categories in the light
of previous research and theory.
By following the guidelines of Corbin and Strauss (2008), the
method of open coding in the present study implied a process in
which the interviewees’ statements were given conceptual labels
(statement by statement), based on their content. Then, by com-
paring similarities and differences between the labels, the state-
ments and their corresponding labels were grouped under more
abstract categories. These categories (or factors) were then named
according to their core consistencies and meanings.
In contrast to the inductive character of the ﬁrst part of the
analysis, the second part had a more deductive character: the
appropriateness and authenticity of the content analysis and the
thematic categories that had been developed were tested and af-
ﬁrmed. This included a re-examination of the data that focused
particularly on identifying cases that did not ﬁt the developed cat-
egories, an approach recommended by Patton (2002).
4. Research ﬁndings and analysis
4.1. Brief case description
Maintenance and modiﬁcation work within the Norwegian
petroleum sector is a growing industry, owing to ageing produc-
tion facilities and a signiﬁcant decrease in investment in new off-
shore installations and onshore plants (Sasson and Blomgren,
2011). Such work is labor-intensive and includes a variety of differ-
ent tasks and operations that differ in complexity and scope. In the
case of the company selected for the present study these tasks and
operations varied from advanced sub-sea operations and large-
scale modiﬁcation projects to simple routine tasks, such as minor
repair and revamp projects. Irrespective of the tasks and opera-
tions, virtually all work operations, complex or simple, were regu-
lated by rules and procedures designed to ensure correct and safe
operating practices. These rules and procedures are referred to as
the ‘governing documentation’ (a term used interchangeably with
‘rules and procedures’ in the following) and they are implemented
in the operating company’s safety management system. This im-
plies that work performed by the contracting company is regulated
by rules and procedures owned and formulated by the operating
company.
The governing documentation related to a given work task is
ﬁrst and foremost a description of how work should be performed
in order for it to be safe, both with regard to the individual worker,
the facility, third parties and the environment. Hence, the proce-
dures do not include a description of quality measures, efﬁciency
demands and the like. Moreover, the governing documentation is
relatively detailed as regards the description of how people should
behave, how the relevant work equipment should be handled,
what preparations are necessary, the type of personal protective
equipment required and so on. Thus, the governing documentation
falls into the category of rules which Hale and Borys (2012a) deﬁne
as ‘action rules’. That is, rules that describe more or less exactly
how people should behave (see also Hale and Swuste, 1998).
In order to ensure that all workers have acquired the necessary
knowledge of the governing documentation that regulated a given
work task, each worker involved in the task had to conﬁrm, by
signing the work permit, that the speciﬁed set of rules and proce-
dures relating to a given work task were fully known and under-
stood. This signature was a central part of the operating
company’s work permit system, and no workers were allowed to
participate in a given work task without conﬁrming by signature
that the relevant governing documentation was known and under-
stood. However, because the governing documentation related to a
given work task is frequently revised, corrected and modiﬁed, it is
not, and should not be, available on paper. Moreover, it was not at-
tached to the work permit form or any other documents associated
with the work task. This was the operating company’s policy, jus-
tiﬁed by the fact that the company wanted to avoid outdated pro-
cedures being in circulation. The governing documentation related
to a given work task was therefore only referred to by paragraph
numbers in the work permit, and was only available in full text
in the operating company’s IT-based safety management system.
Hence, all information regarding governing documentation was lo-
cated in the safety management system, and only there. Up-to-date
knowledge of rules and procedures therefore presupposed active
use of the safety management system. The IT-based safety man-
agement system was accessible on all computers both onshore
and offshore. Physical access to computers, however, varied con-
siderably between the onshore and offshore workers. This is dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.
4.2. Actual knowledge
Despite the formally deﬁned importance of having an in-depth
knowledge of rules and procedures for safe operating practice, it
was clear from the interviews that the actual knowledge of these
rules and procedures varied considerably. With regard to the level
of knowledge, three different groups of workers were identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst group of workers reported active use of the safety man-
agement system: they knew how to use it, they knew how to locate
the relevant governing documentation, they frequently searched
for updates and they regularly read through all relevant procedures
they did not know well enough or had not understood. Typically,
these workers also took their signature on the work permit seri-
ously. As one of the workers expressed it, ‘I am familiar with the
demands made on me in the work permit, or else I wouldn’t have
signed it’.
The second group of workers was in many ways similar to the
ﬁrst group, with some notable exceptions. They were relatively ac-
tive users of the safety management system. They knew how to use
it and reported that their knowledge of the relevant governing doc-
umentation was, by and large, high. These workers, however, did
not regularly check the system for updates, and rarely read through
procedures they felt they did not know well enough or had not
understood properly: ‘Yes, we’re supposed to understand the pro-
cedures we are working with, we really should know these. But
there are updates all the time, and I guess I should have been better
at checking these out. I haven’t been any good at that at all’.
The third group of workers differed considerably from the two
other groups. These workers seldom or never used the safety man-
agement system, they did not know how to use it and their knowl-
edge of governing documentation was poor. Further, they reported
that they had never checked the system for updates or read
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through rules and procedures that they felt they did not know well
enough or had not understood properly. Despite this, most of these
workers were well aware of the gap that existed between their
conﬁrmatory signature on the work permit and their actual knowl-
edge of governing documentation: ‘Personally, I have never used
governing documentation. I have been out offshore several times,
but I have never been into the safety management system. [. . .]
It’s really very daft of me, because I sign my name stating that I
have understood governing documentation, without having famil-
iarized myself with it’.
Workers in this last group did not represent extreme or unusual
cases in the data material (see Table 1). In fact, of the onshore
workers, eight out of twelve interviewees could be placed in this
group, and both contractor workers and subcontractor workers
were represented. Among the offshore workers, however, this pro-
portion was not as high, ﬁve out of twelve, and it was ﬁrst and fore-
most comprised of workers employed by subcontractors.
It should be noted here that none of the participants within this
last group claimed that it was their own unwillingness that caused
them not to use the safety management system in accordance with
what was formally expected. Instead, they pointed to factors with-
in their work context that hindered them from being active users
of the safety management system, and to factors which made them
consider it unnecessary to achieve greater knowledge of the rules
and procedures that governed their work. Thus, the interviews
and the data analysis focused particularly on these reported con-
textual factors.
In total, eight different factors were identiﬁed in the analysis,
some of which were related thematically. They were classiﬁed into
the following common thematic categories: (1) the safety manage-
ment system, (2) work characteristics, and (3) social interaction. In
the following sections, these categories and their underlying fac-
tors are described.
4.3. The safety management system
In the interviews it was evident that certain characteristics of
the safety management system itself were deemed very important
to having an adequate knowledge of rules and procedures. Three
factors within this category emerged from the analysis: access to
the safety management system, the user-friendliness of the system
and training on how to use it.
4.3.1. Access
Despite the fact that all workers were obliged to conﬁrm by sig-
nature that all relevant rules and procedures related to a given
work task were fully known and understood, it was frequently sta-
ted, particularly by the onshore workers, that such a level of
knowledge was difﬁcult to achieve owing to the lack of adequate
access to the safety management system. In fact, among the on-
shore workers ten out of twelve reported that the access not was
satisfactory (the remaining two had supervisory responsibilities).
This lack of adequate access was, however, not reported by any
of the offshore workers. The difference in accessibility might be
an important reason why the number of non-active users of the
safety management system appeared to be higher among the on-
shore workers.
As explained above, the safety management system was IT-
based. The onshore interviewees frequently reported, however,
that no computers were located within an appropriate physical
distance of where the work was actually carried out or planned.
Further, no computers were reserved exclusively for use by or-
dinary workers who needed access to governing documentation
in the safety management system. In fact, all available comput-
ers at the gas-receiving terminal were located in supervisors’
ofﬁces while separate computers, reserved for those who
needed access to governing documentation, were located in
the offshore workers’ break room. Thus, in order to gain access
to governing documentation, many of the onshore workers
claimed that they had to consult their supervisor and use their
supervisor’s computer and user proﬁle in order to read through
relevant rules and procedures. This process was considered
cumbersome, especially if work was carried out far away from
the supervisor’s ofﬁce (sometimes up to 2 km), or if the super-
visor was absent from the ofﬁce. The onshore interviewees fre-
quently claimed that this lack of adequate access to the safety
management system obstructed active use of the system and
that it hindered satisfactory knowledge of relevant rules and
procedures. As one of the onshore workers expressed it: ‘. . .
you have to use the supervisor’s access, and he is not always
there [. . .] and then it could be that some don’t bother waiting
for the supervisor to come back, and just accept what has been
said orally. [. . .] So the ideal thing would be for each of us to
have access to a machine, so that we could go in and check
it out, we haven’t got that so far’.
4.3.2. User-friendliness
Another characteristic related to the IT-based safety manage-
ment system itself, which was frequently mentioned as important
for gaining an appropriate knowledge of rules and procedures, was
the user-friendliness of the system. The challenge that some of the
interviewees reported was that the relevant governing documenta-
tion was often difﬁcult to locate within the comprehensive safety
management system, and this increased the effort and time in-
volved in using it. Among the offshore workers it was often stated
that this challenge could be overcome if they had access to an easy-
to-use service manual:
The safety management system could have been easier to use if
there were instructions by the side of the computer, explaining
how to start up the system an how to make a search. [. . .] They
should have made it easier for us, because then we would be
better at using it.
This alternative was not mentioned by any of the onshore work-
ers. Presumably owing to lack of adequate access to the system, all
of them (except from the supervisors) seemed to be more con-
vinced that regular use of the safety management system would
lead to enhanced perceived user-friendliness and increased knowl-
edge of governing documentation:
The system must be used regularly. If it takes too long between
each time it is used, you will forget how to do it. So, more reg-
ular use is important to make people check the procedures, to
make them check how the job should be done. . .
4.3.3. Training
The third factor associated with the IT-based safety manage-
ment system was the importance of training. It might be self-evi-
dent that adequate knowledge of rules and procedures
presupposes a certain degree of training about how to access the
system, how to navigate within it, how to locate the relevant pro-
cedures, how different symbols should be interpreted and so on.
Table 1
Number of respondents in each of the three groups, onshore and offshore.
Group Onshore (N) Offshore (N) Total (N)
1. High knowledge 2 5 7
2. Medium knowledge 2 2 4
3. Low knowledge 8 5 13
Total 12 12 24
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Such training also needs to be undertaken in order for workers to
be permitted entry to offshore installations on the Norwegian Con-
tinental Shelf. Thus, all of the offshore workers interviewed in the
present study reported that such training had been undertaken. Of
the onshore workers, however, only three interviewees (the two
supervisors and one HSE coordinator) reported that they had been
offered enough formal training on how to use the safety manage-
ment system. This, they indicated, had two effects. First, the lack
of adequate formal training was interpreted as a signal that active
use of the safety management system was not as essential as their
signature on the work permit formally indicated. Second, the lack
of adequate formal training resulted in a deﬁciency of the skills
needed to access the system effectively. This in turn resulted in a
gap between actual and required knowledge of governing
documentation:
Considering that these demands are placed on us, we should
obviously have been more familiar with them. Because we are
really not familiar with them, none of us are. So you could say
it’s kind of unfortunate. We should at least have received some
training.
4.4. Work characteristics
The second category of factors frequently emphasized by the
interviewees as important for knowledge of rules and procedures
were the characteristics related to the work itself and the condi-
tions of employment that the workers were bound by. Three fac-
tors within this category emerged in the analysis. These were the
routinized work, perceived risk level and subcontracting.
4.4.1. Routinized work
The ﬁrst work characteristic that appeared to be important in
seeing the necessity of having a substantial knowledge of rules
and procedures was the degree of routine in the work performed.
Interviewees who saw their work as being unpredictable and var-
ied often reported that their acquired skills were not sufﬁcient to
solve their tasks in a safe way and this increased the need to be-
come familiar with governing documentation. On the other hand,
interviewees who saw their work as highly routinized, in particular
electricians and scaffolding installers, often reported that the
repetitive character of their work led to a reduced need for such
familiarization. They frequently claimed that they had successfully
performed the same work operations several times before, and in
the light of this experience they knew how such operations should
be performed. Hence, past success in similar work operations was
seen as a guarantee of future safety. One of the offshore subcon-
tractor workers expressed it like this: ‘I know what to do, and then
I try to do that. [. . .] and not once have I been into the safety man-
agement system to take a look’.
The negative effect that routinized work had on knowledge of
governing documentation was particularly evident among the
supervisors at the gas-receiving terminal, where the majority of
the work tasks were determined by ﬁxed maintenance intervals.
In fact, the supervisors interviewed at the terminal claimed that
the routinized character of work was the very reason why little
or no training was offered in how to use the safety management
system. The routinized character of work, they claimed, was also
the reason why easy access to the safety management system
was not offered. This is illustrated by a supervisor’s answer to
the question of why easy access and training was not offered, de-
spite the fact that up-to-date knowledge of governing documenta-
tion was formally required:
The thing is that most of our tasks down here are so well-known
to us, and we have done them so many times, so we would
rather do them the way we are used to, and avoid extra work
and stress. Because we know our jobs and do them pretty well,
I think.
It should be stressed here that, although routinized work
seemed to have a negative effect on the knowledge of rules and
procedures, it would be more problematic to claim that routinized
work also had a negative effect on safety as such. This is because, as
the quotes above illustrate and as has been thoroughly debated in
recent safety research (e.g. Besnard and Hollnagel, 2012; Bourrier
and Bieder, 2013; Hale and Borys, 2012a,b), working safely is not
just a plain and linear function of procedure compliance. There
are several reasons for this. One is that procedures cannot cover
all the possible challenges a worker faces when performing a task.
Hence, as for example Dekker (2006) has argued, experience, adap-
tion and practical skills are always the necessary ingredients of a
safe work performance. This is also the point that these intervie-
wees are making.
4.4.2. Perceived risk level
Another work characteristic that was clearly important for see-
ing the necessity of a good knowledge of rules and procedures con-
cerned the level of risk that workers perceived their work carried.
Interviewees who perceived the risk level in their work to be high
were usually of the opinion that knowledge of governing docu-
mentation was important for safe practice. Interviewees who per-
ceived the risk level in their work to be low were more often of the
opposite opinion, and some of them thought that knowledge of
governing documentation was only relevant to work that carried
greater risks. A comment from one of the offshore workers who
never used governing documentation in his work illustrates this
quite clearly: ‘I am of the opinion that governing documentation
is more relevant when you need to enter pressurized systems
and the like, when you need to replace a valve or something; that
it’s more relevant in such cases’.
Ten of the interviewees also indicated that an increased and ex-
plicit management focus on risks could encourage more workers to
realize the important role that rules and procedures play, and
therefore increase workers’ effort to improve their knowledge of
them. One of the onshore interviewees expressed it this way: ‘It
is important to make people conscious, conscious about the things
that can happen if they don’t work by the rules’. Further, he
claimed that such consciousness depends on supervisors’ and man-
agers’ ability to relate governing documentation to the risks that
workers commonly face in their work. He claimed that then work-
ers can see the relevance of rules and procedures in relation to the
work that they perform more easily.
4.4.3. Subcontracting
As already explained, among the offshore workers, the non-ac-
tive users of the safety management system and those who re-
ported the lowest level of knowledge of governing
documentation were mainly those employed by subcontractors.
In the safety literature these workers are often referred to as ‘no-
mads’ (e.g. Hovden et al., 2008; Parkes, 2012). Nomads have no
regular work/leave schedules, they constantly move between dif-
ferent installations and they carry out specialist tasks for a range
of different contractors hired by different operating companies.
This was also the case among the offshore subcontractor workers
in the present study. The effect of this irregularity, they claimed,
was that, in principle, they had to be familiar with different sets
of governing documentation and safety management systems,
which varied between the installations and between different
operating companies. Hence, familiarization with different rules,
procedures and safety management systems was seen as a chal-
lenge: ‘It’s different for those who have worked a long time for
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the same contractor. They are familiar with the system and they
know how it works’.
This challenge was strengthened by the fact that they felt their
prime duty was to perform the tasks they were hired for, and not to
spend time making themselves familiar with a body of rules and
procedures that might only be relevant for a limited period of time.
Thus, instead of actively searching for answers within the safety
management system, and instead of familiarizing themselves with
governing documentation, they simply asked supervisors or col-
leagues with more experience in order to get quick answers. One
of the offshore subcontractor workers, who never examined gov-
erning documentation before starting a job, expressed it like this:
‘When we receive a task we get to work straightaway, and if some-
thing is unclear we ask the supervisor for advice, [. . .] but we never
consult the safety management system’.
4.5. Social interaction
The third and last theme that was identiﬁed as important for
workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures was the impact of so-
cial interaction. Two factors within this category emerged in the
analysis: leadership inﬂuence and co-worker inﬂuence.
4.5.1. Leadership inﬂuence
In the interviews it was clear that the interaction between lead-
ers and subordinates was deemed to be important for how the
workers prioritized safety in their own work. However, many of
the interviewees reported that there appeared to be two sides to
this interaction with regard to safety, and that this two-sidedness
was signiﬁcant to how they perceived the importance of up to date
knowledge of governing documentation. On the one hand, it was
frequently claimed by the interviewees that their leaders repeat-
edly communicated the importance of safe and attentive work per-
formance, and that this type of communication was seen as having
a strong inﬂuence on the priority (relative to other domains) that
the workers gave to safe performance in their own work. One of
the onshore workers expressed it like this: ‘You should work safely,
it’s the ﬁrst priority. They [the leaders] say it, they let you do it, and
they mean it’. In fact, none of the interviewees were in any doubt
about what the number one priority was.
On the other hand, however, it was also often claimed (by eight
of the onshore workers and seven of the offshore workers), that
this type of safety communication from leaders seldom stressed
the importance of having up to date knowledge of governing doc-
umentation (apart from the fact that they were obliged to conﬁrm
by signature that up to date knowledge was obtained). This lack of
explicit emphasis on rules and procedures was frequently inter-
preted by the workers as implying that up to date knowledge
was actually not as necessary as it was formally said to be. One off-
shore subcontractor electrician’s description of his leader’s lack of
emphasis on governing documentation illustrates the effect of this:
‘‘Usually, there isn’t much focus on it [governing documentation].
So then we’d rather start working and producing instead of sitting
down by a computer to look into it’’. Hence, safe and attentive
work performance was often seen as a type of performance that
was dependent on experience in how work is usually and actually
performed, and not on in-depth knowledge of governing
documentation.
4.5.2. Co-worker inﬂuence
Co-worker inﬂuence is the ﬁnal factor that was clearly impor-
tant to how the workers, especially the offshore subcontractor
workers, perceived the importance of a high level of knowledge
of rules and procedures. All of the offshore subcontractor workers
had full access to the safety management system and they had
undergone all the necessary training in how to use the system. This
formal training, they claimed, also highlighted the importance of a
good knowledge of governing documentation and active use of the
safety management system. However, in observing their more
experienced co-workers’ actual use of the safety management sys-
tem, it was apparent that none of them had the impression that ac-
tive use of the system was as important as they had been taught
during their training. Such observations seemed to affect their
own use of the system signiﬁcantly. A comment by one of the off-
shore subcontractor workers illustrates this: ‘You just follow the
crowd. You do like everybody else, and I have never seen anyone
else working with the safety management system’. Hence, informal
observations of their co-workers’ actual practices seemed uninten-
tionally to overrule what they had been taught in their training
courses. Another offshore subcontractor worker claimed that this
type of unintended inﬂuence could be overcome if the focus on
governing documentation were more explicit and formalized:
When someone is newly hired, they should ask: ‘Have you used
the safety management system before?’ ‘No, I haven’t’. ‘You
haven’t? Then we need to ﬁnd someone to show you how it
works’. In this way, you would get an introduction, some guid-
ance and the opportunity to try it. [. . .] Then we would perhaps
be better at using it in our next job.
None of the subcontractor workers reported that they had met
with such an explicit focus on how to use the safety management
system in their work group. This clearly affected their actual use of
the system, their skills in how to use it and their perception of how
in-depth knowledge of rules and procedures were valued.
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Key ﬁndings
The objective of the present study was to identify, categorize
and gain an understanding of the most signiﬁcant factors that af-
fect the workers’ knowledge of the rules and procedures that reg-
ulate their work, on the basis of a qualitative case study of
contractor workers within the Norwegian petroleum industry.
The actual knowledge the 24 workers interviewed had about rules
and procedures varied considerably, despite the fact that in-depth
knowledge was a strict requirement of the formal work permit sys-
tem. Use of content analysis and open coding to uncover recurring
patterns and themes in the interview data showed that eight fac-
tors (summarized in Fig. 1) within the workers’ organizational con-
text contributed to this variation.
The ﬁrst three of the identiﬁed factors were related to the IT-
based safety management system, wherein the body of rules and
procedures was assembled. The three factors were (1) access to
the safety management system, (2) the user-friendliness of the sys-
tem, and (3) training in how to use it. As regards access and train-
ing, the lack of sufﬁcient training and adequate access to the safety
management system affected the onshore workers’ knowledge of
rules and procedures negatively. This effect was negative, not only
because these conditions were disadvantageous to the workers’
practical skills in terms of how to use the safety management sys-
tem, but also because it signalled to the workers that an in-depth
knowledge of rules and procedures was not as necessary as had
been stated formally.
Hence, it can be argued that there was a perceived misalign-
ment between what is usually referred to in the organizational sci-
ence literature as the ‘espoused values’ and the ‘enacted values’
(Argyris and Schön, 1996), since the priorities as enacted (i.e.
involving lack of sufﬁcient training and adequate access) were
clearly in conﬂict with the espoused priorities (i.e. necessity for
in-depth knowledge of rules and procedures). The present study
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complements previous safety literature, which has argued that
misalignment between espoused and enacted values is detrimental
to fostering a high priority for safety in a work unit (Leroy et al.,
2012; Zohar, 2003), as it also ﬁnds such a misalignment to be dis-
advantageous to the workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures.
According to Zohar (2010) such misalignment is detrimental to
safety because it is the enacted values, not the espoused values
that provide employees with reliable information regarding what
sort of behavior is expected and supported.
The lack of satisfactory user-friendliness of the IT-based safety
management system also negatively affected the workers’ chances
of gaining appropriate knowledge of rules and procedures. The off-
shore workers particularly emphasized that it was difﬁcult to lo-
cate the relevant governing documentation within the system,
and that this reduced their actual use of the system. This ﬁnding
is consistent with Elling’s (1987) previously described study of rail-
way workers, which found that characteristics related to the regu-
lations themselves, such as complexity and size, had a negative
impact on the workers’ knowledge of rules and procedures and
on whether the regulations were actively used. This ﬁnding is also
consistent with Antonsen et al.’s (2008) conclusions in a study of
safety compliance on an offshore supply base, which identiﬁed
procedural simplicity as a key condition for achieving increased
use of procedures.
The next three factors that were identiﬁed in the data material
were related to the characteristics of the work itself and to the con-
ditions of employment that the workers were bound by. These
three factors were (4) routinized work, (5) perceived risk level and
(6) subcontracting. As regards subcontracting, the negative effect
of this was primarily visible among the offshore subcontractor
workers who frequently moved between different installations
and worked for different operating companies. This nomadic exis-
tence seemed to have a negative effect because it led to a shortage
of time spent at each installation. This reduced the offshore oppor-
tunity for the subcontractor workers to become familiar with the
operator-speciﬁc safety management system and the installation-
speciﬁc body of rules and procedures. Related effects of the noma-
dic characteristics of subcontracting have also been found in other
studies. For example, Biggs et al.’s (2013) study of safety culture
within the construction industry found that subcontracting was
the most signiﬁcant barrier to improvements in the safety culture
because of the transient characteristics of this type of employment.
It should, however, be noted that the ﬁndings related to subcon-
tracting in the present study are restricted to knowledge of speciﬁc
rules and procedures, and not to safety in any wider sense, as is the
case in Biggs et al.’s study. It should also be noted that the subcon-
tractor workers’ varied practice at different installations and their
experience of other safety management systems, rules and proce-
dures might make an in-depth knowledge of the installation-spe-
ciﬁc body of rules and procedures less essential.
The workers’ perception of the risks involved in their work ap-
peared to be positively related to their comprehension of how
important knowledge of rules and procedures was and, conse-
quently, how much effort they put into becoming familiar with
governing documentation. This implies that those who perceived
their own work to be hazardous were more often of the opinion
that in-depth knowledge of rules and procedures was necessary,
which was in contrast to those who perceived that their own work
contained little risk. This ﬁnding complements those of previous
studies of safety in work organizations which have argued that
there is a positive link between risk perception and safe behavior
(e.g. Arezes and Miguel, 2008; Ji et al., 2011; Mearns and Flin,
1995). However, none of these studies has explored the link be-
tween risk perception and workers’ knowledge of safety rules
and procedures. The ﬁndings in the present study might indicate
that such knowledge is an important mediating variable in the cau-
sal relationship between risk perception and safety behavior.
As regards routinized work, the effect of this appeared to be
negative. That is, workers who experienced little variation in their
work were of the opinion that in-depth knowledge of rules and
procedures was not necessary because, on the basis of experience
and past success with similar tasks, they knew how their tasks
should be performed. In turn, this led to little active use of the
safety management system and a low level of knowledge of gov-
erning documentation. This negative effect of routinized work
has not received much attention in previous studies, but it is well
demonstrated that unsafe behavior, such as the failure to use pro-
tective gear and the ignorance of known safety procedures, is
strongly provoked by routine work, partly because past success
in using unsafe practices in similar tasks serves as a reinforcement
to continue with unsafe practices (e.g. Snook, 2000; Zohar and
Erev, 2007). Hence, while routinized work is recognized in previous
studies as a signiﬁcant antecedent of intentional violations, its ef-
fect on knowledge of rules and procedures is under-investigated.
It should, however, be stressed that the interviewees in the present
study considered the routinized characteristics of their work to be
a positive aspect with respect to safety, in spite of its negative ef-
fect on knowledge of rules and procedures. Hence, the ﬁndings do
not give any direct support to the notion that routinized work has a
negative effect on safety in a wider sense.
The last two factors which emerged in the analysis were related
to the impact of social interaction. These were (7) leadership inﬂu-
ence and (8) co-worker inﬂuence. The emergence of these two fac-
tors was not unexpected. The relationship between leadership
behavior and the safety behavior of subordinates is well recognized
in the safety literature (Hofmann and Morgeson, 2004), and has
been so for a long time (e.g. Heinrich, 1931). Previous studies have
also recognized the important role of co-workers, in particular the
inﬂuence that experienced workers have on newcomers (e.g. Cho-
udhry and Fang, 2008; Mullen, 2004). In the present study these
two factors were important for the workers’ perception of the true
priority of knowledge of rules and procedures in the organization,
which is similar to the effect of the lack of sufﬁcient training and
inadequate access to the safety management system. For example,
the strong focus on safe and attentive work performance, com-
bined with the lack of an explicit leadership focus on the governing
documentation per se, was frequently interpreted by the offshore
Fig. 1. The most signiﬁcant factors affecting workers’ knowledge of rules and
procedures.
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subcontractor workers as implying that an in-depth knowledge of
rules and procedures was in practice not so important, notwith-
standing its formal expression through the work permit. The mis-
alignment between the espoused and enacted values is therefore
relevant for understanding the impact of these factors as well.
5.2. Implications, limitations and further research
A signiﬁcant contribution of the present study is the insight it
provides into some of the factors that affect workers’ knowledge
of rules and procedures. This is an under-researched area of safety
compliance research. The factors identiﬁed are to a certain degree
also related to motivation and attitudes. However, these types of
motivation and attitudes are not connected to the propensity to
act in accordance with the prevailing regulations during the execu-
tion of work; instead, they are associated with gaining knowledge
of rules and procedures prior to the execution of work. Thus, the
factors identiﬁed in the present study ﬁll a serious research gap
within safety compliance research, and shed light on factors that
it is important to take into consideration in order to understand
some of the organizational origins of unintentional violations. In
combination with previous research, the ﬁndings of the present
study therefore offer a more comprehensive framework for under-
standing non-compliant behavior.
In addition to these theoretical contributions, the ﬁndings of the
present study have some important practical implications. While
these are particularly relevant to the petroleum industry, they
are also relevant to other industries characterized by extensive
and complex safety regulations, such as the aviation, mining, ship-
ping and nuclear power industries. Most importantly, the ﬁndings
clearly imply that bureaucratic routines, such as requiring workers
to conﬁrm by signature that a speciﬁed set of rules and procedures
is fully known and understood, are not at all sufﬁcient to ensure
adequate knowledge. If such bureaucratic routines are expected
to have a signiﬁcant impact, several other aspects of the work con-
text should also be addressed.
First, all workers should be offered adequate access to relevant
rules and procedures and receive the necessary training to enable
them to locate and interpret the regulations. This is not only
important because access and training are essential practical tools,
but also because it signals that knowledge of rules and procedures
is a real priority for the organization. In addition, the body of rules
and procedures should be characterized by simplicity and user-
friendliness. Second, the characteristics of the work itself and the
workers’ conditions of employment should be taken into consider-
ation. In particular, the ﬁndings indicate that it is important to
make sharp-end workers aware of the link between rules and pro-
cedures and the risks that such administrative barriers are meant
to reduce. Further, it is important for managers, leaders and other
stakeholders to pay particular attention to routinized work, and to
ensure that the balance between the practical acquired know-how
and knowledge of rules and procedures is within the boundaries of
safe practice. In addition, the ﬁndings clearly indicate that it is
important to pay speciﬁc attention to nomadic subcontractor
workers, and to recognize that this group of workers needs to be
offered extra time and resources. Third, the signals that leaders
send to their subordinates and the impact that experienced work-
ers have on newcomers should be given particular attention. If
knowledge of rules and procedures is given a high and visible pri-
ority, this signals to the crew that it is of real importance and not
just a bureaucratic necessity.
In sum, these three aspects point to one common theme: the
importance of sending clear and unambiguousmessages toworkers
about the level of understanding that is actually expected of them
with regard toknowledgeof rulesandprocedures. Suchanunambig-
uous approach cannot be delivered simply by issuing a clear formal
demand (the demand for signing the work permit to conﬁrm ade-
quate knowledge) while, at the same time, displaying a passive atti-
tude when it comes to the organization’s responsibility to support
this demand. Clearly, employees could interpret such passivity as
indicating thatup todateknowledge isnotasnecessaryas the formal
statement implies.Moreover, this could also result in the impression
that the signature and the rules are necessary only to protect the
back ofmanagement if something goeswrong. According to Chunlin
and Chengyu (1999), this is actually the widespread impression of
petroleumworkers. In their study, 48%of theworkerson theUKCon-
tinental Shelf were of the opinion that some rules only are there to
cover management’s back.
Despite the theoretical and practical implications of this study,
the ﬁndings should be interpreted in the light of certain methodo-
logical limitations. First, owing to the study design and the sample
size, the ﬁndings are not generalizable in the traditional statistical
sense of the word. Irrespective of this, it is believed that the partic-
ular empirical setting of the study, a highly regulated work envi-
ronment, ﬁts the explorative objective of the study well, and that
it therefore sheds relevant empirical light on an under-investigated
area of safety compliance research that is transferable to other
industries. It would, however, be useful for future research to
examine and test the ﬁndings of this study with a quantitative
study design, across different settings. Second, like any other inter-
view study, the data limitations of the present study include the
possibility of inaccurate and distorted responses owing to personal
bias, bias introduced by social desirability, recall errors and so on
(Patton, 2002). Hence, the ﬁndings of the present study would have
been strengthened if the interviews had been underpinned by
observations. Observation studies should therefore be considered
in future research on this topic. Such a study design could also
be well suited to identifying relevant factors that might have been
overlooked in the present study. Third, and more fundamentally,
the study does not shed empirical light on the actual relationship
between knowledge of rules and procedures, compliance and
safety. That is, the ﬁndings do not necessarily imply that more
knowledge automatically leads to more compliance, or that more
compliance automatically leads to safer operations. This last rela-
tionship is for example problematized by Reason (1997), Besnard
and Hollnagel (2012) and Dekker (2006), who emphasized that ri-
gid compliance with procedures is not a guarantee for safe opera-
tions and that departures from procedures sometimes are
necessary to preserve safety. This is not a topic which has been
dealt with explicitly here, owing to the research objective of the
study. Hence, the ﬁndings of this study should be understood with-
in the limits of its research objective.
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Appendix A. Interview guide
Question: Can you please tell me a little about yourself,
including your professional background and the work that
you perform here?
Examples of follow-up questions: How long have you been
working offshore/onshore and on the current installation/
plant? Are you working for a contractor company or a
subcontractor company? Do you have any leadership
(continued on next page)
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responsibilities/HSE duties? Can you please tell me more
about that?
Question: The HSE statistics indicate that there are relatively
few accidents and injuries among the workers here, what do
you think is the reason for that?
Examples of follow-up questions: Is it your opinion that safety
is taken seriously here? What does it mean in practice to
take safety seriously? Can you please give an example?
Compared to where you have worked before, how is safety
prioritized here?
Question: Have you ever been involved in or witnessed an
accident/incident here? Can you please tell me more about
that?
Examples of follow-up questions: From your perspective, what
was it that caused the accident/incident? Could it have been
prevented?
Question: How do you plan your work with regard to safety?
Examples of follow-up questions: Can you give a step by step
description? In what way are you involved in the pre-
planning? Is such involvement important? Why?/Why not?
Question: When planning and performing a job, how relevant
are rules and procedures?
Examples of follow-up questions: Are rules and procedures an
integrated part of the planning? How do you locate the
relevant rules and procedures? Are you familiar with the
rules and procedures? Are you familiar with the IT-based
safety management system? Why?/Why not? Is knowledge
of rules and procedures/active use of governing
documentation emphasized in your department? Please
explain.
Question: Do you encounter unexpected situations that make
it necessary to ignore rules and procedures?
Examples of follow-up questions: Can you give an example? In
what way does this affect safety?
Question: Are you offered enough time to perform your work
safely and to make yourself familiar with rules and
procedures?
Examples of follow-up questions: Does this affect your work
performance in any way? How?
Question: How do you make yourself familiar with rules and
procedures?
Examples of follow-up questions: Is knowledge of rules and
procedures important for safe performance? How? What
gives you that impression? Have you been offered any
formal training in rules and procedures and the IT-based
safety management system? In what way is such training
important?
Question: In what way is leadership important to how you
perform your work with regard to safety matters?
Examples of follow-up questions: What characterizes a leader
who works proactively with safety? How does your leader
compare with such a description? How does your leader
prioritize safety? Are knowledge of rules and procedures a
part of this priority? How? In what way is your leader
involved in the work that you perform? In what way does
your leader follow up newcomers and subcontractor
workers?
Question: Are safe working practices a common topic at
meetings? How?
Examples of follow-up questions: How is knowledge of rules
and procedures emphasized in these meetings? Are rules
and procedures explicitly discussed? How is safety
performance in completed work tasks/safe job analyses
evaluated at these meetings?
Question: In what way is the operator company important for
how you perform your work with regard to safety matters?
Examples of follow-up questions: How does the operator
company prioritize safety? Are knowledge to rules and
procedures a part of this priority? How? How is accident
reporting followed up by the operator company?
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ABSTRACT
A recurring conclusion in accident investigations and analyses, across a range of different industries, is that 
non-compliance with safety regulations is a significant contributory factor to accidents. Such non-compliance 
can take place both at the individual level and the organisational level. In recent years, safety researchers 
have mostly focused on individual non-compliance, its contextual origins, and the relevant measures that can 
be taken to improve safety compliance among frontline workers. However, few studies have paid attention to 
organizational compliance or non-compliance with safety regulations and the measures that can be taken to 
improve compliance at the organizational level. In Norway it is first and foremost the Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority which is responsible for ensuring that enterprises comply with the national safety 
regulations, such as the Working Environment Act and its accompanying regulations. This is done primarily 
by on-site inspections of the enterprises. On basis of two field experiments (N=291), which compare 
inspected versus previously uninspected enterprises, the present paper examines the impact that such control 
activity has on the enterprises’ compliance with national safety regulations. The results of the comparative 
analyses show that enterprises which have been subject to inspections by the labour inspection authorities 
exhibit a significantly higher level of compliance with safety regulations compared to enterprises which not 
have been subject to inspections. These findings are of great importance considering the fact that non-
compliance is a common triggering factor of accidents at work. The implications of the findings are discussed 
here.
1. INTRODUCTION
Accident investigations and analyses across a range of different industries regularly identify non-
compliance with safety regulations as a significant contributory factor (Hopkins, 2011). This is not only the case 
in investigations of occupational accidents with a relatively limited extent of loss, but is also a recurring finding in 
investigations of major accidents and catastrophes (Hudson et al., 1998). One of the best known examples of this 
is the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, where five of the seven human actions that led directly to the accident were 
deviations from written procedures (Reason, 1987), and the Piper Alpha disaster two years later where platform 
managers’ safety practices were found to be contributory to the disaster and significantly diverging from written 
procedures (Wright, 1994). Another well-known example is the BP Texas City refinery explosion in 2005, where 
an important finding, among others, was that a casual attitude to compliance with safety procedures contributed to 
the explosion at the refinery (Hopkins, 2009).
As regards occupational and organizational safety, non-compliant acts can be defined as ‘deviations from 
safe operating procedures, standards or rules’ (Reason, 1997: 72). Such deviations can take place both at the 
individual level, in relation to company internal safety procedures, and at the organisational level, in relation to 
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the national occupational health and safety regulations. In recent years, safety researchers have paid most attention 
to individual non-compliance among frontline workers, and a considerable amount of research has been conducted 
with the aim of identifying the antecedents of such unsafe acts and suggesting measures which can be taken in 
order to improve individual safety compliance (e.g. Antonsen et al., 2008; Clarke, 2006; Dahl and Olsen, 2013; 
Griffin and Neal, 2000; Kapp, 2012; Kongsvik et al., 2012; Lawton, 1998; Lu and Yang, 2011; Martínez-Córcoles 
et al., 2011; Mearns et al., 2010; Pedersen and Kines, 2011; Torp and Grøgaard, 2009; Zohar, 2002). A recurring 
finding in these studies is that non-compliant behaviour not is a random phenomenon (Wagenaar, 1998) that 
evolves in a vacuum, but is triggered to a large degree by different inadequate organizational conditions, often 
created by management itself (Alper and Karsh, 2009).
In spite of the substantial amount of research that has been conducted with the aim of identifying the 
origins of non-compliance at the individual level and effective measures which can be taken to improve individual 
safety compliance, few studies have paid attention to the organizational level. Thus, few studies have examined 
why some organizations follow national safety regulations while others do not and few studies have aimed at 
identifying effective compliance-enhancing measures at the organizational level. 
There are, however, some exceptions. For example, Saksvik et al.’s (2003) study of Norwegian companies 
and Baldock et al.’s (2006) study of British small enterprises, found that poor compliance with safety regulations 
at the organisational level is a consequence of a limited access to health and safety resources. Hence, factors such 
as enterprise size, public sector, management training and experience and membership of trade or business 
associations were found to be positively associated with rule compliance at the organizational level in these 
studies. 
As regards effective compliance-enhancing measures, Baldock et al. (2006) found that enterprises 
inspected by regulatory authorities (labour inspections) were far more likely to comply with safety regulations, 
compared to enterprises which not had experienced such inspections. In fact, in their study, inspections on the part 
of regulatory officials were found to be the variable with the most positive influence on organizational safety 
compliance. In addition, the study revealed that enterprises which had been controlled by the regulatory 
authorities’ labour inspectorates were more likely to use external assistance in order to improve compliance with 
health and safety regulations. Hence, the positive impact of labour inspections was found to be indirect as well as 
direct. On the basis of these findings, Baldock et al. (2006: 844) therefore concluded that an appropriate strategy 
with regard to enhanced compliance at the enterprise level “would be to provide the resources needed to increase 
substantially the number of inspections undertaken”.
Baldock et al.’s findings in relation to the impact of labour inspections are important because they indicate 
that public resources spent on control and enforcement within this area actually serve one of its intended key-
purposes, namely to improve enterprises’ compliance with health and safety requirements. This finding is also 
supported by some other studies which have looked at a broader set of regulatory instruments (Andersen et al., 
2009; Wright et al., 2000).
A limitation of these studies, however (including Baldock et al.’s (2006) own study), is that compliance is 
measured by the use of self-reported data. This can result in an unintended positive bias. Another limitation is that 
the cross-sectional design of these studies makes it difficult to establish a sequential cause and effect relationship 
between the measures imposed by the labour inspectorates and improved compliance. The internal validity of 
these studies, related to their interpretations of cause and effect, can therefore be discussed. In order to further 
examine the impact of regulatory authorities’ control activity on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations it 
is therefore necessary for additional investigations which make use of research methods which not are vulnerable 
to the biases associated with self-reported data. This is what the present study aims to do.
The methodological limitations related to interpretations of causality that are associated with the studies 
described above are characteristic of social research in general, and there is no widely acknowledged solution to 
the causality problem in the social sciences (Vedung, 1997). The experimental research design is, however, often 
pointed out as the research method that is most suitable for producing systematic and robust evidence when 
examining the effects of different public actions or services in general (Clarke and Dawson, 1999), and has been 
recommended as an appropriate research methodology for examining the effects of safety interventions (Robson 
et al., 2001) and labour inspections in particular (Hillage et al., 2001). In order to further examine the effect that 
labour inspections have on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations, the present study was therefore 
designed as a field experiment, where compliance was measured by more objective criteria than self-reports and 
where the researchers fully controlled the independent variable (i.e. labour inspections).
To date, 130 countries have ratified the international Labour Inspection Convention (ILO, 2013). This 
implies that the majority of countries across the world have implemented a system of labour inspection, under the 
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control of a central authority, which aims to secure the enforcement of legal provisions relating to health and 
safety at work. The purpose of the present paper is not to address the multitude of different labour inspection 
systems, but to focus on one of them; the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA). The control activity 
which is examined here is on-site inspections of enterprises related to workplace safety (not health or employment 
conditions), carried out by the NLIA, and the objective of this paper is to examine whether labour inspections 
carried out by the NLIA have an impact on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations. 
The methodological design of the current study allow for a comparative analysis of the level of compliance 
between inspected versus previously uninspected enterprises. The applied method and specific research 
hypotheses will be described in detail in section three of this paper, after a section that gives a brief description of 
the case of NLIA. Section four of the paper presents the empirical results of the study and is followed by a 
discussion and a conclusion in sections five and six, respectively.
2. BRIEF CASE DESCRIPTION
In general, the overall mission of most labour inspectorates, regardless of country, is to ensure safe and 
healthy work environments and secure employment conditions, by making sure that the enterprises comply with 
existing legislation. Within the Norwegian context it is intended to achieve this mission via the application of 
different instruments, such as inspections, verifications, guidance, information, campaigns and through 
collaboration with other public authorities like the police, the tax authorities and the environmental authorities.
The main instrument, however, is the one that is the focus of this study, namely inspections of enterprises which 
aim to control and enforce compliance with the national working environment regulations.
The NLIA performs approximately 15.000 workplace inspections per year, and at this activity level the 
inspectorate covers roughly 7% of all land-based enterprises annually. Some guidance and information is usually 
offered by the inspectors during an inspection, but when dealing with enterprises that do not comply with the 
requirements of the Working Environment Act and its accompanying regulations, the NLIA has four different 
coercive measures available: formal orders, coercive fines (which can be imposed if formal orders are not 
followed), shutdown of operations and reports to the police. Formal orders, which are written orders to correct 
eventual violations within a limited time period, represent the most widely applied coercive measure. In 2011 
formal orders were given in approximately 60% of all inspections (NLIA, 2012).
The inspections are divided among different priority areas such as work-related musculoskeletal disorders, 
work-related psychological disorders, social dumping, young workers, chemical hazards and technical safety. In
this study, which deals with safety rather than health-related issues or employment conditions, it is important to 
underline that the effect of inspections was evaluated by addressing the two priority areas that are most clearly 
related to safety, namely chemical hazards and technical safety. Hence, priority areas related exclusively to health
and employment conditions (such as wages, contracts and working hours) were excluded from this study.1
In 2011 roughly 20% of all inspections were performed within the priority area of technical safety, and 
17% within the priority area of chemical hazards (NLIA, 2012). Within both of these priority areas the NLIA’s 
focus is on control of some paramount statutory demands, such as appointment of safety representatives,
establishment of safety objectives, risk identification, risk analysis and plans of action, but also on some specific 
statutory demands, such as proper access to personal protective equipment, safe storage of hazardous substances 
and the technical condition of production facilities. The legal basis for these demands is the Working Environment 
Act and its accompanying regulations such as the Internal Control Regulations and the Regulations concerning 
Safety Representatives.
3. METHOD
3.1. The experimental research design
As already described, the present paper is based on a study that applied an experimental research design. 
Basically, an experiment is a form of research methodology which examines the effect that an independent 
variable has on a dependent variable, by means of comparing two groups; an experimental group and a control 
group. Under ideal experimental conditions, assignment to the two groups should be random to assure that they 
are equal, except that the members of the experimental group are exposed to the independent variable, and the 
1 Separate studies (within other priority areas) related to the impact that labour inspections performed by the NLIA has 
on enterprises’ compliance with health regulations and employment conditions has also been conducted, but is not 
reported in this paper.
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members of the control group are not. Further, both groups should be pre-tested. The independent variable is 
usually dichotomous (i.e. present or absent, e.g. treatment or no treatment) and is typically under the control of the 
experimenter. In this model, the experimenter measures observations of changes in the dependent variable when 
the independent variable is present compared to observations of when it is absent (Clarke and Dawson, 1999).
The upside of the experimental research design is that it provides a high level of causal inference and 
internal validity. That is, it enables relatively firm conclusions to be drawn with regard to the effect of the 
independent variable (Babbie, 2010). Within the social sciences, including safety science, true experimental 
conditions are often difficult to achieve unless the experimental situation is moved to a laboratory or another 
artificial context. Such a context is, however, normally not desirable because it is necessary for the external 
validity to study the subjects in their naturally occurring environments (Clarke and Dawson, 1999). Thus, when 
experimental designs are applied in safety research the pure experimental design is usually replaced with different 
types of quasi-experimental designs, where some of the characteristics of the true experimental design are altered 
(Shannon et al., 1999).
In the present study, two experiments were conducted; one for the priority area of chemical hazards and 
one for the priority area of technical safety. A particular type of quasi-experimental design was employed for both 
experiments; the so called post-test-only control group design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963), also referred to as 
after-only measures and a control group (Robson et al., 2001). This implies that there were no pre-tests of the 
experimental groups and the control groups. Instead the experimental groups and the control groups were 
compared simply by assuring equality between the two groups through the use of matching pairs. Also, the 
context of the two experiments was natural. Such experiments are usually referred to as field experiments, and are 
frequently used within all types of evaluation research (Clarke and Dawson, 1999).
3.2. Experimental groups and control groups
The assignment of enterprises to the experimental groups in the present study was done primarily by means 
of randomization. This implied the existence of two lists of all enterprises that had been subject to inspections 
which either focused on (1) chemical hazards or (2) technical safety during the previous calendar year was created 
(at least 6 months and maximum 18 months before inclusion in the study), and then enterprises were selected at 
random from these lists. In total 100 enterprises were selected randomly from the list of enterprises that had been 
subject to inspections which focused on chemical hazards. 
The list of enterprises that had been subject to inspections which focused on technical safety was 
subdivided into two different lists. These lists mirrored two different types of inspections within this priority area: 
accident inspections and preventive inspections. The first list consisted of enterprises which had been subject to an 
inspection due to an accident (accident inspections). The second list of enterprises consisted of enterprises that 
had been subject to preventive inspections. In total 40 enterprises from the first list were selected randomly. The 
40 enterprises from the second list, however, were selected by matching. This implies that each enterprise from 
this second list was matched with another enterprise selected from the first list (matched pairs). The enterprises 
were matched on the following variables: branch of industry, geographical localization and number of employees.
In order to assure that the three experimental groups were comparable to the control groups, the assignment 
of enterprises to the control groups was done by using matching pairs. Firstly, a complete list of enterprises that 
had never previously been subject to inspections by the NLIA was created. Then, enterprises were selected from 
this list so that they matched those in the experimental groups. In total, 100 enterprises were selected to match 
those from the experimental chemical hazard group, and 40 enterprises were selected to match those selected from 
the two (40+40) experimental technical safety groups. Branch of industry, geographical localization and number 
of employees were used as criteria for matching. This ensured that the matched pairs were within the same branch 
of industry, that they were located within the same province and that they had approximately the same number of 
employees.
3.3. Measures, hypotheses and statistical procedures
In order to compare the level of compliance with safety regulations between the experimental groups and 
the control groups, follow-up inspections were conducted. These inspections were performed by regular 
inspectors from the NLIA. Due to practical reasons, however, some of the enterprises and some of the inspectors 
were not available for follow-up inspections. The net sample was therefore reduced accordingly, see table 1.
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Table 1
Gross sample, net sample and net sample rate 
 Chemical hazards Technical safety 
 Exp. group Contr. group ǆƉ͘ŐƌŽƵƉϭ࣊ Exp. ŐƌŽƵƉϮ࣎ Contr. group 
Gross sample 100 100 40 40 40 
Net sample 96 96 33 33 33 
Net sample rate (%) 96.0% 96.0% 82.5% 82.5% 82.5% 
࣊WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝǀĞŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕࣎ĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ 
During the follow-up inspections, the inspectors applied a check list to measure the level of compliance 
with safety regulations within the enterprises. The check list consisted of eight variables and was developed by the 
researchers, prior to the inspections, in collaboration with chief inspectors and experts from the NLIA within the 
given priority area. Unlike for example Levine et al.’s (2012) study of labour inspection effects in the U.S., safety 
performance data such as occupational injury records was not applied. This was a conscious choice based on the 
aim (compliance and not safety performance) of the study, and because objective and comparable safety 
performance data are notoriously hard to obtain (e.g. Brown et al., 2000, Choudhry et al., 2007).
To assure reliability, validity and to avoid potential positive bias, all the inspectors were given written 
instructions with regard to how the inspections should be performed and with regard to how the check list should 
be applied. All eight variables were dichotomous, and were either assigned a ‘yes’ (value 1), indicating 
compliance, or a ‘no’ (value 0), indicating non-compliance. All the variables typically represented compliance 
with a specific relevant statutory demand, see table 2. Thus, if an enterprise was assigned a ‘no’ on a given 
variable, this would also trigger a formal order. Hence, the potential for systematic errors, positive bias and 
reduced validity were reduced by the fact that a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ would trigger a real juridical consequence. 
Table 2
ŝĐŚŽƚŽŵŽƵƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĞĐŬ-lists 
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,ϭ͗ĂŶƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĂǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůŚĂǌĂƌĚƐ͕ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞĂůůƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ
ƌŝƐŬĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ͕ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ͍ 
,Ϯ͗ ĂŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽĨ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůŚĂǌĂƌĚƐĂŶĚͬŽƌŚĂƐƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĂƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĚƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚƉůĂŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ͍ 
CH3: Can the employer ensure ƚŚĂƚŚĞͬƐŚĞŚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŶĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚ͕ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐĂĨĞƚǇǁŽƌŬ͍ 
CH4: Can the enterprise eŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƐĂĨĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞůĞĐƚĞĚ;ŽƌŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŐƌĞĞĚ
ŝŶ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ƵƉŽŶ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚͬŶŽƚ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ĨŽƌ
ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚĞŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐͿ͍ 
CH5: Can the enterprise present aŶƵƉƚŽĚĂƚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ͍ 
CH6: Can the enterprise ensure that written procedures regarding use, storage and maintenance of 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝǀĞĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĂƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ͍ 
,ϳ͗ĂŶƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƌŝƐŬƐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚďǇĂ
ƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͍ 
CH8: Can the enterprise ensure ƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƐŽƵƚ͍࣊ 
Te
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TS1: Can the ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǌĂƌĚƐ ĂƌĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ͍ 
TS2: Can the enterprise ensure ƚŚĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬƐ ŽĨ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ
ŚĂǌĂƌĚƐĂŶĚͬŽƌŚĂƐƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĂƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĚƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚƉůĂŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ͍ 
d^ϯ͗ĂŶƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŚĞͬƐŚĞŚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŶĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚ͕ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐĂĨĞƚǇǁŽƌŬ͍ 
d^ϰ͗ĂŶƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƐĂĨĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞůĞĐƚĞĚ;ŽƌŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŐƌĞĞĚŝŶ
writing upŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚͬŶŽƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƐĂĨĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚĞŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐͿ͍ 
TS5: Can the enterprise ensure ƚŚĂƚŝƚƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌƐĂůůƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝŶũƵƌŝĞƐͬŝůůŶĞƐƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨǁŽƌŬ
performed in ƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ͍ 
TS6: Can the enterprise ensure ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƌŝƐŬƐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚďǇĂ
ƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͍ 
d^ϳ͗ĂŶƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
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occupaƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƐŽƵƚ͍࣊ 
d^ϴ͗ ĂŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌ͕ ƌĞĐƚŝĨǇ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ŶŽŶ-
ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĂĨĞƚǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ͍ 
࣊ ŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŶŽƚĂƌĞŽďůŝŐĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁĞƌĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞϭŽŶƚŚŝƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ͘ 
 
On basis of the check lists, all enterprises were assigned an index-score of between 0 and 8 following an 
inspection, by summing up the score on each individual variable (no missing values were registered). This index-
score was treated as a measure of compliance with safety regulations on the enterprise level (dependent variable), 
and was used to test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Enterprises that have been subject to labour inspections which focus on chemical hazards 
will display a higher level of compliance with safety regulations relevant to this priority area, compared to 
enterprises that have never been subject to labour inspections.
Hypothesis 2: Enterprises that have been subject to labour inspections which focus on technical safety will 
display a higher level of compliance with safety regulations relevant to this priority area, compared to enterprises 
that have never been subject to labour inspections.
In order to test hypothesis 1, a one-tailed independent samples t-test was performed (Field, 2005). A one-
tailed test, not a two-tailed, was considered appropriate owing to the fact that the hypothesis was directional. The 
t-test tested whether the mean index-scores in the experimental group were significantly higher from those in the 
control group. The alpha level was set to .05. This implies that if the t-test yields probability values below .05 this 
indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the data, whereas the existence of probability values greater than .05 
indicates that the hypothesis is not supported by the data. The effect size was estimated by Pearson’s r (Field, 
2005).In order to test hypothesis 2, a t-test was not appropriate since the data consisted of three groups (two 
experimental groups and one control group). For this reason, a one-way ANOVA was conducted (Field, 2005).2
The advantage of the ANOVA is that it can test whether or not the means of three or more groups are all equal. 
The ANOVA, however, does not provide information on which means are significantly different from each other. 
To test this, a Least Significant Difference (LSD) post-hoc test was applied (Ott and Longnecker, 2010), and, in 
line with hypothesis 2, it was expected that the two experimental groups would have a mean index-score greater 
than the control group, but that they would not differ significantly from each other. As for the t-test, the alpha 
level was set to .05 for both the ANOVA and the LSD-test.3
4. RESULTS
4.1. Internal consistency and reliability
Prior to the test of the two hypotheses the internal consistency and reliability of the applied indexes 
were evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability (Cronbach, 1951). According to Nunnally 
(1978) DOSKD VFRUHV Į JUHDWHU WKDQ 70 are indications of adequate internal consistency and reliability. 
The alpha scores (see table 3) for the two indexes vary from .78 to .82. Hence the internal consistency and 
reliability were considered adequate.
Table 3
ĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐĨŽƌŝŶĚĞǆĞs 
Index sĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ Mean SD N ɲ 
Chemical hazards 8 5.78 2.20 192 .78 
Technical safety 8 5.63 2.44 99 .82 
4.2. Test of hypothesis 1
After having confirmed that the index had adequate internal consistency and reliability, the one-tailed t-test 
was conducted to test hypothesis 1. The results of the test, including a comparison between the experimental 
group and the control group for each individual variable in the index are presented in table 4.
2 Hypothesis 2 is directional. However, the ANOVA is a non-specific test which means that it just tells us whether there 
is a difference or not. Thus it is not possible to run a one-tailed ANOVA (Field, 2005).
3 All statistical tests, including randomization, were conducted with SPSS 18.0.
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As shown in table 4, the experimental group scored higher on all of the eight individual variables in the 
index. The greatest difference between the two groups was to be found in variable CH1, where 84% of the 
enterprises within the experimental group were given the value 1 (=yes) compared to only 42% of those within the 
control group. This implies that whereas 84% of enterprises which had been subject to a labour inspection that 
focused on chemical hazards could document that a written risk assessment of chemical hazards has been 
conducted, this could only be documented by 42% of the enterprises which had not been subject to a labour 
inspection. The smallest difference between the two groups is to be found in variable CH4, which concerns the 
election of safety representatives, where 89% of the enterprises within the experimental group were given the 
value 1 (=yes) compared to 82% within the control group.
The t-test of hypothesis 1, which concerns the overall safety compliance index, demonstrated that 
enterprises which have been subject to a labour inspection (M=6.70, SD=1.61) display a significantly higher level 
of compliance with safety regulations relevant to the priority area of chemical hazards, compared to enterprises 
that had never been subject to labour inspections (M=4.85, SD=2.32), t(190)=6.40, p<.001. Thus, the data gave 
support to hypothesis 1. This implies that labour inspections performed by the NLIA have a positive effect on 
enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations relevant to the priority area of chemical hazards. The calculated 
effect size was r=.42, p<.001, and the difference between the experimental group and the control group on the 
safety compliance index represents a 38.1% difference.
Table 4
^ĐŽƌĞƐŽŶǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĚĞǆŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůŐƌŽƵƉ;EсϵϲͿĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŐƌŽƵƉ;EсϵϲͿ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚ-test 
of mean index difference (hypothesis 1) 
 Exp. group Contr. group Difference 
sĂƌŝĂďůĞƐͬŝŶĚĞǆ Mean SD Mean SD Mean difference 
CH1 .84 .37 .42 .50 .42 
CH2 .76 .43 .42 .50 .34 
CH3 .89 .32 .78 .42 .11 
CH4 .89 .32 .82 .38 .07 
CH5 .86 .34 .78 .42 .08 
CH6 .83 .38 .66 .48 .17 
CH7 .76 .43 .48 .50 .28 
CH8 .86 .34 .50 .50 .36 
Index (chemical hazards) 6.70 1.61 4.85 2.32 1.85࣊ 
࣊ T-ƚĞƐƚ͗ĚĨсϭϵϬ͕ƚсϲ͘ϰϬ͕Ɖф͘ϬϬϭ;ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŝǌĞ͗ƌс͘ϰϮ͕Ɖф͘ϬϬϭͿ 
4.3. Test of hypothesis 2
The results of the ANOVA, including a comparison between the two experimental groups and the control 
group for each individual variable in the index are presented in table 5. As shown in the table, the two 
experimental groups scored higher than the control group on all of the eight individual variables in the index. The 
greatest difference between the two experimental groups and the control group was to be found in variable TS7,
where 82% and 67% (mean for both groups =75%) of the enterprises within the experimental group 1 and 2 were 
given the value 1 (=yes) respectively, compared to only 33% within the control group. This implies that whereas 
75% of enterprises which had been subject to a labour inspection which focuses on technical safety could
document that they had prepared periodic plans and reports regarding the work that the occupational health 
service carries out, and this could only be documented among the 33% of enterprises which had not been subject 
to a labour inspection. The smallest difference between the two experimental groups and the control group was to 
be found in the variables TS2 and TS8, which concern implementation of risk-reducing measures and routines to
uncover, rectify and prevent non-compliance with national safety regulations.
As regards the test of hypothesis 2, which concerns the overall safety compliance index, the ANOVA 
demonstrated that there was a statistically significant difference between the groups, F(2, 96)=4.47, p=.041. The 
LSD post-hoc test revealed that enterprises which had been subject to a preventive inspection (M=6.10, SD=2.18) 
scored significantly higher on the safety compliance than did enterprises which not had been subject to an 
inspection (M=4.76, SD=2.70), p=.025. This difference in the safety compliance index represented a percentual 
difference of 28.2%. Also, the LSD-test revealed that enterprises which had been subject to an accident inspection 
(M=6.03, SD=2.23) scored significantly higher on the safety compliance index than enterprises which not had 
been subject to an inspection, p=.033. This difference in the safety compliance index represents a percentual 
difference of 26.7%. In addition, the LSD post-hoc test (not reported in table 5) revealed that there was, as 
expected, no statistically significant difference between the two experiment groups, p=.918. In sum, the results 
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from the ANOVA and the LSD supported hypothesis 2. This implies that labour inspections performed by the 
NLIA have a positive effect on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations relevant to the priority area of 
technical safety.
Table 5
^ĐŽƌĞƐŽŶǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĚĞǆŝŶĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůŐƌŽƵƉϭ;EсϯϯͿ͕ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůŐƌŽƵƉϮ;EсϯϯͿĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽntrol 
ŐƌŽƵƉ;EсϯϯͿ͕ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐEKs-test of mean index difference and LSD-tests (hypothesis 2) 
 Exp. group 1࣊ Exp. group 2࣎ Contr. group Difference 
sĂƌŝĂďůĞƐͬŝŶĚĞǆ Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean diff gr. 1 Mean diff gr. 2 
TS1 .76 .44 .73 .45 .67 .48 .09 .06 
TS2 .70 .47 .64 .49 .61 .50 .09 .03 
TS3 .76 .44 .82 .39 .70 .47 .06 .12 
TS4 .88 .33 .85 .36 .55 .51 .33 .30 
TS5 .73 .45 .76 .44 .61 .50 .12 .15 
TS6 .79 .42 .85 .36 .67 .48 .12 .18 
TS7 .82 .39 .67 .48 .33 .48 .49 .34 
TS8 .67 .48 .73 .45 .64 .49 .03 .09 
Index (techn. saf.)ण 6.10 2.18 6.03 2.23 4.76 2.70 1.34࣏ 1.27࣐ 
࣊ WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝǀĞŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕࣎accident inspections 
ण EKs͗ĚĨсϮ͕ϵϲ͕&сϯ͘Ϯϵ͕Ɖс͘Ϭϰϭ͕࣏ LSD-ƚĞƐƚ͗Ɖс͘ϬϮϱ͕࣐ LSD-ƚĞƐƚ͗Ɖс͘Ϭϯϯ 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
To ensure that enterprises comply with national health and safety regulations, most countries across the 
world have implemented a system of labour inspection (ILO, 2013). However, few studies have attempted to 
examine the effect that labour inspections actually have on enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations. Some 
exceptions exist, but the methodological design of these studies (self-reports/cross-sectional) has some limitations 
in regard to interpretations of causality (e.g. Baldock et al., 2006). Thus, by applying an experimental research 
design and focusing on two priority areas (chemical hazards and technical safety) within the Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority (NLIA), the objective of the present study was to examine whether labour inspections carried 
out by the NLIA have an impact on enterprises’ compliance with national safety regulations.
By comparing inspected versus previously uninspected enterprises, via follow-up inspections conducted by 
inspectors from the NLIA, the results of the empirical analyses demonstrated that enterprises which had 
previously  been subject to inspections by the NLIA exhibit a significantly higher level of compliance with safety 
regulations compared to enterprises which not have been subject to inspections. Within the priority area of 
chemical hazards, the experimental group (previously inspected enterprises) scored 38.1% higher than the control 
group (previously uninspected enterprises) on the safety compliance index. The t-test confirmed that the mean 
score within the experimental group was significantly higher than the mean score of the control group, thus 
supporting hypothesis 1. Within the priority area of technical safety, the two experimental groups (preventive 
inspections and accident inspections) on average scored 26.7% higher than the control group on the safety 
compliance index. The ANOVA and the LSD post-hoc test confirmed that the mean score within both
experimental groups was significantly higher than the mean score of the control group, but that there was no 
significant difference between the two experimental groups, thus supporting hypothesis 2.
Owing to the fact that comparability between the experimental groups and the control groups was assured 
(at least on three variables) through matching pairs, it would be reasonable to conclude that the variation between 
the two groups’ level of compliance was caused by variation in the independent variable; labour inspection. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies of the impact that labour inspections have on enterprises’ compliance 
with safety regulations (Andersen et al., 2009; Baldock et al., 2006), but the methodological design of the present 
study provides higher internal validity with regard to inferences about the causal relationship.
The findings have important theoretical implications. As already described, safety researchers have 
traditionally been concerned with identifying the origins of non-compliance among frontline workers and to 
suggest effective measures which can be taken to improve individual safety compliance. Simultaneously, few 
studies have paid attention to compliance at the enterprise level and even fewer have examined the impact that 
labour inspections have on enterprises’ propensity to act in accordance with prevailing safety regulations. The 
findings of the present study should therefore fill a research gap within safety research and add new knowledge to 
our understanding of the impact of labour inspections.
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In a broader sense, the findings should also shed light on another under-researched topic within safety 
research, namely the causal relationship between company external factors and safety critical internal factors. As 
Kongsvik et al. (2012) previously have highlighted, there is a need to include external factors in order to more 
fully understand the state of safety within organizations. The findings of this study are an example of this, and 
they clearly illustrate a classical point made by Rasmussen (1997); that the socio-technical system which actually 
is involved in the creation of organizational safety extends far beyond a company’s internal conditions and, 
moreover, that it is the result of the interplay between actors operating on different societal levels.
In addition to these theoretical implications, the findings of the present study also have some important 
practical implications. As described in the introduction, non-compliance with safety rules and procedures is a 
common triggering factor of accidents at work. Hence, it needs to be dealt with. The findings of the present study 
indicate that labour inspections have a positive effect with regard to this. This is important. Because, as has been 
stressed by for example Levine et al. (2012), occupational health and safety regulators are surrounded by 
controversies, with some observers claiming that workplace inspections have no effect on workplace safety and 
others arguing that inspections improve workplace safety. The findings of the present study, including Levine et 
al.’s own study which focused on injury rates and inspections conducted by OSHA4, clearly support the latter 
group of observers. The findings should thus be a well-founded argument for the necessity of labour inspections in 
a period where (1) deregulation has been debated for a long time (Walters et al., 2011), (2) where a reduction in 
the frequency of labour inspections is a fact in many countries (e.g. Larsson, 1997; Tombs and Whyte, 2010; 
2012), and (3) where economic recession has led to funding cuts which in turn have forced regulatory authorities 
across several countries to limit their activities (Johnson, 2012).
However, the findings of the present study should be interpreted with some methodological limitations in 
mind. Firstly, the study deals only with short-term effects. All enterprises in the experimental groups that were 
included in the study had been subject to an inspection in the previous calendar year (at least 6 months and 
maximum 18 months before inclusion in the study). Thus, the findings do not offer information on long-term 
effects. It would therefore be useful for future research to replicate the present study over a longer time span. 
Secondly, the study was performed within the Norwegian context. Hence, the validity of the findings is, 
strictly speaking, restricted to inspections conducted by the NLIA. The conclusions that can be drawn from the 
study are thus not automatically generalizable to other regulatory regimes. The methodology which is developed 
in this study, however, should be applicable, with some adjustments to national variations, when assessing the 
effect of labour inspections within other regulatory regimes. 
Thirdly, the findings do not illuminate the causal mechanism between labour inspections and improved 
compliance. Thus, the study indicates that labour inspections performed by the NLIA have a positive impact on 
enterprises’ compliance with safety regulations, but it says less about why. It would be tempting to interpret the 
findings as a result of enforcement actions, and to conclude that compliance at the enterprise level can be 
improved by more enforcement and more use of coercive measures. However, as Wright and Marsden (2005) and 
Wright et al. (2005) have previously noted, non-compliance at the enterprise level is not only associated with 
deliberate attempts to ignore regulations, but more with a lack of knowledge and understanding of the regulations. 
If this is true, it is likely that the positive impact that labour inspections were found to have in the present study 
was caused more by guidance and information given during inspection than by formal orders or other coercive 
measures. The present study, however, does not provide sufficient information for robust conclusions to be drawn 
on this subject. It would therefore be valuable if future research could test and compare the impact of 
enforcement-only inspections versus guidance-only inspections.
6. CONCLUSION
The present study has demonstrated that enterprises which have been subject to inspections by the 
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authorities exhibit a significantly higher level of compliance with safety 
regulations compared to enterprises which not have been subject to such inspections. The methodological basis of 
the study was two field experiments which applied a post-test-only control group design that compared inspected 
versus previously uninspected enterprises. Comparability between the two groups of enterprises was assured 
through matching pairs. It is thus highly likely that the variation between the two groups’ level of compliance was 
caused by the fact that the one group of enterprises previously had been subject to inspection while the other had 
not. These findings are important considering the fact that non-compliance is a common triggering factor of 
accidents at work. The findings should also contribute with significant knowledge of the impact of labour 
4 OSHA: U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
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inspections and about the causal relationship between company external factors and safety critical internal factors. 
Also, the findings should be important in a time where deregulation, economic recession, funding cuts, and a
reduction in the frequency of labour inspections are affecting many countries.
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